part in any activity, either open or secret, aimed at subverting or overthrowing the government of a Member State. 8. The United Nations does not-and obviously cannot-have an investigation agency comparable to those at the disposal of national governments. Therefore, the United Nations must depend upon the governments of members for assistance in checking the character and record of staff members. The Secretary-General has had this assistance from many governments, but he has always reserved, and must always reserve, to himself the final decision on the basis of all the facts. 9. It is, moreover, of fundamental importance that the Organization should comply with elementary requirements of justice and fairness in dealing with individual cases. Vague suspicions without backing must not take the place of tangible and convincing evidence; idle or malicious accusations must be guarded against and arbitrary and hasty inferences must be avoided. In the words of the Assistant SecretaryGeneral for Administrative and Financial Services, in the memorandum attached to the present report as annex I, ". . . no organization dedicated to law and order in world affairs can hope to survive if its own administrative actions are arbitrary and precipitate, based on mere suspicion and devoid of the due process to which all civilized peoples are dedicated". 10. To place the problem in its proper setting, it should also be kept in mind that the Secretariat of the United Nations works in a glass house not only physically, but in every respect. It is not a profitable place for spies and saboteurs. Almost all meetings and documentation of the United Nations are open for all to see and hear. No military secrets are ever handled by the Secretariat. Furthermore, the policies and programmes of the United Nations in all fields, political, economic, social and financial, are determined by the governments of Member States, not by the Secretariat. The work of the Secretariat in carrying out these policies and programmes is subject to the constant scrutiny of the governments. PART I. GENERAL PERSONNEL POLICY PART II. THE PROBLEM OF ALLEGED SUBVERSIVE A. BACKGROUND (1) Introduction 44. As indicated in the Introduction to the present report, allegations by United States authorities of subversive activities by certain staff members have been causing increasing concern and discussion. In the present section the factual background of this issue will be 1 Not reprinted here. summarized. Reference will be made to various documents annexed to the report where a more complete account may be found. 45. It should be noted that, with a single exception, no staff member has ever been indicted or charged in any court with espionage or any other subversive activity. In one case a staff member-not of the United States nationality-was convicted of espionage in the United States and left the country. The espionage in no way related to the staff member's functions as a United Nations official. In a further case a staff member-also not of United States nationality-was terminated while on home leave, after the United States Government said he had attempted espionage. (2) Information supplied by the United States of America relating to staff members 46. The history of the discussions between the Secretary-General and the United States of America regarding information about possible subversive activities on the part of staff members and applicants of United States nationality is given in full in the memorandum of the Assistant Secretary-General for Administrative and Financial Services, transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representative of the United States on 23 December 1952 which is reproduced in annex I to the present report. Requests for information were made as early as 1946. Beginning in 1950, the United States Mission gave the Secretary-General adverse evaluations or comments from time to time regarding a few Americans. These comments were not accompanied by any evidence. They were in such terms as "reject", "questionable", or "incomplete". The total number of persons so commented upon was less than 3 per cent of the more than 2,000 Americans in the Secretariat. In some cases additional confidential information was obtained from reliable sources which was sufficient to enable the Secretary-General to reach a decision. In most of these cases, however, he was left with no more than the bare adverse comments, which served only as a basis for further examination of each case. (3) Investigations by a Special Federal Grand Jury 47. In 1952, a Special Federal Grand Jury 2 impanelled by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York conducted an investigation of possible violations of United States law by United States citizens who were members of the Secretariat. The scope of this investigation was described by the Grand Jury in a presentment prepared at the termination of its service as follows: "Our investigation has not been concerned in any way with the United Nations itself-its policies, objectives, or its internal affairs. 1 Not reprinted here. Unlike the petty or trial jury, the Grand Jury does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused individual but only decides whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant a prosecution. It is thus an accusatorial and investigatory, rather than a judicial body. It is considered, however, a part of the court and is not an agency of the prosecuting attorney. (Footnote in original.) 415900-57-22 Our sole concern and effort has been directed toward the possible violations of law by United States citizens whose activities are indisputably within our jurisdiction. Consequently, only United States citizens have been called as witnesses by us, and their interrogation has been scrupulously confined to matters unrelated to their official activities in the United Nations", 48. It was reported orally to the Secretary-General that during this investigation several staff members refused, on the ground of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, to answer questions about associations and activities outside the United Nations. Some of these staff members had never been adversely commented upon by the United States. The Secretary-General at once requested a copy of the record of the Grand Jury proceedings, or at least some official statement of what took place, but this request was denied on the ground that it could not legally be complied with. 49. On 2 December 1952, the Grand Jury made public a presentment which it submitted to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. This presentment contained no indictments and mentioned no names. It set forth certain conclusions and made certain recommendations. Among the conclusions were statements that there was "infiltration into the United Nations of an overwhelmingly large group of disloyal United States citizens", and that this situation constituted a menace to the security of the United States. The Grand Jury recommended among other things that no United States citizens should be permitted to accept employment with the United Nations without prior clearance by the United States Government; that staff members and applicants of United States nationality should be required to fill out an application form designed to elicit information on subversive activities; and that another Grand Jury should continue the investigation. 50. On the following day, the Secretary-General formally addressed the United States Mission asking that, in fairness to himself and the staff, he be given either the Grand Jury records or at least an official statement of specific evidence. The text of the letter follows: "My dear Senator Austin, "You are aware of my great concern over recent disclosures regarding United States citizens on my staff charged with having engaged in subversive activities and of the measures I have taken to meet this problem in a manner satisfactory to both the United Nations and its host country. "I should like to express my appreciation to you for the assistance given to me by the United States Mission in regard to this problem and in particular for having made available to me the official records of the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee relating to personnel of the Secretariat. I have found these records most helpful. "In this morning's paper I have read the presentment of the Federal Grand Jury 'on disloyalty of certain United States citizens at the 1 For its text, see the New York Times, Dec. 3, 1952. United Nations' which was submitted to the United States District Court yesterday. This presentment, as you are no doubt aware, contains a number of conclusions involving serious charges against members of the staff of the United Nations who are not specifically identified. "Although these conclusions bear directly on my responsibility as Secretary-General I have not received the records of the Grand Jury proceedings, nor have I received official information setting forth the facts on which the conclusions of the Grand Jury have been based. I am sure you will agree that in view of the conclusions made public there should be made available to me either the records of the Grand Jury relating to personnel of the United Nations, or, if this cannot be done, an official statement of the specific evidence on which the conclusions of the Grand Jury have been based. I wish to assure you that any such information declared to be confidential will be held by me in strict confidence. "In this connexion, I should like to draw your attention to the recent opinion submitted to me by a commission of eminent jurists which recommended that if the Secretary-General is satisfied that he has reasonable grounds for believing that a member of the staff is engaged or is likely to engage in activities regarded as disloyal by the host country the officer concerned should no longer be employed in that country. "The Commission pointed out that where such allegations have been made against a staff member a full inquiry by the Secretary-General is required and that in such an inquiry it would be highly desirable if the Member State in question could give the Secretary-General not only the general conclusions but also the evidence upon which the Member State has come to that conclusion. They state in this connexion 'to put the Secretary-General on inquiry and to withhold the evidence places him in a position of great embarrassment'. It is recognized by the Commission of Jurists that the information received would have to be kept confidential if the Member State so requests. "In view of the wide publicity given to the conclusions of the Grand Jury I consider it highly desirable, indeed essential in fairness to me and my staff, that the evidence for the conclusions be made available to me as quickly as possible. I should be most grateful for your assistance in this respect. "Sincerely yours, (Signed) TRYGVE LIE 51. On 28 January 1953, the Permanent Representative of the United States replied that the Secretary-General's request had been transmitted to the Department of State, and referred to the Department of Justice. The note continued: "As has been communicated informally to the Assistant SecretaryGeneral in charge of Administrative and Financial Services, the Representative of the United States has been advised that in the view of the Department of Justice that Department is forced to adhere to its construction of Rule 6 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as prohibiting the disclosure by that Department to the SecretaryGeneral of any testimony or proceedings before the Federal Grand Jury, for which request was made by the Secretary-General. In this connexion, however, the Department of Justice has pointed out that the procedure established by the Executive Order issued by the President of the United States on 9 January 1953 has been devised especially to make available to the Secretary-General information upon which he may take action as contemplated by the report of the Commission of Jurists established by him". (4) Investigations by the Internal Security Sub-Committee of the United States Senate 1 52. The Internal Security Sub-Committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee has, during the past year, investigated, among other matters, United States employees of the United Nations suspected of subversive activities. The investigations of this Sub-Committee were conducted under Senate resolutions which direct a continuing study of the administration, operation and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and of other laws relating to espionage, sabotage and the protection of the internal security of the United States, and also of the extent, nature and effects of subversive activities in the United States. 2 53. The scope and purpose of the investigation of United Nations staff members of American nationality was more specifically defined by the Acting Chairman of the Sub-Committee at the opening of public hearings in New York in October 1952 when he stated: "This Sub-Committee will take testimony to determine whether United States citizens who, even though they are United Nations employees, have been engaged in subversive activities which are clearly beyond the scope of their employment. Our interest in this inquiry is solely to safeguard the internal security of the United States. This is in no sense an investigation into the United Nations or the functions of the United Nations". 58. During the course of the investigations of the Senate SubCommittee, a number of senators issued strongly worded statements on the necessity of eliminating disloyal United States citizens from the Secretariat. A ruling made on 15 October 1952 by the Acting Chairman of the Sub-Committee is reproduced in the Opinion of the Commission of Jurists (annex III). This statement concerns the right of United States citizens who are staff members of the United Nations to refuse, on the ground of United Nations immunity, to testify about acts performed by them in their official capacity and falling within their functions. 1 S. Res. 7, 81st Cong., 1st sess., and S. Res. 366, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 2 PL 831, 81st Cong., 2d sess., approved Sept. 23, 1950; 64 Stat. 987. 3 Not reprinted here. |