pushed preparation for war. The Soviet Union has forced countries to rearm for their self-defense.

Fourth, the use by Soviet leaders of the international Communist movement for direct and indirect aggression has been a great source of trouble in the world. With words which play upon honest aspirations and grievances the Soviet leaders have manipulated the people of other states as pawns of Russian imperialism.

Fifth, the Soviet use of violence to impose its will and its political system upon other people is a threat to the peace. There is nothing unusual in the fact that those who believe in some particular social order want to spread it throughout the world. But as one of my predecessors, Secretary Adams, said of the efforts of an earlier Russian ruler, Czar Alexander, to establish the Holy Alliance,' the Emperor "finds a happy coincidence between the dictates of his conscience and the interests of his empire." The combination of this international ambition and the Soviet reliance on force and violencethough it be camouflaged as civil war is a barrier to peaceful relations.

2

This conduct conflicts with the Charter of the United Nations. It conflicts with the "Essentials of Peace" Resolution passed at our last Assembly. It has created a great and terrible peril for the rest of the world.

Even this conduct has not made war inevitable-we, for our part, do not accept the idea that war is inevitable. But it has lengthened the shadow of war. This fact cannot be obscured by propaganda which baits the hooks with words of peace and, in doing so, profanes the highest aspirations of mankind.

There is only one real way the world can maintain peace and security in the face of this conduct. That is by strengthening its system of collective security. Our best hope of peace lies in our ability to make absolutely plain to potential aggressors that aggression cannot succeed. The security of those nations who want peace and the security of the United Nations itself demand the strength to prevent further acts of aggression.

One of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations, as expressed in article 1 of the Charter, is that it shall ". . . take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace

The action of the United Nations to put down the aggression which began on June 25 against the Republic of Korea was exactly the effective collective measure required. It marked a turning point in history, for it showed the way to an enforceable rule of law among nations.

Treaty of Sept. 26, 1815; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. III, pp.

211-212.

Instruction of July 5, 1820, to the American Minister at St. Petersburg; Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine (Department of State publication 37; 1930), pp. 80-82.

A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 951-952.

The world waits to see whether we can build on the start we have made. The United Nations must move forward energetically to develop a more adequate system of collective security. If it does not move forward, it will move back.

Article 24 of the Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace. This is the way it should be. But if the Security Council is not able to act because of the obstructive tactics of a permanent member, the Charter does not leave the United Nations impotent. The obligation of all members to take action to maintain or restore the peace does not disappear because of a veto. The Charter, in articles 10, 11, and 14, also vests in the General Assembly authority and responsibility for matters affecting international peace. The General Assembly can and should organize itself to discharge its responsibility promptly and decisively if the Security Council is prevented from acting.

To this end, the United States delegation is placing before the Assembly a number of recommendations designed to increase the effectiveness of United Nations action against aggression.

This program will include the following proposals:

First, a provision for the calling of an emergency session of the General Assembly upon 24 hours' notice if the Security Council is prevented from acting upon a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.

Second, the establishment by the General Assembly of a security patrol, a peace patrol, to provide immediate and independent observation and reporting from any area in which international conflict threatens, upon the invitation or with the consent of the state visited.

Third, a plan under which each member nation would designate within its national armed forces a United Nations unit or units, to be specially trained and equipped and continuously maintained in readiness for prompt service on behalf of the United Nations. To assist in the organization, training, and equipping of such units, we will suggest that a United Nations military adviser be appointed. Until such time as the forces provided for under article 43 are made available to the United Nations, the availability of these national units will be an important step toward the development of a worldwide security system.

Fourth, the establishment by the General Assembly of a committee to study and report on means which the United Nations might use through collective action-including the use of armed force-to carry out the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The United States delegation shall request that these proposals be added as an item to the agenda. It is the hope of our delegation that the Assembly will act on these and other suggestions which may be offered for the strengthening of our collective security system.

In so doing, we must keep clearly before the world the purpose of our collective security system, so that no one can make any mistake about it.

We need this defensive strength against further aggression in order to pass through this time of tension without catastrophe and to reach

a period when genuine negotiation may take its place as the normal means of settling disputes.

This perspective is reflected in the proposals of the SecretaryGeneral for a 20-year program, a perspective from which we can derive the steadiness and patience required of us.

This perspective takes into account the possibility that the Soviet Government may not be inherently and unalterably committed to standing in the way of peace and that it may some day accept a liveand-let-live philosophy.

The Soviet leaders are realists, in some respects at least. As we succeed in building the necessary economic and defensive military strength, it will become clear to them that the non-Soviet world will neither collapse nor be dismembered piecemeal. Some modification. in their aggressive policies may follow if they then recognize that the best interests of the Soviet Union require a cooperative relationship with the outside world.

Time may have its effect. It is but 33 years since the overthrow of the Czarist regime in Russia. This is a short time in history. Like many other social and political movements before it, the Soviet revolution may change. In so doing, it may rid itself of the policies which now prevent the Soviet Union from living as a good neighbor with the rest of the world.

We have no assurance that this will take place. But, as the United Nations strengthens its collective security system, the possibilities of this change in Soviet policy will increase. If this does not occur, the increase in our defensive strength shall be the means of insuring our survival and protecting the essential values of our societies.

But our hope is that a strong collective security system will make genuine negotiation possible and that this will in turn lead to a cooperative peace.

It is the firm belief of the people and the Government of the United States that the United Nations will play an increasingly important role in the world during the period ahead as we try to move safely through the present tensions.

I have already stressed the importance we attach to the United Nations as the framework of an effective system of collective security. The steps we take to strengthen our collective security are not only essential to the survival of the United Nations, but will contribute positively toward its development. The close ties of a common defense are developing an added cohesion among regional groups. This is a significant step toward a closer relationship among nations and is part of the process of growth by which we are moving toward a larger sense of community under the United Nations.

The United States also attaches importance to the universal character of the United Nations, which enables it to serve as a point of contact between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world during this period of tension.

As our efforts to strengthen the collective security system become more and more effective, and as tensions begin to ease, we believe See supra, doc. 2.

that the United Nations will be increasingly important as a means of facilitating and encouraging productive negotiation.

The United States is ready and will always be ready and willing to negotiate with a sincere desire to solve problems. We shall continue to hope that some time negotiation will not be merely an occasion for propaganda.

Solving the many difficult problems in the world must, of course, be a gradual process. It will not be achieved miraculously, overnight, by a sudden dramatic gesture. It will come about step by step. We must seek to solve such problems as we can, and endure the others until they too can be solved.

Among the immediately pressing problems which require the attention of the General Assembly are the aggression against the Republic of Korea, and the problem of Formosa.

In a special and indeed a unique sense, the Republic of Korea is a responsibility of the United Nations. The actions of this Assembly, in its sessions of 1947 and 1948, outlined the United Nations aspirations for its future. Before the aggression of last June, the failure to achieve these purposes had been a matter of deep disappointment and concern. The aggression of June 25 raised a new challenge, which was met by the stout action to which I have already referred. I have every belief and confidence that this challenge and defiance to the authority of the United Nations will be crushed as it deserves to be, and that thereafter the future of this small and gallant country may be returned where it belongs to the custody of its own people under the guidance of the United Nations.

From the outset, the United States has given its full support to the actions of this Assembly and of the Security Council. We shall continue to support the decisions of the United Nations as the future course of events unfolds.

We shall do our full part to maintain the impressive unity which has thus far been demonstrated in Korea.

The aggressive attack upon the Republic of Korea created the urgent necessity for the military neutralization of the island of Formosa. The President of the United States, in announcing on June 27 the measures taken to effect this neutralization, emphasized that these measures were to prevent military attack either by mainland forces against Formosa or by forces from Formosa against the mainland.2 The President made it clear at that time and on several subsequent occasions, that these measures were taken without prejudice to the future political status of Formosa, and that the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position or privileges with respect to Formosa.

It is the belief of my Government that the problem of Formosa and the nearly 8 million people who inhabit it should not be settled by force or by unilateral action. We believe that the international com

1 See Resolutions 112 (II) of Nov. 14, 1947 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 677-678) and 195 (III) of Dec. 12, 1948 (General Assembly, Official Record, Third Session, Part I, Resolutions (A/810), pp. 25–27).

2 See infra, pp. 2539-2540.

munity has a legitimate interest and concern in having this matter settled by peaceful means.

Accordingly, the United States delegation proposes that the General Assembly should direct its attention to the solution of this problem under circumstances in which all concerned and interested parties shall have a full opportunity to express their views, and under which all concerned parties will agree to refrain from the use of force while a peaceful and equitable solution is sought.

We shall therefore request that the question of Formosa be added to the agenda as a matter of special and urgent importance.

Advances which can be made on these specific issues, and the improvement which can result from an effective collective security system, may help the United Nations to move in the direction of settlement of further disputes.

We also anticipate that, as our collective security system is strengthened, our efforts to achieve the regulation of armaments may then begin to be productive.

1

My country reaffirms its support of the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy which would effectively prohibit atomic weapons. We will continue to give sympathetic consideration to any other proposals that would be equally or more effective in accomplishing this purpose. We reaffirm our support of the efforts of the United Nations to work out the basis for effective regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.2 In talking about disarmament, we must keep one elementary point absolutely clear: that is, that the heart and core of any real disarmament is confidence that agreements are being carried out by every armed nation. No one nation can have such confidence, unless it has knowledge of the real facts in other countries. Such knowledge can come only from international controls based upon free international inspection in every country. There are no safe short-cuts.

Disarmament has been the subject of a great deal of propaganda effort, and this will doubtless continue to be the case. To those who advance various disarmament plans for propaganda purposes, the United Nations has only to ask this simple question: If you mean what you say, are you willing to take the first step? That first step is the acceptance of effective safeguards under the United Nations. There can be no other basis for disarmament. Only when every nation is willing to move into an era of open and friendly cooperation in the world community will we begin to get genuine progress toward dis

armament.

We believe nevertheless that efforts in this direction should continue, that plans should be made, and negotiations should go on. This subject is of such vital significance that no stone should be left unturned, in the hope that these efforts will someday be successful.

I have stressed the work we must do to strengthen and develop our collective security system. This is something none of us wants to 1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 1135. Ibid., pp. 1136-1143, and infra, pp. 2739-2745.