McCormick stated that the errors which had taken place were fully understandable in view of the tremendous task of co-ordinating international forces of such size and complexity, and that the lessons learned would be invaluable to future planning.

Lest the number and variety of ships and aircraft having undergone NATO training present too optimistic a picture of the forces available to SACLANT for the accomplishment of his mission, it must be placed on record that there is at present a grave shortage of escort vessels and maritime aircraft.

In Allied Command Europe most of the manoeuvres were designed to integrate the forces of countries, unaccustomed to working together, into a co-ordinated fighting machine, and to practise headquarters and staffs in their wartime role. During division and corps manoeuvres the co-operation of air forces with ground forces was stressed, logistical support was emphasized, and inter-allied liaison co-operation practised when possible. The following are examples of exercises held in Allied Command Europe in 1953:

1. Exercise "Italic Weld" was conducted in the general area of Northern Italy during August. It involved the land, air and naval forces of the United States and Italy, together with the air forces of Greece and Turkey.

2. Exercise "Weld Fast" was conducted in the general area of Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea during October, and involved naval and air forces of the NATO Southern Command and the Greek and Turkish air and land forces. It was designed to test the training and co-operation of assigned and earmarked forces in Southern Europe.

3. Exercise "Grand Repulse" was held in Germany near Osnabruck during September by the British Army of the Rhine and the Netherlands Corps together with considerable air participation from the Allied air forces of Central Europe.

4. Although atomic conditions had been simulated in earlier exercises, Exercise "Monte Carlo", conducted by the Central Army Group during September, was the first instance of a NATO air-ground exercise in which atomic weapons were simulated for manoeuvre purposes. The forces included United States, Belgian and French troops, and the area of manoeuvre was in Germany along the east bank of the Middle Rhine.

The combat efficiency of the armed forces of a coalition largely depends on the extent to which the various national components are trained on uniform lines and use the same systems of staff work and the same operational procedures and techniques. As explained in Chapter VII, the Military Agency for Standardisation is responsible, inter alia, for studying and fostering the standardisation of operational and administrative practices throughout the armed forces of all member countries: and international exercises have provided op

1 Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic until April 1954. report.]

2 NÁTO: The First Five Years, pp. 79-80.

[Footnote in original

portunities for these "back-room" studies to be tested out in practice. As a result, remarkable progress has been made in all directions, particularly in respect of naval and air forces.

It must of course be remembered that the North Atlantic coalition started off with the advantage that many of the member countries had had experience of working together as Allies in World War II; and that there were a number of officers and men still serving in the armed forces of those countries who were available to apply that experience to the new conditions and to place it at the disposal of the Allies as a whole.

THE TRAINING OF RESERVES

While Supreme Commanders are responsible for international manoeuvres, the training of reserves is a national responsibility. Reserve training liability varies considerably amongst the NATO countries. The importance of this training can hardly be exaggerated, since the successful defence of Western Europe would largely depend upon the combat efficiency of the reserve formations and the speed with which they can be mobilised and brought into action.

The limiting factor is money. Indeed two member states carried out no reserve training in 1953 simply because they could not afford it. On the other hand, the larger proportion of European members of the Alliance did carry out practice mobilisation and training of reserves in varying degrees in 1953 and 1954.

Belgium mobilised a complete division, which trained for 30 days and carried out divisional manoeuvres. It also called up certain other nondivisional troops for training. France called up sufficient reservists to bring three semi-active divisions to full strength. These, as well as many corps and army troops, were then engaged in training. Luxembourg called up and trained a brigade headquarters and two battalions. The Netherlands mobilised one division which trained as a complete formation: another division was called up for brigade training. Portugal called up reservists for a divisional exercise. Greece, in this particular period, was only able to call up one battalion. In the United Kingdom, all Territorial Army formations, and some Army Emergency Reserve units carried out annual training, including fourteen days in camp. Early in 1954, Norway carried out winter manoeuvres which involved calling up three reservist brigades, two divisional headquarters with divisional supporting units and certain local defence units. Manoeuvres were then held involving two divi

sions.

Air Training Problems: To help nations, themselves lacking in the facilities for training aircrews, the United States and Canada have sponsored an important training scheme for pilots, navigators and radar observers from other NATO countries. Up to the end of 1953, approximately 2,200 pilots and 2,400 other specialised aircrew from other NATO countries had been trained in Canada and the United States. The United States has also provided trainer aircraft to enable European countries to expand their own training programmes. Mention has been made in Chapter VII of the Air Training Advisory

Group which was established to advise and assist nations on air training problems. All these efforts have been successful not only in meeting the initial heavy demand for aircrews, but also in providing crews for the frontline aircraft which are planned to be available in 1955.

To improve NATO training as a whole, a number of specialist schools have accepted students from other NATO nations which do not have the same facilities. Amongst these are the French Combined Training Establishment at Arzew (Algeria), the School of Land-Air Warfare at Old Sarum (UK), the joint Anti-Submarine School at Londonderry (UK), the technical and maintenance schools of the United States Army in Germany and the United States Weapons Schools at Garmisch (Western Germany), which trains Allied Commanders and staff officers in the military implications of atomic weapons. In addition, SHAPE Military Missions are operating in the Netherlands, Portugal and Luxembourg, which all asked for help in their training problems.

During 1953, considerable progress was made towards improving the logistics situation. For example, reserve stocks of most of the member countries which had been dangerously low, particularly in ammunition-were increased, although substantial shortages still exist today. The combat efficiency of NATO armed forces has also been considerably enhanced by the progress of the common infra-structure programme, described in the next chapter.2

FORCES WITH SPECIALISED MISSIONS

There are certain military forces not assigned or earmarked to any of the Supreme Commands, but which are nevertheless of great value to NATO. Although these forces are retained directly under national command their potential contributions to the defence of the West are massive and might be decisive. For example, the United States Strategic Air Command, based largely in North Africa, the British Isles and the United States, is of particular importance as a deterrent force. Similarly, the United Kingdom Bomber Command is equipped and trained for strategic air operations. The United Kingdom also has a large interceptor force for the defence of the British Isles. Finally, each NATO country is responsible for the defence of its own coastal waters, and therefore retains some naval forces primarily equipped for inshore minesweeping, harbour defence and similar tasks. PROGRESS IN 1953

The progress made during the year 1953 may be summarised as follows. In land forces there was little numerical increase, but their efficiency had considerably improved as a result of combined training; while support units increased during the year by 40 per cent.

The number of aircraft increased by about 30 per cent, with again a major improvement in quality, particularly in the provision of

1 NATO, the First Five Years, pp. 80-81.

2 Chapter X, ibid., pp. 114-124.

modern jet types. At the same time there was a steady improvement in the numbers and quality of air and ground crews.

The naval forces actually in commission, and those immediately available in case of war, did not increase greatly in number during 1953, but they were better trained to work together.

If we now attempt to sum up NATO's accomplishments in the military field, we find that three years after Allied Command Europe began to function, the land forces directly available to NATO have increased to some 100 divisions-both active and reserve-in varying states of combat readiness. It must be realised, of course, that this improvement is due partly to increases in the forces of the original member states, and partly to the addition of the Greek and Turkish forces which joined the Alliance in 1952: this latter contribution must be balanced against the additional responsibility accepted by NATO in South Eastern Europe. The progress is, nevertheless, impressive. In the air, NATO has almost doubled its strength, and there are some 125 air bases available to the NATO squadrons. As regards naval forces, large building and modernisation programmes have been undertaken, with the result that the number of additional ships available for commissioning after mobilisation has increased by some 30 per cent since 1951 and they are of higher technical quality.

On the 15th December, 1953, the North Atlantic Council met to carry out their annual examination of the progress of NATO forces, and to take decisions which would govern the future conduct of policy. They concluded that their assessment of Soviet policy and capabilities required that the military plans of the Alliance should be based on the expectations of a continuing threat to the security of the North Atlantic Community over a long period. Accordingly, they agreed that it would be necessary for member countries to support over a long period of years forces which, by their balance, quality and efficiency of armament, would be a major factor in contributing to the effective security of the NATO area. In other words the Council contemplated a "long haul".

In furtherance of this policy, the Council resolved that member governments, the International Staff, and the NATO military authorities should have as their future military objectives the development of a balanced collective force, both active and reserve, planned to meet a continuing threat, maintained in the highest practicable state of readiness, and supported by adequate reserves of material.

The NATO military authorities were directed, inter alia:

1. to keep under continuous review, within the framework of the agreed strategic concept, the size and nature of the forces required to defend the NATO area, taking account of developments in military technology, Soviet capabilities, and the overall strategic situation, in order to provide general guidance to NATO defence planning.

2. to press on with their reassessment of the most effective pattern of military strength in the next few years within the resources which it is anticipated may be made available.

1 See the Council's communiqué of Dec. 16, 1953; supra, pp. 1633-1636.

THE FUTURE

The problem before NATO in 1954 has changed since the hectic days of early 1951, and even since the balanced appraisal at Lisbon in February, 1952. NATO's present task is not only to maintain the armed strength in being, or coming into being, but also steadily to improve its quality, in spite of the fact that economic difficulties still persist, and that there is perhaps a diminished sense of urgency. The advent of new weapons has also set a difficult problem, which is now being studied by NATO's Supreme Commanders. When the results of these studies have been considered by the Standing Group and by the Military Committee, the Council will receive their recommendations, and make their decisions. Until this has been done, it would be both unwise and misleading to hazard any guess as to the future. At present it can only be surmised that the existing conventional forces will have to be maintained until and unless it is clearly shown that the advance of science has rendered them obsolete. This chapter may well conclude with extracts from statements made by NATO Commanders in 1954.

In January, General Gruenther said:

We have .. an air-ground shield which, although still not strong enough, would force an enemy to concentrate prior to attack. In doing so, the concentrating force would be extremely vulnerable to losses from atomic weapon attacks. We can now use atomic weapons against an aggressor, delivered not only by long-range aircraft, but also by the use of shorter range planes, and by 280 mm. artillery. This air-ground team constitutes a very effective shield, and it would fight very well in case of attack. We think that it is of such strength that the Soviets do not now have in occupied Europe sufficient air and ground forces to be certain of overwhelming this shield. Of course, the Soviets can move in additional forces to overcome that deficiency. But if they do, we should be able to get some warning of an impending attack. As a result of that warning, we ought to be able to increase our defensive strength considerably. In particular, we should be able to alert our air forces.1

In June, 1954, General Gruenther told the English-Speaking Union in London that NATO had available 90 to 100 divisions in varying degrees of readiness, i. e., three to four times as much land power available as when General Eisenhower first took command. "The air build-up has been even greater", General Gruenther stated. Indeed, he went so far as to say that, in his judgment, the Soviet would in the end be severely defeated if it attacked the Western Powers in 1954. Nevertheless, he added the warning that this situation might not endure, and that he doubted whether time was on the side of the Alliance.

On the naval side, let us turn to Admiral McCormick's report to the Standing Group in April, 1954. He pointed out the considerable progress which has been made within the Atlantic Command in the

1 Statement of Jan. 3, 1954; New York Times, Jan. 4, 1954.

2 Address of June 8, 1954; excerpts in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, June 19-26, 1954, p. 13640.