of the Communists to halt the unloading and transfer of military supplies.

Every French official and political leader with whom I talked believes that confidence in the ability to build an effective defense is growing among the French people. This is important and must be given weight, for you will agree with me that it is a necessity that those in public [life] be able to appraise correctly the opinion of their people.

I have discussed France at some length because the movement in France toward defense is in a sense typical of Europe. With the possible exception of Italy, the magnitude of the efforts made in other countries is not yet so great, but in each country, defense budgets have been increased, military forces are being increased, reorganized, and equipped. Confidence is growing among the people.

ITALY

The strong desire of Italy, limited by its peace treaty, to participate in European defense, its vigorous Government, and the recent defections in the Communist Party, are characteristic evidences of this confidence.

I do not want to exaggerate. It is certain that Europe could not defend itself now against Soviet aggression. It is certain that its programs are yet inadequate. But it is a growing, developing process that can succeed with our help.

FAITH IN U. S. BUILDS CONFIDENCE

My last conclusion, and one which I emphasize most strongly, is that the magnitude and adequacy of the European defense effort and the speed with which it moves will depend at last upon the confidence of the people of Europe that it has a reasonable chance of

success.

The indispensable requirement in building that confidence is that the United States will participate fully in the defense of Europe in the air, on the seas, and I emphasize, on the land.

If there is belief in the constancy of our policy, if there is faith that we will carry out every obligation of the North Atlantic Treaty, that we will join in the defense of Europe in the initial stages of an assault, should it come, there will be a defense of Europe. Without that faith, the effort which is necessary will not be made.

This is applicable to Germany. There I talked to a larger number of people than in any other country. I am certain that they have made their choice with the West. Eight million expellees and hundreds of thousands of veterans who were war prisoners of the Russians know their cruelty and tyranny. But the Germans are exposed. They will not arm before there is some assurance of security. They do not believe there will be such assurance without United States participation in defense.

I make it clear that this is not a proposal to defend Europe singlehanded. I found no official in Europe who believed that the United

States should or would defend Europe alone. Everyone understands that the United Kingdom, and every European treaty member, must contribute fully, but everyone knows that without the full participation of the United States at this time, defense is impossible.

It may be said that we have committed ourselves to mutual defense by the North Atlantic pact. But there is a vast difference between the statement of a commitment made in the best of faith and in providing the means to make the commitment effective. The Korean experience emphasizes the difficulty and time necessary to transport men and equipment after an assault has commenced. However good our intentions, it is doubtful that we would be able to transport men and equipment to Europe in time, once an assault has started. The people of Europe have suffered one occupation. They know that a Soviet occupation would stamp out the elements of resistance and then civilization. Their interest is in an effective defense.

This means that the United States and Great Britain must commit men and equipment to deter an assault or to defend against it if it

comes.

Will these decisions provoke an attack? I would like to report to the Committee that every official, every party leader, every labor leader with whom I talked expressed the opinion that the commitment of additional troops would not cause Soviet action. All said that to fail to defend ourselves would ultimately encourage Soviet aggression or would bring about the loss of Europe through subversion, hopelessness, and despair.

PURPOSE OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

I would like to emphasize, as so many have done, that the great purpose of the pact is not to be found in article 5 and the measures which would be taken in the event of war.

The great purposes of the pact are to deter aggression, to prevent war, and to build such military and economic strength, and a unity that in time may enable us to escape the impasse which binds us today. The people of Europe and Great Britain are tremendously tired of war. Around them are the monuments of destruction. The best of a generation of young men are gone. Their civilian populations have suffered material and psychological wounds that we have not experienced. They do not have our resources, or industrial plants, yet there is a growing determination to make the effort and sacrifice for defense.

U.S. OBLIGATIONS AND LEADERSHIP

In summing up, I make these points:

First. There is a full understanding in Europe of the aggressive purposes of Soviet Russia and of their threat to Europe.

Second.-The Governments have made the decision that the defense of Europe must be constructed to deter aggression and to withstand it if attacked.

415900-57-100

Third. The peoples are awakening and will make the great effort to build a defense if they have reasonable confidence that it will succeed.

Fourth. The absolute requirement for that confidence is the full participation of the United States in the defense of Europe with ground forces as well as sea and air forces.

Fifth. The question which is now being debated, that is the sending of additional troops by the United States to Europe, is crucial. If a decision emerges from this debate which denies the use of ground troops or so limits their use as to cast doubt on our purpose to stand with Europe, it could kill the effort and the confidence now developing. A decision of approval will give them impetus and lead toward success. The decision of the President to send additional troops to Europe was courageous and right. This Committee, the Congress, and the people of the United States have a difficult decision to make. A failure to act could well be the greatest surrender in history. I cannot believe that the United States-which more than any other nation holds the ability to tip the scales toward peace by deterring aggression, the ability to sustain the vitality and force of the democratic idea in the world-will fail.

I hope that the pending resolution will be defeated and that a majority of both parties will vote against it.

26. SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 18 (82d Congress, 1st Session), APRIL 4, 19512

Whereas the foreign policy and military strength of the United States are dedicated to the protection of our national security, the preservation of the liberties of the American people, and the maintenance of world peace; and

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty, approved by the Senate by a vote of 82-13, is a major and historic act designed to build up the collective strength of the free peoples of the earth to resist aggression and to preserve world peace; and

Whereas the security of the United States and its citizens is involved with the security of its partners under the North Atlantic Treaty, and the commitments of that treaty are therefore an essential part of the foreign policy of the United States; and

Whereas article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty pledges that the United States and the other parties thereto "separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"; and

1 See the President's statement of Sept. 9, 1950; supra, p. 1504.

2 Congressional Record, vol. 97, pp. 2363, 3294. S. Res. 99, adopted this same date, was identical in language to S. Con. Res. 18 with the substitution of the word "Senate" for "Congress" wherever it appears in the text, and with the omission of "Turkey and Greece" in paragraph 9. S. Con. Res. 18 was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Apr. 6, 1951. No additional parlia mentary action was taken.

Whereas recent events have threatened world peace and as a result all parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are individually and collectively mobilizing their productive capacities and manpower for their self-defense; and

Whereas the free nations of Europe are vital centers of civilization, freedom, and production, and their subjugation by totalitarian forces would weaken and endanger the defensive capacity of the United States and the other free nations; and

Whereas the success of our common defense effort under a unified command requires the vigorous action and the full cooperation of all treaty partners in the supplying of materials and men on a fair and equitable basis, and General Eisenhower has testified that the "bulk" of the land forces should be supplied by our European allies and that such numbers supplied should be the "major fraction" of the total number:1

Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That

1. The Congress approves the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defensive effort of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by designating, at their unanimous request, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in placing Armed Forces of the United States in Europe under his command;

2. It is the belief of the Congress that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area;

3. It is the sense of the Congress that the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, before taking action to send units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, should consult the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and that he should likewise consult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

4. It is the sense of the Congress that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are giving, and have agreed to give, full, realistic force and effect to the requirement of article 3 of said treaty that "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" they will "maintain and develop their

1 This portion of General Eisenhower's testimony, given in executive session, was not printed in Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st Session, on .S Con. Res. 8, etc.

individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," specifically insofar as the creation of combat units is concerned;

5. The Congress herewith approves the understanding that the major contribution to the ground forces under General Eisenhower's command should be made by the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that such units of United States ground forces as may be assigned to the above command shall be so assigned only after the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion such assignment is a necessary step in strengthening the security of the United States; and the certified opinions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States, and to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, and to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services as soon as they are received;

6. It is the sense of the Congress that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and the Congress hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe, but it is the sense of the Congress that no ground troops in addition to such four divisions should be sent to Western Europe in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty without further congressional approval;

7. It is the sense of the Congress that the President should submit to the Congress at intervals of not more than 6 months reports on the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, including such information as may be made available for this purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

8. It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should seek to eliminate all provisions of the existing treaty with Italy which impose limitations upon the military strength of Italy and prevent the performance by Italy of her obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty to contribute to the full extent of her capacity to the defense of Western Europe;

9. It is the sense of the Congress that consideration should be given to the revision of plans for the defense of Europe as soon as possible so as to provide for utilization on a voluntary basis of the military and other resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece, but not exclusive of the military and other resources of other nations.