1

The relevant documents were transmitted to the Senate by the President on November 15, 1954, and I trust that the Senate will now find it possible to take prompt, favorable action on the two treaties which require Senate approval.2

B. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

[The United States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom were original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949. Greece and Turkey adhered by a protocol of October 17, 1951, and a protocol of October 23, 1954, provided for the adherence of the German Federal Republic. For the texts of the treaty and protocols, see supra, pp. 812-815, 853-854, and 871-873.]

Assignment of American Troops to NATO

21. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRESS, SEPTEMBER 9, 19503

On the basis of recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by the Secretaries of State and Defense, I have today approved substantial increases in the strength of United States forces to be stationed in Western Europe in the interest of the defense of that area. The extent of these increases and the timing thereof will be worked out in close coordination with our North Atlantic Treaty partners. A basic element in the implementation of this decision is the degree to which our friends match our actions in this regard. Firm programs for the development of their forces will be expected to keep full step with the dispatch of additional United States forces to Europe. Our plans are based on the sincere expectation that our efforts will be met with similar action on their part. The purpose of this measure is to increase the effectiveness of our collective defense efforts and thereby insure the maintenance of peace.

1 S. Execs. L and M, 83d Cong., 2d sess.

2 i. e., the protocols of Oct. 23, 1954, on the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany (supra, pp. 483-485) and the acces sion of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty (supra, pp. 871-873).

3 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 18, 1950, p. 468.

22. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, DECEMBER 19, 19501

DEAR GENERAL EISENHOWER: The North Atlantic Treaty Nations have agreed on the defense organization for Europe and at their request I have designated you as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. I view their request as a pledge that their support of your efforts will be complete and unequivocal.

I understand that the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will shortly issue a directive to you concerning your responsibility and authority as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.2

You are hereby assigned operational command, to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of your mission, of the U.S. Army Forces, Europe; U.S. Air Forces, Europe; and the U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

Subject to overriding requirements of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the missions, routine employment, training and administration of these forces will continue to be handled through command channels heretofore existing.

You are authorized to have officers and enlisted personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces, as well as civilian employees of the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, for your Staff in such numbers and grades as you consider necessary.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Secretary of State for his guidance and a copy to the Secretary of Defense for his guidance and necessary action by the Department of Defense.

You are undertaking a tremendous responsibility. As President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I know that our entire country is wholeheartedly behind you. Indeed, you carry with you the prayers of all freedom-loving peoples. I send you my warmest personal good wishes for success in the great task which awaits you.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

23. REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 22, 1950

3

This afternoon I would like to talk with you about the point we have reached in the development of the North Atlantic Treaty, what we did at Brussels, and where we are going from that meeting.

I think the best way of putting this thing in perspective is to say

1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 1, 1951, p. 7.

2 For a description of the authority entrusted to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, see the communiqués of the Fifth and Sixth Sessions of the North Atlantic Council, Sept. 26 and Dec. 19, 1950 (infra, pp. 1607-1609). 3 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 1, 1951, pp. 3-6.

See the North Atlantic Council's communiqué of Dec. 19, 1950; infra, pp. 1608

that this meeting at Brussels was the conclusion of a chapter in a long book, a book in which the chapters which lie behind us are history, and the chapters that lie before us are plans for dynamic action.

So far as the North Atlantic Treaty organization is concerned, that is only one part of this book. It is an important part. That of part the chapter which lay before Brussels was a period, and a very important and necessary period, of planning and organization. We were thinking about drawing up the structure of this organization before we could go to work to put real muscle and real bone into it.

FIRST STEP IN FIELD OF ACTION

Brussels brought the culmination of that part of the North Atlantic Treaty work. We have finished the matter of plans. We have finished the matter of organization. Now we have taken the first step in the field of action. From now on it is action which counts and not further resolutions or plans or meetings, although there will be all of those.

At Brussels we did several things. We took recommendations which had come from the meetings immediately preceding in London and acted on those recommendations. They had to do with the creation of the united, unified, integrated army which is to provide for the defense of Europe. The papers which came to us laid out the structure of that army, how it should be composed, of what troops, where the troops should come from, how it should be organized, its command structure, the higher command structure which would give that army its direction, and how the Supreme Commander should be selected and appointed. We dealt with and acted upon all those

matters.

SELECTION OF SUPREME COMMANDER

The structure was agreed upon and the force was created. The Council unanimously asked the President of the United States to select a United States officer to be the Supreme Commander. A specific recommendation was made as to who it was hoped that officer would be. The President responded at once, and that officer, General Eisenhower, was unanimously appointed the Supreme Commander. As he has stated, he will leave shortly after the first of the year to go. over and arrange for the creation and location of his staff.2

The creation of a supreme commander and the selection of General Eisenhower is an essential step and a most vital step in galvanizing into action the actual translation of these papers into terms of men with guns, matériel, air forces, and naval forces.

There must be this one dynamic figure to give all of our allies the guidance, the direction, and the inspiration which will lead to the translation of papers into organized people and organized things.

1 See the Secretary's telegram of Dec. 18, 1950, to the President transmitting the Council's request and the President's reply; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 1, 1951, p. 6.

2 See General Eisenhower's report of Feb. 1, 1951, on his tour of NATO capitals before an informal meeting of the Congress; ibid., Feb. 12, 1951, pp. 245-251.

General Eisenhower, more than any living soldier, has the capacity, the prestige, and the imagination which can bring that about. His appointment is in itself a great act in Europe, which has completely revolutionized the attitude of people toward the problems ahead of them.

Now at Brussels also we considered material things as well as men with guns. It was clear to us that you cannot have an army, no matter how well organized, unless it is supplied, unless it is supplied in quantity, and unless all the productive capacities of all the allies are harnessed to that great effort. Consequently, the whole conception of the old production board was changed and there is to be a new vigorous and active board. I trust that at the head of that there will be a man in the economic field as dynamic and as full of leadership as General Eisenhower is in the military field. These two men must work very closely together if we are to use the vast potential and economic power of Western Europe to create what is necessary for this force. CONCRETE OBJECTIVES OF UNIFIED COMMAND

This force which is now in being means several concrete things. It means, first of all, that our forces in Europe will be, and they now are, under the command of General Eisenhower. It means that the British, French, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, and the forces of all the other North Atlantic Treaty nations which are now in existence for the defense of Europe will be, and many of them now are, under his command. It means also that those forces must be increased. They are not now adequate for their mission. They will be increased and steps are in process now by which they will be increased in France, in England, and in other countries of Europe; in the United States additional forces will be placed at General Eisenhower's disposal in Europe.

We made it clear also at Brussels that, contrary to the propaganda which the Soviet Union and its satellites are putting out, this is a defensive force. It will be clear to any intelligent person that it must be. Certainly there is no remote intention, and there never has been, to use this force for aggressive purposes.

GERMAN PARTICIPATION

Also at Brussels we took action on the very important question of the relation of Germany to the defense of Western Europe. We cleared away the obstacles which had been in front of German participation. We made it perfectly clear to the Germans that their participation is a matter to be discussed with them. Their will and their enthusiastic cooperation is an essential part of anything which is to be done. We made it clear that, if they take part in this effort, then clearly their relations with the nations of Western Europe and with us

1 See the communiqué of the Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 19, 1950 (infra, pp. 1608-1609), and Section VIII of the communiqué of the NAC Deputies, May 5, 1951 (infra, pp. 1609-1612).

2 William R. Herod of the United States was appointed Coordinator of Defense Production.

in the United States will be and can be on a different basis from what they are now.

Now that is perhaps nothing new to you. That is the action which was taken and I should like for a moment to try and put it in its relation with other chapters in this long book about which I have spoken.

The North Atlantic Treaty work is only a part of that book. The action at Brussels is only a part of one chapter. It is that important part, however, which is moving from plans into action.

COMMON PROBLEM OF SECURITY

Now the rest of the book, the material part of the book, the part which is history, has to do with what we and our allies have tried to accomplish since the end of the war. What we have tried to accomplish has been in the light of a clear conception which we have all had. That is that the security of each one of us is tied up with the security of all of us, and therefore strength and security is a common problem and a common task. It is a task in which we must all wish to work together and in which we are all partners in the truest sense of the word.

So far as the United States is concerned, this is a national policy. It isn't a matter which has been decided by any small group of people in connection with any particular event. It is the product of the decisions of all the Executive branches of the Government, of the Congress, and of the people of the United States over a long period of years. It is something which has found expression at various times in different acts. Exactly these same conceptions were inherent in, were discussed, and were decided when the Greek-Turkish Aid Program came up in the early part of 1947. These same ideas are inherent in the Economic Recovery Program. These same ideas are contained in the so-called Vandenberg resolution passed by the Senate. We moved from the economic field into the field of viding a common defense when we negotiated and almost unanimously ratified the North Atlantic Treaty.

pro

Again this policy was reiterated when we came to the military defense program, which was to put our aid at the disposal of our allies while they were building up the forces which, with ours, would give a common strength and a common defense to all of us.1

Now all the way through these chapters of the book and in connection with all the steps that I have mentioned there have been dissenting views expressed. There have been views expressed that we should not use our resources and our power in conjunction with others to build up a common strength and a common defense, but that we should retire to our own continent, that we should try to isolate ourselves from the problems and difficulties of the world, and that here on our hemisphere we should attempt to secure ourselves against the

1 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1252-1267.

2 See ibid., pp. 1268-1327.

3 Resolution of June 11, 1948; ibid., p. 197.

4 See ibid., pp. 1356-1364.