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peoples." As such it greatly increases what the President, in his challenging address, called "the chance for peace."

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4. ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

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DECEMBER 22, 1953 3

Last week the NATO Ministerial Council met in Paris. The United States was represented by the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, and by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration. We reviewed the progress made and we made plans for the future.

This is important business from the standpoint of the American people. NATO comes closer than anything yet to being an effective international community police force. Fourteen nations have joined together to create a defensive organization committed to protect the security of a large area. This area is vital to the defense of freedom. It constitutes the principal home of Western civilization. Also, the Western European part contains coal and iron and industrial plants which, if they fell into hostile hands, would markedly shift the balance of power away from us.

All of the 14 member nations have made important contributions toward building this North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Many strategic facilities are contributed by smaller nations. Most of the forces in Europe are contributed by nations other than the United States, although there are approximately six United States divisions, with air and naval support, now in the European theater. The United States has made the largest single contribution to arming and equipping the NATO forces. We have put some $11 billion into this phase of our effort.

The project is so vital and the investment in it so large that it deserves careful supervision. That is, of course, the continuing task of our able permanent representative at NATO's headquarters in France. But also it is important that Cabinet Ministers from the 14 countries should come together to talk about NATO and its problems.

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THE "LONG HAUL" CONCEPT

We found the Organization in good shape. It has adapted itself to a new concept which the United States brought to the NATO meeting of last April. This was that NATO should operate on a budget which the member nations can sustain for what may be a long period. When NATO was organized in 1950, many thought that general war

1 The full text of President Eisenhower's message to the North Atlantic Council (submitted to it on Apr. 23, 1953), appears ibid., p. 673.

2 Address of Apr. 16, 1953; supra, pp. 65–71.

'Delivered before the National Press Club; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 4, 1954, pp. 3–71.

See the Council's communiqué of Dec. 16, 1953; infra, pp. 1633-1636.
John C. Hughes.

See the Council's communiqué of Apr. 25, 1953; infra, pp. 1631–1633.

might come quickly and that NATO should build itself up, on an emergency basis, to full defensive strength. That involved setting a pace which none of the member nations could sustain indefinitely.

At the Ministerial Council Meeting of last April, virtually every member nation was saying that it could not carry its allotted share of the NATO program without large grants of economic aid from the United States. The total was a figure which the United States itself could not indefinitely support.

It seemed to us that it was justifiable and even prudent now to moderate NATO's emergency-and exhausting-pace.

So, at the last April Council Meeting, the United States put forward a new concept, now known as that of the "long haul." That means a steady development of NATO, which, however, will preserve, and not exhaust, the economic and fiscal strength of member nations.

Some feared that this shift, from the mood of emergency to that of a steady pace, could not be made without destroying the morale of the Organization and leading to its disintegration. Some felt that what we proposed would be misinterpreted as a loss of United States interest in NATO. We knew that the change of pace could not be safely accomplished except by skillful handling. But that has now been done. It was made possible by comprehension on the part of the permanent staff and the military leaders of NATO. They were statesmen, as well as soldiers, and they understood and adapted themselves to the need of taking into account all of the risks-not merely the military risks, but also the nonmilitary risks.

Today we can honestly judge that NATO is on a sustainable basis. This sustaining basis is one which largely reduces the necessity for continuing United States economic aid to the countries of Western Europe.

These countries have made a good economic recovery. Their currencies are showing greater strength and stability. The inflationary pressures are reduced, as a result of sounder fiscal and monetary policies. There is also some progress toward greater economic freedom and liberalization of trade, though there continue to be serious restrictions on the movement of goods, and especially on the import of dollar goods.

These NATO meetings, along with the activities of other international groups, are spreading an understanding of the requirements for economic strength, which is basic to the political and military strength of the West.

THE DETERRENT OF CAPTIVES' DISCONTENT

It is important to bear in mind that while military power is a principal deterrent to armed aggression, it can be importantly reinforced by other deterrents. For example, the Soviet rulers may hesitate to attack if contrasting social conditions bring them domestic troubles. At our Paris meeting it was generally judged by the NATO Ministers that the danger of open military aggression from Soviet Russia was less than it had been a year or two before. That, if true, is largely due to NATO's growing power. But also it is due to internal pressures

and discontents resulting from the bad living conditions within the Soviet bloc and the contrasting better conditions within the neighboring free countries.

It seems that the Soviet rulers' exploitation of their own and the satellite peoples has reached a point where it would be reckless for them to engage in general war. All recent major speeches by high Soviet officials seek to encourage their people to hope for more food and more consumers' goods of better quality. That clearly shows a popular demand so insistent that it cannot be ignored. It suggests that perhaps the workers within the Soviet Union may be allowed to work less for military purposes and more for their own good. That, of course, would be a welcome approach to the practices observed in the free world.

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The revolt of last June within East Germany exposed the vast underlying discontent which exists among the workers within the satellite areas. It indicates that if there were an armed invasion of Western Europe, the Soviet lines of communication might not be altogether secure.

These were among the factors which, the Foreign Ministers at Paris felt, operated to deter an invasion of Western Europe. It shows how important it is for the free world countries to continue to provide living standards really superior to those within the captive world.

I am not suggesting that an orgy of self-indulgence is the answer to the Soviet menace. The danger is immense and persistent. This is no time for the free world to relax and to weaken its own military capacity to defend and strike back. We are, however, at a time when we can usefully confront [the] Soviet rulers with a demonstration of our capacity to do two things at once-i. e., to develop military power and to increase well-being.

I said to the NATO Council

We are convinced that our members can provide the resources for an adequate defense, including a wide range of new weapons, and at the same time permit a steady improvement in the living standards and general welfare of our peoples.

That itself is a security measure. It nullifies the Communists' subversive efforts against the free governments. Also, it creates a striking contrast to despotism, and thus confronts the Soviet rulers with a dilemma at home.

We gave consideration to the problem of the defense of the North American Continent. Canada and the United States form part of the treaty area and the Council recognizes that it is important to protect North America's military potential. The temptation to aggression would be great if the aggressor could, by an initial blow, knock out the industrial power of North America.

It is not feasible to provide an absolute insurance against serious damage to our cities and industries. However, it is possible to secure a substantial measure of protection.

The Foreign Minister of Canada joined with us in emphasizing the importance to NATO of defensive measures within this continent. But we both indicated that this would not be sought at a scale of 1 See infra, pp. 1744-1749

expense which would impair the ability of our countries to contribute to other aspects of the NATO effort.

We were greatly impressed by the spirit of vigorous fellowship which pervades NATO. The permanent NATO staff, drawn from 14 countries, is dedicated to a common purpose. That is an inspiring fact. Indeed, NATO is a unique organization in more respects than Never before have sovereign nations so freely exchanged military information. Never before have nations taken recommendations from an international body concerning length of military service, balance of forces between military services, and other equally delicate problems and, what is even more surprising, accepted them in spite of adverse domestic political considerations.

The American people can take pride in NATO and take comfort in it. We should sustain it on the basis now planned-a basis which involves a fair sharing of burdens and benefits, and which combines growing strength for NATO with economic and fiscal integrity for ourselves and other member countries.

Certainly, each member of NATO gets out of it much more than the price of admission. It is costly, but it is not nearly as costly as though each tried to buy separately, for itself alone, the amount of security that it now gets on a collective basis. Indeed, no nation, at any cost, could get alone what NATO provides for all its members.

THE PRECARIOUS FOUNDATION

So far, so good. However, if we go farther and delve deeper, it is not so good. NATO has become a splendid structure. But it rests upon a foundation which is precarious and which must cause us grave

concern.

United States postwar policy has consistently recognized the imperative necessity of a closer integration of Western Europe. Congress expressed that when it adopted the European Recovery Program in 1948,1 when it ratified the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, and when it subsequently provided economic and military assistance to Europe. In so doing, our Congress was not imposing an American concept on Europe. It was endorsing a conviction that every Western European statesman of this generation has eloquently and forcefully expressed.

Actually, much progress has been made toward economic, military, and political unity.

A Coal and Steel Community has already been created and the possibility of broader unity now resides in the treaty to create a European Defense Community (EDC). This treaty was signed in May 1952 by France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the West German Republic. In essence, this treaty provided

1 See the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1299-1321) and S. Rept. No. 935, 80th Cong., 2d sess.

2 See the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report on the North Atlantic Treaty, supra, pp. 825-852.

3 See the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, infra, pp. 3059-3086. See supra, pp. 1039-1078.

'Supra, pp. 1107-1150.

for the establishment of a common military force, drawn from the six countries, which would be placed under common institutions created by them. They would operate under a single budget, with common procurement of military equipment. They would have similar uniforms and training and would be put at the disposal of the NATO Supreme Commander.

At the same time that this EDC treaty was signed, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France signed a convention with the West German Republic designed, in effect, to end the postwar occupation.1 This convention, however, provides that it does not come into force unless the EDC treaty comes into force.

It was contemplated by the EDC treaty that it would be ratified within 6 months. Now 18 months have elapsed and there is still no assurance of early action, although good progress toward ratification has been made in several of the EDC countries. No Parliament to which the EDC treaty has been submitted has voted against ratification. But some of the Parliaments have not wanted to face the issue.

None of us must underestimate the difficulty of affirmative action. It involves a merging of national institutions which the nations identify with their respective histories. It involves substituting fellowship for hatreds which are both ancient and recent. However, the day of decision cannot be indefinitely postponed. We are close to a date when nonaction is the equivalent of adverse action. This is the more true because the Mutual Security Act of 1953 2 conditions much of our European military support upon the actual existence of EDC.

"THE DEADLY DANGER OF PROCRASTINATION"

General Eisenhower, in an address made in London on July 3, 1951,3 made an appeal for European unity which has rarely, if ever, been equaled in its eloquence and in the clarity of its reasoning. After speaking of the immense gains that could be achieved through unity, General Eisenhower pointed out that "the project faces the deadly danger of procrastination. . . . The negative is always the easy side, since it holds that nothing should be done. The negative is happy in lethargy, contemplating, almost with complacent satisfaction, the difficulties of any other course."

Since he spoke, 2%1⁄2 years have gone by and the truth of his observation has been manifest.

When I was in Paris last week, I mentioned the importance of action soon, and said that if there was not an early and affirmative response, the United States would have to undertake an "agonizing reappraisal" of basic foreign policy in relation to Europe.

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That statement, I thought, reflected a self-evident truth. Successive international communiques issued throughout this year have said

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1 Convention of May 26, 1952; S. Execs. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 9–22.

2 Act of July 16, 1953 (67 Stat. 152); see also infra, pp. 3059-3086.

Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1951, pp. 163–165.

* Statement of Dec. 14, 1953; see the New York Times, Dec. 15, 1953.

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