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of the opinion that these conditions are reasonable and consistent with national policy.

3. Participation by the United States now in the construction and operation of a St. Lawrence River Seaway would increase its defense advantages to this country, and would in time of emergency assure it of full benefits of joint participation.

4. Participation by the United States now in the project would strengthen our strategic position at all times respecting use of the seaway for transportation of basic materials.

5. Construction of the international rapids section canals on the U. S. side would be more economical than construction on the Canadian side and would result in lower tolls, and, because of its design, the American project would constitute in certain aspects a superior navigation facility.

6. The Committee is of the opinion that the St. Lawrence Seaway, Lake Erie to Montreal, so constructed and operated, would be selfliquidating over a projected period of 50 years.

7. The Committee feels that the early initiation and completion of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Seaway project in accordance with the recommendations contained in this report is in the national interest.

37. THE ECONOMIC BASIS FOR THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY: Conclusions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 1953 (Excerpts)1

The committee is profoundly aware of the extensive studies, surveys, debates, and discussions which have attended the St. Lawrence project throughout the years, and of the many arguments advanced for and against the seaway. After careful consideration of all of the arguments, the committee is convinced that the United States participation in the St. Lawrence seaway project, Lake Erie to Montreal, is in the interest of the security of the United States, is economically desirable and sound, will pay for itself out of its earnings, and is a wise undertaking for the United States and Canada to build and operate jointly. Its true perspective is continental and its final results must inevitably be continental in their impact.

The seaway will permit the little-developed but rich Labrador ores to be brought to the heart of the steel industry of the United States at a low cost and thus supplement the domestic and foreign supplies of American ores. The routes of shipping are shown on the map (attached hereto). New markets will be available to the Midwest and needed raw materials and other commodities will be made available to the consumers of the region by low-water transportation costs. New industries are bound to spring up and greater prosperity through

1 S. Rept. No. 441, 83d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 23-25; reprinted in St. Lawrence Seaway Manual, pp. 73-75. 2 Not reprinted here.

out the Midwest area will undoubtedly be reflected in a stepped-up well-being of the United States.

The committee is firmly convinced that that which increases the prosperity of a large portion of the United States will inevitably increase the prosperity of the whole Nation. Indeed, employment and production opportunities would be created by the initial construction and the stimulus of the modern waterway would be lasting upon the completion of the project.

Every governmental survey made, both here and in Canada, irrespective of the cost of estimates, has been favorable to the project. The case has been overwhelmingly approved, especially with iron ore and power supply problems we now face. Plans are ready and the work should proceed. Every American President since 1923 has supported the seaway [,] and the executive branch of the Government has shown convincingly and unanswerably that the project is engineeringly feasible and economically justified. A most imposing array of outstanding citizens have backed the seaway and continue to do so. Nature has provided a 90 percent complete waterway-a seaway that will provide an all-water route to Europe with a thousand miles less open water from the heart of the continent than the routes from our Atlantic ports. Only 10 percent, particularly the 114 miles in the St. Lawrence River, needs to be constructed.

The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway stands in a class by itself in that it can be made self-liquidating. No such potential traffic could be visualized for either the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal as is now anticipated for the St. Lawrence seaway. While in the initial stages. the project is to be financed with the assistance of the Federal Government, the seaway ultimately will be built and operated at no cost to the taxpayer. The tolls on the traffic using the navigation facilities will make the project self-liquidating. The related power phase will represent no cost to the Federal Government since the State of New York has been granted a license to construct the power facilities jointly with the Hydroelectric Power Commission of Ontario and to share the costs previously classified as common to power and navigation.

The committee is convinced that the seaway will not over the years injure existing ports and other transportation facilities. Such loss as may be entailed by the Atlantic and gulf ports from diverted traffic will be more than offset by new traffic and demands on those ports growing out of the expanded activities attendant upon the construction and operation of the seaway. While New York, Boston, Baltimore, and other coastal ports may conceivably at first suffer some loss of traffic, they will all gain in the long run from the new business, and it is not thought that other ports would suffer at all. Indeed, they would be expected to gain.

The seaway will undoubtedly benefit the general economy by reducing transportation costs and by providing a new and auxiliary route and facility in addition to those already in existence. Savings as high as 50 percent in transportation costs for some commodities have been estimated to destinations in the heart of the United States. The committee is convinced from testimony presented that domestic shipping,

including a large block of iron ore not now moving over the railroads or coastal ports, will use the seaway and will profit by its existence. Ships go wherever there is assurance of a cargo. As far as navigation conditions are concerned, the present obsolete 14-foot canal is being used profitably, despite the inadequacy for meeting present demands, and during the navigation period, weather conditions are favorable to extensive navigation. Montreal has on an average of 4 foggy days during the navigation period, while New York has 44. Foreign vessels are prohibited by law from engaging in trade between American ports on the Great Lakes, so there would be no danger of competition from foreign vessels in United States coastwide trade.

In answer to the many arguments presented against the seaway, the committee has the following observations to make. The project is financially sound and can be made self-liquidating. The estimates of the costs are reasonable and there is every expectation that all contingencies have been provided for as far as is humanly possible. The seaway will not be a duplicating but a supplementary and complementary system of transportation. The seaway is practical and safe as a route of transportation, and will constitute no exceptional problem of defense in case of war.

To enter upon this project by legislation is both feasible and constitutional. The Constitution gives Congress the "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States . . ." This power has often been exercised with respect to projects in boundary waters and in foreign territory pursuant to agreements and in cooperation with foreign countries. Many agreements of at least comparable importance, including the annexation of Texas and Hawaii,2 and the Bretton Woods agreement, have been dealt with through legislation rather than by the treaty process. Moreover, the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 with Canada prescribed a procedure for concluding agreements through reciprocal legislation of the two countries with respect to the proposed uses, constructions, and diversions of boundary waters.

The seaway will constitute an important part of our system of national defense. It will provide an alternate route for low-cost mass movement of vitally needed iron ore to our steel arsenal. It will provide access to shipbuilding and ship-repair facilities located in a relatively secure area to supplement coastal shipyards. It will furnish an additional needed line of communication for ocean shipping which can ease wartime strain on rail transportation and the port

1 Joint Res. No. 8, Mar. 1, 1845, 28th Cong., 2d sess., gave the consent of Congress to the designation of Texas as a State eligible for admission into the Union; Joint Res. No. 1, Dec. 29, 1845, 29th Cong., 1st sess. (9 Stat. 108) admitted Texas into the Union.

2 Joint Res. No. 55, July 7, 1898, 55th Cong., 2d sess. (30 Stat. 750-751). Bretton Woods Agreements Act, July 31, 1945; PL 171, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (59 Stat. 512). Treaty Series 548; 36 Stat. 2448.

facilities of the gulf and Atlantic coasts. It is needed as a reserve route in case of interruptions of other routes. The seaway would be a valuable part of the national defense of Canada and the United States while the related hydroelectric power will be available for defense industries and is urgently needed for the general economy of the market region both in Canada and in the United States. It is by reason of this urgency for making this low-cost power available as quickly as possible that has removed the power development from the project facilities which require the attention of Congress at this time. The administration's approval and support of United States participation in construction of a 27-foot waterway in the international section of the St. Lawrence rests on its conclusion that such a draft is sufficient to meet our security needs respecting import of ore from Labrador, general expansion of use by deeper draft vessels for the benefit of our economy in the Great Lakes area, and in connection with increased shipbuilding and repair activities on the lakes as a defense measure. Removal of the present 14-foot bottleneck on the St. Lawrence River will make all of these things possible. The committee accepts this reasoning as sound. A 27-foot channel would accommodate practically all the present Great Lakes fleet-consisting of 413 United States vessels of deadweight capacity 3,600,000 tons. Concerning the contention of opponents that the 27-foot project is obsolete because it will accommodate only 4 percent of our seagoing fleet fully loaded in terms of draft, the following should be noted: 75 percent of the traffic will be transported in lake-type vessels which can be satisfactorily handled by the 27-foot channel; thus only 25 percent of the traffic is subject to movement in seagoing ships; the majority of our general cargo seagoing ships can ply the 27-foot channel with profitable pay loadings.

Perhaps there is no more telling argument in favor of S. 21501 than that Canada has decided to build a seaway with or without the United States. Canada has completed substantial improvements and has now determined to go ahead with an all-Canadian route if the United States does not participate, conditioned only on the power phase being placed under construction. Since the seaway is a joint interest of both the United States and Canada, the committee is convinced that the United States should join Canada in promptly completing the seaway. Thus, in assuming an equitable share of the costs of construction, we shall have an equitable share in its operation and administration-a voice in determining tolls, commodity by commodity, rules of measurement, amount of tolls after the payoff period, etc. Since by far the dominant portion of the traffic will either originate or terminate in the United States, it is obvious that business interests in our country are vitally concerned, as demonstrated by tolls discussions on the Panama Canal.

1 S. 2150 (as amended by the House of Representatives), called also the WileyDondero Act, became PL 358 (see infra for text).

38. ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY CORPORATION: Public Law 358 (83d Congress, 2d Session), May 13, 19541

AN ACT

Providing for creation of the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation to construct part of the Saint Lawrence Seaway in United States territory in the interest of national security; authorizing the Corporation to consummate certain arrangements with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Authority of Canada relative to construction and operation of the seaway; empowering the Corporation to finance the United States share of the seaway cost on a self-liquidating basis; to establish cooperation with Canada in the control and operation of the Saint Lawrence Seaway; to authorize negotiations with Canada of an agreement on tolls; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

CREATION OF CORPORATION

SECTION 1. There is hereby created, subject to the direction and supervision of the President, or the head of such agency as he may designate, a body corporate to be known as the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "Corporation").

MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATION

SEC. 2. (a) The management of the Corporation shall be vested in an Administrator 3 who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall receive compensation at the rate of $17,500 per annum.

(b) To assist the Administrator in the execution of the functions vested in the Corporation there shall be a Deputy Administrator who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall receive compensation at the rate of $16,000 per annum. The Deputy Administrator shall perform such duties as the Administrator may from time to time designate, and shall be acting Administrator and perform the functions of the Administrator during the absence or disability of the Administrator or in the event of a vacancy in the Office of the Administrator.

5

(c) There is hereby established the Advisory Board of the Saint

1 68 Stat. 92-97.

2 Ex. Or. No. 10534, June 9, 1954 (19 Fed. Reg. 3413), designated the Secretary of Defense to direct and supervise the corporation; Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1954, p. 959.

3 Lewis G. Castle was nominated by the President on June 23, 1954, and confirmed by the Senate on July 1, 1954.

1954.

M. W. Õettershagen was nominated, Aug. 7, 1954, and confirmed, Aug. 16,

5 John C. Beukema, Harry C. Brockel, Kenneth M. Lloyd, Hugh Moore, and Edward J. Noble, whose appointments were confirmed, Aug. 16, 1954.

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