Dreams, that rais'd fuch, mighty Fears and Terrors. As in the Dreams of Jofeph, there is no mention made of fuch Fears, that fignified them to be Divine; and in general, when Evils are not foretold in Dreams, for what Reafon fhould Fears accompany them? Then there would be Fears without an Object to excite them, which is filly and unaccountable. Hence we conclude, this can be no adequate Note or Mark. of Diftinction.

Again, it hath been imagin'd, that a Repetition of the fame Dream, either exactly, or in Images or Figures, fignifying the fame, imports fomething beyond Natural. As in the Dream of Pharaoh and diverfe others, in which, profane (d) Hiftory abounds. And in Truth when this happens, it muft appear the more furprifing, because it muft denote a Caufe more certain, than what is fuppos'd to produce Natural Dreams; in which Chance, the Cares and Thoughts of the Day, the Temper and Conftitution of the Body have doubtless a great fhare, which unguided, are unapt to repeat the fame Tale, or excite the fame Scenes or Imaginations exactly; neither is it ufual, and confequently this Repetition may be proper, to raife in the wifeft Man, peculiar Notice and Heed to fuch Dreams; yet not enough immediately to infer, and conclude them Divine and Supernatural; because there are fuch things, we vulgarly term ftrange and lucky Chances, aftrange Union and Concurrence of Caufes, to produce an Effect. And it is well known likewife, when a ftrong Impreffion hath been once. made upon the Fancy, it will often remain a long while, and render very accountable, a Re

(d) Cicer, de Divin. lib. 1.

E 4

petition

petition of the fame Dream. But how true at Mark foever this may be, where it accompanies Supernatural Dreams; yet we read, fome have been truly Supernatural, and have been own'd,i and difcern'd as fuch, without any fuch Repe-tition; and confequently this cannot be a cer tain and univerfal Mark, whereby thefe fort of Dreams are diftinguifh'd from others.

Something B. I profefs, I grow weary of hearing thefe more pro- idle Conceits, and therefore muft intreat you," bable, as to give this over, as an unfolvable Point, or to the Di- elfe to come to fomething you conceive more finition, certain, or at leaft that carries with it a greater Divine Air of Probability.

between

and Natu

A. In my Opinion, it must be either by the ral Dreams Manner of the Impreffion, that was made upon the Mind or Fancy in Sleep; or elfe from the things fignified, or reveal'd, or from the Event, as we before faid, or fome other extraordi nary Circumftances, that attended thefe Dreams, that Holy Men could be capable of knowing them to be Supernatural and Divine.

Dreams

And Firft, As to the Manner of the ImprefFirst, the manner of fion. It is in the highest degree reafonable to the Impref- fuppofe, when an Angel affects the Mind or fion, that Fancy of a Man in Sleep, raifes Thoughts or Divine Scenes, or any ways acts on it; the Sentiments make on the Soul receives, are very peculiar, are quite the Mind, of a different Nature, from the common and may de ordinary Motions of the Spirits or Imagination. For, as we fee there is a Capacity in the Soul of being affected from outward Objects, and the Impreffions they make on her, are fo very clear and evident, that without any Difficulty the can di ftinguish them, from what arifes from her felf; fo with the fame Reafon, may it be imagin'd, that when an Angel, or any other invifible Cause, acts on the Mind, or Fancy; these Touches or

note their

Original.

Applications may be as different in their own Nature, and the inward Sentiment, the Soul receives from them, as different, as the real Impreffions of the Objects of Senfe, are different from the bare Acts of Imagination: and upon the Souls being used to them, may be as clearly diftinguishable; fo that a Man may with as much Certainty pronounce, in any particular Cafe, this flow'd from fome External and Supernatural Caufe; as in the other Cafe, this proceeded from an outward Object, was not the effect of any Paffion, or Imagination within me, but what really I faw or heard. For if the real Impreffions of outward Objects, be diftinguishable, from what only a Man merely imagines, by the inward Sentiment or Paffion they raife in the Soul; why may not the real Application of an Angel to the Mind, the Thoughts it excites, be as diftinguishable, from what flows from it felf, or from what the bare Imagination excites, and that too by the inward Sentiment or Paffion, that fuch an Application produces ? There is as great Ground of Difference, and confequently of Diftinction, in the one as in the other. But then, I think, it is very carefully to be confider'd, upon what Grounds, a Man concludes, or how he becomes certain, that outward Objects are things, really without him, not meer Phantafms or Imaginations. For a full Explication of this Matter, I refer you to the new Philofophers, and fhall juft only mention (e), what is neceffary to our prefent Purpofe. And I think, this Certainty, as to the Reality of outward Objects, arifes not barely from the Sentiment, or Paffion, they excite in the Soul. For be it acknowledg'd, that the Paffion,

(e) Des Cartes's Meditations.

or

Farther

or inward Sense and Feeling,, that the Mind has through the Operation of outward Objects on it, is far different from the Senfe it has of its own Acts of Fancy or Imagination; yet as hence cannot be concluded, the Certainty of outward Objects, fo neither upon Examination, will it be found, I believe, that any Man hence concludes it. For fuppofing, a Man had never but once an outward Object prefented to his View,.. and confequently never but once had the Paffion or Senfation, that outward Objects excite;; could, or indeed would a Man, hence infer the real Existence of fuch an Object without him, and confequently, that really he was affected with fomething from without him? The Paffion or Senfation, we acknowledge, would be ftrange and unufual, but could be the Ground of no fuch Inference nor Conclufion, but muft leave the Judgment in a ftrange Amusement and Sufpenfe. But if this were often and often repeated, if conftantly outward Objects appeared the fame, excited the fame Senfation in others, as well as himfelf; and that neceffarily, waited not for his own Inclination or Confent, if things anfwer'd in Fact, according to the Report of the Senfes; this Diffidence would foon vanish, and Reafon must pronounce, that fuch and fuch Senfation must be the Effect of the Agency of fome External Caufes or Objects, So that Repetition, Conftancy, Uniformity, Order and the like, is the immediate Ground of that Certainty the Mind has of the Existence of outward Objects, and confequently of its being. affected by them.

Explicati- B. This is fomething, I confefs; and to give ons and In- you fome refpite, and to fhew how well I comferences from the prehend you, give me leave, to draw fome unforegoing avoidable Conclufions from it.

@pinion.

Firft,

First, Hence it is clear, That were we not born into a World full of outward Objects, and with Senfes fit to receive Impreffions, and Actings from them: Were we not thus from our Infancy inur'd to receive them; the first Impreffions these outward Objects make on us, would be as surprising, as now the Application of Supernatural Caufes is to our Minds; and had we only Notice of thefe Impreffions, from Difcourfe, and had never felt them, our Reafoning," for ought appears, would have been as dark and as obfcure, as now it is about Inspiration; and we fhould have been as much puzzl'd to infer the real Existence of thofe outward Objects, from the Impreffions they make, as now it feems dark and unconclufive, from the Impreffions or Actings of Spiritual Objects, (while we are unacquainted with them) to infer their Exiftence. And it feems probable in the Nature of the thing, could we fuppofe the Objects of Senfe difplay'd before us on a fudden, and at a time, when our Reafon could remark them, that the firft Impreffions of thefe Objects would raife in us, no greater Certainty as to their real Exiftence, than that which the firft Impreffions of Supernatural Caufes or Beings would raife in us, as to their Existence without us; and as the Impreffions of the Objects of Senfe allow room for the Exercife of our Reason, and our Certainty of their Exiftence is grounded upon the clear inferences of Reafon, fo the firft Impreffions of Supernatural and Invifible Caufes allow room for Exercise of our Reafon on them, and our Certainty of being Supernaturally acted on, or infpired, is grounded upon Reafon; and farther, as in the Cafe of Madness, or a dif order'd Imagination, that a Man believes he fees and hears things, which in reality he

1

does