CHAPTER VI.

REPLY TO CHAPTER V.

Mr. Ingersoll's Reply to the Argument from "Design"-Self-existence Alleged by Father Lambert to Imply the Infinity and Perfection of every Attribute; the Fallacy of the Doctrine-" Infinite Justice" a Redundant Expression; the Word Just not Logically Admitting of Degrees of Comparison-God Supposed to be Flattered by Complimentary Words-The Finite Cannot Measure the Infinite, but may Test its Nature and Quality-Opinion, Good or Bad, is Judgment.

To do justice to Mr. Ingersoll, as well as to show how fragmentary are the Father's citations from him, I will quote, somewhat at length, Mr. Ingersoll's reply to the argument from design. I will do justice even to an infidel!

Ingersoll." I know as little as any one else about the 'plan' of the universe; and as to the 'design' I know just as little. It will not do to say that the universe was designed, and therefore there must be a designer. There must first be proof that it was 'designed.' It will not do to say the universe has a 'plan,' and then assert that there must have been an infinite Maker. The idea that a design must have a beginning and that a designer need not, is a simple expression of human ignorance. We find a watch, and we say: 'So curious and wonderful a thing must have had a maker.' We find the watch-maker, and we say: 'So curious and wonderful a thing as man must have had a Maker.' We find God, and we say : 'He is so wonderful that he must not have had a

Maker.'

"In other words, all things a little wonderful must have been created, but it is possible for something to be so wonderful that it always existed. One would suppose that just as the wonder increased the necessity for a Creator increased, because it is the wonder of the thing that suggests the design of creation. Is it possible that a designer exists from all eternity without a design? Was there no design in having an infinite designer? For me it is hard to see the plan or design in earthquakes and pestilences. It is somewhat difficult to discern the design or the benevolence in so making the world that billions of animals live only on the agony of others. The justice of God is not visible to me in the history of this world. When I think of the suffering and death, of the poverty and crime, of the cruelty and malice, of the heartlessness of this' design' and 'plan,' where beak and claw and tooth tear and rend the quivering flesh of weakness and despair, I cannot convince myself that it is the result of infinite wisdom, benevolence and justice."

In the brief excerpt which the Father quotes from the above, "The justice of God is not visible to me in the history of this world," Mr. Ingersoll only states an orthodox sentiment, a sentiment proclaimed from the pulpit thousands of times every week. It accords with the teachings of Scripture; it is the oft sad refrain of the songs of the modern Zion, and of afflicted, pious hearts everywhere. All say, 66 we know not why it is that sin defiles us, that sickness tortures us, and that death, cold, ghastly death, is the conqueror of all." But the Father, in his haste to vanquish his adversary, selects the passage of all others the least obnoxious to orthodox criticism.

Lambert." If there is an infinite, self-existent being, he must, from his very nature, be infinite in everything; and, if in everything, infinite in his justice. To assert that he is not

infinitely just is to deny his existence, but your statement supposes his existence, and therefore grants his infinite justice."

All this is mere assertion without attempt at proof. It is worse; it is an unintelligible medley. Suppose we had never before heard of God, and were told for the first time that he is a self-existent, infinite being, would not our first inquiry be: "Infinite in what?" If assured that he is infinite in every holy attribute, would we not further ask: "How do you know it?" The Scriptures do not deal in this kind of patristic logic, but refer us to the works of God, and to his providential care over his creatures, in attestation of his goodness, and to his punishment of vice and reward of virtue, as proof of his justice. But to dispose of the assertion that infinity of being combined with self-existence implies "infinite justice," we remark, that infinity can scarcely be predicated of justice, and it is doubtful whether any attribute can be properly described as infinite, which does not admit of degrees of comparison. We cannot say with philosophical propriety—just, more just, most just. When we say just, we have expressed a quality or attribute in its fullness. Conventionally speaking, and for convenience, we employ the words “more just" and most just," as when we say, A is a more just judge than B; or, as we say that one mathematician is more correct than another. But philosophical diction is not so indulgent to us; for when we wish to draw an important conclusion by the use of words, we should employ them with regard to their strict meaning. But "infinite" is a word which strikes the popular mind as exceedingly eulogistic, and it can scarcely realize that when we call God just we have accorded to him as great praise as when we declare him "infinitely" just. Neither can any being be more than perfect. Therefore we ascribe to deity as complete and entire perfection when we say that he is perfect as when we say that he is infinitely perfect.

We may concede the perfection of his every attribute, and aver that he is infinitely wise, infinitely glorious, etc.; but to say that he is infinitely perfeet or infinitely just is as redundant as to describe an object as infinitely round or infinitely square. We multiply words without addition of meaning when we say more than that one is round, the other square. No man is truthful who will tell one lie. He may approximate truthfulness, but he is not completely, absolutely-in short, he is not truthful; or, as one lexicon defines the word, he is not "wholly full of truth." In this definition the word "wholly" is superfluous. We read of infinite fullness. Can a vessel be more than full? We so often confound poetical with philosophical diction; the figurative with the real; the double superlative of adoration and affection with the literal realities of fact, that we do injustice to both poetry and philosophy.

Passing this, how do we know that self-existence necessitates the possession of any specific qualities, good or bad? The oldest man is not always the best or wisest, and neither power nor wisdom measures the justice of men; why should they the ethics of deity? The truth is, fear constrains the theological world to adopt certain dogmatic and complimentary forms of expression when speaking of deity. Likening the infinite to the finite-the human to the divine-it is supposed the vanity of God delights itself in adulatory phrases and in the self-abnegation of his subjects. That he is especially glorified by the abasement and self-imposed torture of his creatures-such are the conceptions born of fear.

Lambert." The finite cannot be the measure of the infinite. God's justice is infinite; the human mind is finite. Hence the latter cannot be the measure of the former."

We are here told, "The finite cannot be the measure of the infinite." True, but it may test its nature and quality if it

may not measure its extent. We know enough of space included between two material objects to render it inconceivable to us that space, in any part of the universe, can differ from it save in extent.

You say that "God's justice is infinite; " we admit its perfection, but the question is whether the God of your conception is just. If we know aught of God we are compelled by the laws of our mental and moral being to judge him. If we say that he is righteous we pronounce judgment upon him, which, according to the Father's logic, we cannot do, because the finite cannot judge the infinite. And if not, we can neither affirm nor deny his justice, nor any other of his attributes; and, with regard to his character, the human mind must ever remain in equilibrio. The Father (p. 43, 4th ed.) virtually. concedes the right of examination but not of judgment. But it is apparent that if we have the right to think and examine any subject, it must be with a view to the formation of an opinion in regard to it, and opinion is judgment.