CHAPTER 31 PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF AGENT § 250. Authorized torts. § 251. Ratified torts. § 252. Liability for torts within scope of authority. § 253. What torts within scope of authority. § 250. (Agency, Sec. 66.) Authorized torts. (Note: If the principal directs or authorizes the commission of the tort he is clearly liable.) § 251. (Agency, Sec. 67.) Ratified torts. (Note: The principal is liable for the torts of the agent committed as a part of an act afterwards ratified by the principal. See Dempsey v. Chambers, supra.) § 252. (Agency, Sec. 68.) Liability for torts within scope of authority. (See cases under next section.) § 253. (Agency, Sec. 69.) What torts within the scope of the authority. Case 244. Lloyd v. Grace et al., [1912] A. C. 716. Point Involved: Whether a principal is liable for the fraud of his agent, committed within the general scope of the agent's duties, the principal taking no benefit from said fraud, and in no way consenting to or ratifying the same. (Opinions of Earl of Halsbury, Lord MacNaghten, Lord Atkinson and Lord Shaw, omitted.) "EARL LOREBURN: My Lords, the facts of this case, except in immaterial points, are quite clear and undisputed. "The appellant, Mrs. Lloyd, had bought some property, and thus had come to know of the defendant, a solicitor. She had doubts about having got her money's worth, and went to the defendant's office to inquire. When there she saw one Sandles, the defendant's managing clerk, and was induced by him to give him instructions to sell or realize this property, and for that purpose to give him the deeds and to sign two documents which she neither read nor knew the tenor of, but which put into Sandles' possession her interest therein. She gave him the deeds as the defendant's representative. Having got them and the signed documents, he dishonestly disposed of this lady's property and pocketed the proceeds. That is the whole story as it is now either found or admitted because it was incontestable. "It is clear to my mind, upon these simple facts, that the jury ought to have been directed, if they believed them, to find for the plaintiff. The managing clerk was authorized to receive deeds and carry through sales and conveyances, and to give notices on the defendant's behalf. He was instructed by the plaintiff, as the representative of the defendant's firm, and she so treated him throughout-to realize her property. He took advantage of the opportunity so afforded him as the defendant's representative to get her to sign away all that she possessed and put the proceeds into his own pocket. In my opinion there is an end of the case. It was a breach by the defendant's agent of a contract made by him as defendant's agent to apply diligence and honesty in carrying through a business within his delegated powers and entrusted to him in that capacity. It was also a tortious act committed by the clerk in conducting business which he had a right to conduct honestly, and was instructed to conduct, on behalf of his principal. "At the hearing the learned judge, no doubt with a view to avoid the risk of a new trial in so small a case, appears to have been prevailed upon to put no less than six questions, with subdivisions making in all ten questions, to the jury. Some of them were quite immaterial. Others were framed in order to raise a point of law supposed to be affirmed by Willes J. in the case of Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank in a passage which admitted of more than one meaning. The meaning of the answers depends upon how the jury understood the questions, and we were not told how they were explained to the jury. That Sandles committed this fraud in order to steal the money for himself is obvious, and any jury must so find. That he did it in the sense in which Willes J. means the word 'benefit' is not true upon the admitted facts. Willes J. cannot have meant that the principal is absolved whenever his agent intended to appropriate for himself the proceeds of his fraud. Nearly every rogue intends to do that. "I have only to say, as to the authority of Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, that I entirely agree in the opinion about to be delivered by Lord MacNaghten. If the agent commits the fraud purporting to act in the course of business such as he was authorized, or held out as authorized, to transact on account of his principal, then the latter may be held liable for it. And if the whole judgment of Willes J. be looked at instead of one sentence alone, he does not say otherwise." Question 244: What were the facts in the above case, and what did the Court hold? Case 245. Daniel v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 136 N. C. 517. Facts: Daniel sues the R. R. Co. for damages caused by his wrongful arrest and imprisonment. The R. R. Co. had a station at Greenville, N. C. Daniel went to said station to take passage on one of defendant's trains, and finding the passenger depot closed, went to the freight depot and was invited into the office by Atkinson, the agent of the company. Atkinson was counting money and putting it into a package. Atkinson then put the money in a drawer and locked it, and went out to supper. Daniel in a few minutes went out after him, leaving several people who were waiting there. When the train arrived, plaintiff boarded it and went to Kinston, where he was to change cars, and missing connections, went to a hotel at Kinston. The agent at Greenville then called up the agent, Meacham, at Kinston, whereupon the agent at Kinston went with a policeman to the hotel, and demanded entrance to Daniel's room. They made a search for the money, and later arrested Daniel, taking him to the guard house, where he was later released. On the following Sunday he was re-arrested on direction of the agent at Greenville. On the trial Daniel was discharged. Atkinson's duties were to collect money for freight, sell tickets to passengers, take care of the money received, and forward same to company's treasurer. The R. R. Co. claims that it is not responsible for the arrest. (Editor's note: It may be explained parenthetically that one who causes the arrest of another is liable in damages therefor when he acts without probable cause. We may assume that there was no probable cause in this case and that the company would be liable if the act was within the scope of the agent's employment.) Point Involved: Under what circumstances, if any, a principal is liable for the tort of malicious prosecution or false arrest by his agent, where he has not expressly authorized such prosecution or arrest, and where he has not expressly made it the agent's duty to prosecute or arrest. WALKER, J.: "The foregoing statement of the testimony [here given in brief resume] is sufficient to present the point upon which the case turns, namely, the authority of the agent of the defendant to cause the arrest to be made. We are not concerned so much with the manner in which the arrest was made as we are with the question whether the defendant, who was the principal of Atkinson and Meacham, is to be charged with liability for their tortious acts. That their conduct toward the plaintiff was inexcusable, if not criminal, and justly provokes the resentment of every good and law abiding citizen against them, may be freely admitted. * The excesses of Atkinson and Meacham do not establish the defendant's liability. That can be shown only by proof that the defendant authorized the acts to be done, or that, after they were done, it ratified them. The plaintiff's sole contention is that what Atkinson did at Greenville and Meacham at Kinston was within the line of their duty and the scope of their employment, and therefore they had implied authority from defendant to do what they did, upon the theory, we suppose, that every authority carries with it or includes in it, as an incident, all the powers which were necessary, proper, or usual as means to effectuate the purposes for which it was conferred, and that consequently when an agency is created for a specified purpose or in order to transact particular business, the agent's authority by implication embraces the appropriate means and power to accomplish the desired end. This is the general rule and the doctrine of respondeat superior is a familiar one. But in our opinion it has no application to the facts of this case. If we should hold it is so broad in its scope as to include a case like this, it would lead to most dangerous consequences. * "For us to say that an agent can by his acts subject his principal to liability in damages to any one injured by his said acts done when he was not about his master's business and had no express or implied authority to do them, but was merely seeking to avenge a supposed wrong already committed or to vindicate public justice, would be carrying the doctrine of respondeat superior far beyond its acknowledged limits. A servant entrusted with his master's goods may do what is necessary to preserve and protect them, because his authority to do so is clearly implied by the nature of the service, but when the property has been taken from his custody or stolen and the crime has already been committed, it can |