CHAPTER 19 INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELA TIONSHIPS BY THIRD PERSONS § 158. Duty not to interfere with contract rights. § 159. Contract for indefinite period. § 160. Prevention of future contracts. § 158. (Contracts, Sec. 126.) Duty not to interfere with contract rights. Case 171. London Guarantee Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493. Facts: This is a suit brought by Gustave Horn against the L. G. Co. to recover damages alleged to have been caused him by the defendant in procuring his discharge by Arnold, Schwinn & Co. of Chicago, as a foreman of the frame department of its bicycle factory. He alleged that he was injured while operating a milling machine and that he had a claim on that account against Arnold, Schwinn & Co.; that his employers carried insurance against loss by damage claims of employees, and that the insurance company procured his discharge because he would not settle at a small amount offered by it. He was not employed for any particular time and could have been discharged by his company at any time and for any reason, without liability on the employer's part, but he alleged and produced evidence tending to prove that the sole reason he was discharged was the interference of the insurance company. Point Involved: Whether a person has a cause of action for damages against another who interferes to procure his discharge by his employer, even though he was not employed for any particular time, and could have been rightfully discharged at any time by his employer, the reason for such interference being his refusal to settle a cause of action upon which the party procuring discharge was liable as insurer? Inferentially, whether a third person is liable who maliciously interferes to cause a breach of any contract, and what constitutes malice therein? MR. JUSTICE SCOTT: 66* We have been favored with most elaborate and exhaustive briefs by counsel for both parties. The case principally relied upon by counsel for appellant is that of Allen v. Flood, 67 L. J. Q. B. 119, decided by the House of Lords in 1897. This case has excited a wide discussion, and was considered at length by this court in Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608. In this English case certain boiler-makers, members of a trade union, in common employment with the plaintiffs, who were shipwrights, members of a rival organization, working on wood, objected to working with the latter on the ground that in a previous employment they had been engaged on iron work, it being contrary to the regulations of the union to which the boiler-makers belonged for shipwrights to do work of that character. Allen, as a representative of the boiler-makers, saw the manager of their employer, to whom he stated that if the shipwrights, who were engaged from day to day, were not dismissed, the boiler-makers would leave their work or be called out by their union. The shipwrights were thereupon discharged and brought an action against Allen. Their right to recover was denied, principally upon the ground that every workman has a right to exercise his own option with regard to the persons in whose society he will agree to continue to work, and that when the employer was confronted with a situation where he would lose the services either of the boiler-makers or the shipwrights, he had the right to elect which class of workmen to discharge, and electing to discharge the shipwrights, both he and the boiler-makers were within their legal rights and no cause of action arose. “蓉 "In Quinn v. Leathem, App. Cas. of 1901, p. 495 (de CHAPTER 19 INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELA TIONSHIPS BY THIRD PERSONS § 158. Duty not to interfere with contract rights. § 159. Contract for indefinite period. § 160. Prevention of future contracts. § 158. (Contracts, Sec. 126.) Duty not to interfere wi*' contract rights. Case 171. London Guarantee Co. v. Horn, 206 Facts: This is a suit brought by Gustave Hor the L. G. Co. to recover damages alleged to caused him by the defendant in procuring his by Arnold, Schwinn & Co. of Chicago, as a for frame department of its bicycle factory. He he was injured while operating a milling that he had a claim on that account aga Schwinn & Co.; that his employers carr against loss by damage claims of employees insurance company procured his discharg would not settle at a small amount offer was not employed for any particular time been discharged by his company at any tim reason, without liability on the employer's leged and produced evidence tending to p sole reason he was discharged was the interi insurance company. Point Involved: Whether a person has a tion for damages against another who interf cure his discharge by his employer, even thou not employed for any particular time, and c been rightfully discharged at any time by his e the reason for such interference being his re settle a cause of action upon which the party procuring discharge was liable as insurer? Inferentially, whether a third person is liable who maliciously interferes to cause a breach of any contract, and what constitutes malice therein? cided by the House of Lords), Lord Macnaghten, in speaking of Allen v. Flood, stated that its head-note might well have run in these words: 'An act which does not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable because it is done with bad intent,' and in this case last referred to it is said, that 'it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law, if there be no sufficient justification for the interference.' "We are of opinion that the contention of appellant in the case at bar, to the effect that competition in trade, employment or business is such a justification, is in accord with the authorities. This view finds support in the case of Chambers v. Baldwin, 15 S. W. Rep. 57, where it was held that a party to a contract for the sale of goods cannot maintain an action against one who maliciously, and with design to injure him and to benefit himself by becoming a purchaser in his stead, advises and procures the other party to break the contract. "In our judgment the cases cited by appellant, in so far as they lend support to its theory, will be found to be cases where the party who secured the discharge of the employee was in some way in competition with that employee in the business or work in which the employee was then engaged, or was a member of some organization which was in competition with the employee or some organization to which that employee belonged, and the fact that such competition existed has been treated by some of the courts as justification for the act of the defendant in bringing about the discharge. While it is true that the temporal interests of Horn and appellant were involved in the negotiations between them, we believe that the authorities which look upon competition as a justification for the act of one party in securing the discharge of an employee have regarded the term in a more restricted sense, and given to the term 'competition' its ordinary meaning and signification. This conclusion is certainly warranted by the reasoning in Doremus v. Henessy, supra, where this court discusses competition as a defense |