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C. The Problem of Regulating the Number of Countries Possessing and Manufacturing Nuclear Weapons

369. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A NUCLEAR TEST BAN AGREEMENT AND THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES AMONG ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES: Replies Made by the President (Eisenhower) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, February 3, 1960 1

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Of course, if you had real test bans that applied to all nations, then the only way other nations could get weapons would be through sale, transfer, or gift. Of course, it concerns any thoughtful individual as to the problem of the spread of these weapons to smaller and other nations, as the process of their manufacture may become more simple and as just through, you might say, the method of absorption the necessary know-how becomes more widespread.

I am of the belief that, if you could have now a ban on all testing that everybody could have confidence in, it would be a very, very fine thing to stop this-for this very reason, if no other: it is a very expensive business, to begin with. The very first bomb we produced, I think, cost America $2 billion or more before we ever had the very first one. Since that time, although you'd have to look this up, I think our appropriations have never been below $2 billion a year. So it is an expensive business.

I want to keep him [our negotiator] there [at the Geneva test ban negotiations] as long as there is the slightest chance of success. We should get this kind of agreement as soon as we can.

370. THE NEED FOR LIBERALIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT TO PERMIT CLOSER COOPERATION WITH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIELD: Replies Made by the President (Eisenhower) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, February 3, 1960 2

The [Atomic Energy] law itself says what information the Executive can give to particular nations, and it defines rather accurately the nations to whom you can give this information. As far as giving

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1The replies printed here are taken from p. 149 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61.

'The replies printed here are taken from pp. 148 and 152 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61.

8 For the international provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, pp. 28612877, and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1439-1442.

Docs. 369, 370

away the bombs [is concerned], this cannot be done under existing law.

I do believe this: that where we are allied with other nations and we are trying to arm ourselves in such a way as to make certain of our defense, we should try to arm them in such methods and ways as will make that defense more strong and more secure. I would not ever, even if the law permitted, give away information that was still, in our opinion, withheld from the Soviets themselves. But when the Soviets have the information and know-how to do things, it's pretty hard for me to understand why we don't do something with our allies as long as they themselves stand with us firmly in defending against the probable aggressive intent of communism.

From the very beginning, from what I knew about allied cooperation, and so on, I have always been of the belief that we should not deny to our allies what your potential enemy already has. We do want allies to be treated as partners and allies and not as junior members of a firm who are to be seen but not heard.

So I would think that it would be better, for the interests of the United States, to make our law more liberal, as long as we classify our countries as those that we are confident, by our treaties and everything else, they'd stand by us, and stand by us in time of trouble.

371. FRENCH ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SUCCESSFUL EXPLOSION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE, Issued by the Presidential Office, Paris, February 13, 1960*

The President of the French Republic and of the Community announces that at 7 a.m. on February 13, in favorable meteorological conditions, the order was given to explode an atomic device in the Tanezrouft area of the Sahara Desert, south-west of Reggane. The device was detonated at the top of a tower, the explosive used being plutonium. The safety of the inhabitants of the Sahara and of neighboring countries has been completely assured.

General de Gaulle expresses the gratitude of the nation to the architects of this achievement-Ministers and scientists, officers and engineers, industrialists and technicians. Thanks to her single-handed national effort, France is now able to strengthen her defensive capacity, as well as that of the Community and of the West. At the same time the French Republic is now in a better position to take effective action for the conclusion of agreements between the atomic Powers with a view to nuclear disarmament.

'Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 17279.

372. UNITED STATES REACTION TO THE FRENCH SUCCESSFUL TESTING OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE: Reply Made by the President (Eisenhower) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, February 17, 1960 s

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If you go back to 1947, one of the arguments that Mr. Baruch presented in the United Nations, in the committee of which he was the chairman, and to the Russians, [was] that one of the great risks we wanted to avoid was that of having many nations developing this kind of a device, this kind of a weapon.

I think it's only natural that first Britain' and then France have done this, in the circumstances of life as we now understand them and know them. I would hope that we could get the kind of agreements among the larger nations that have already done this thing to make sure that other nations don't want to go into the expense of going into this kind of an armament race, that would stop this whole thing in its tracks.

This is not easy. We must realize that this spirit of nationalism of which we hear so much is not felt just by the underdeveloped nations, the ones that the people want to be suddenly independent; it is felt by all of us. The matters of pride and national prestige impel people to do things, I think at times, that would not be necessary.

But I would say this, that our great hope is for agreement where we can stop the thing where it is.

[NOTE: During the question-and-answer period following his Feb. 18, 1960, address before the National Press Club, the Secretary of State had the following to say in reply to a question on this subject:

[... "As far as I know, there have been no discussions with France whatsoever about entering into the Geneva talks [as a consequence of French explosion of a nuclear device], nor have I heard any question discussed as to what might be anticipated in that direction. This is something that still has to develop. ["I may say that I personally do not know whether the tests that the French are conducting will be continued or not. There have been reports that there may be more. But I certainly don't know on my own, and I rather doubt whether Mr. Moch would want to say anything about that at this time."

["Insofar as the existing law and the explosion of this weapon are concerned, the reading of the legislative history of that law would not be encouraging from the point of view of saying that the shooting off of this weapon would automatically entitle France to a sharing of atomic secrets. The legislative history is long and complicated. And obviously the Atomic Energy Committee of the Congress has a great deal to say with respect to this matter. I cannot predict what will happen. As of the moment, as the President has said, the administration is not prepared to send up any change in the law to the Congress. Nor have we discussed this matter with the French since the bomb has been exploded." (Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1960, p. 361)]

"The reply printed here is taken from p. 193 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61.

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See A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949, pp. 1079-1087. The "Baruch proposals" were submitted to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission June 14, 1946.

The first successful British test of a nuclear device was made at sea off the northwest coast of Australia Oct. 3, 1952.

• See supra.

'M. Jules Moch, French representative at the U.N. and on the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

373. REQUEST FOR THE SUMMONING OF A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE SAHARA: Note by the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold), April 15, 1960 10

1. By a letter dated 14 March 1960, the Permanent Representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen requested, under Article 20 of the Charter and rule 9(a) of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly," that a special session of the Assembly be summoned to consider the question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara.

2. On 15 March 1960, the Secretary-General communicated the request to all Member States, by telegram sent to the Permanent Missions, and inquired whether they concurred in the summoning of the session. At the same time the Secretary-General stated that if within thirty days a majority of Members so concurred, a special session would be summoned in accordance with rule 8 of the rules of procedure.

3. Up to and including 14 April 1960, replies to the Secretary-General's communication have been received as follows:

Members concurring in the request (in addition to
the twenty-two requesting States)

Cuba
Yugoslavia

Date of reply

16 March

4 April

6 April

7 April

Japan

Thailand

Albania

12 April

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4. With the twenty-two States which requested the calling of a special session, the number of Members in favour of holding such a session is therefore thirty-six, which is less than the majority required (forty-two) under rule 9(a) of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

10 U.N. doc. A/4369.

"U.N. doc. A/4700.

IRISH REQUEST FOR INSCRIPTION OF THE ITEM "THE PREVENTION OF THE WIDER DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS" IN THE AGENDA OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Letter From the Irish Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at the U.N. (Kennedy) to the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold), August 15, 1960 12

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374. "ISRAEL HAS NO INTENTION OF PRODUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND... ITS PROGRAM IS CONCERNED EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY": Statement Issued by the Depart. ment of State, December 19, 1960 13

The Department of State has noted press reports of statements by Israeli Government spokesmen concerning the peaceful character of Israeli atomic energy activities. The Department welcomes these reported assurances that the Government of Israel has no intention of producing nuclear weapons and that its program is concerned exclusively with the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

U.S.-Israeli cooperation in the field of atomic energy is limited to research cooperation under President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program. In the same way as we have done in many countries in pursuance of our atoms-for-peace program, we have assisted Israel in constructing near Rehoboth a small research reactor for peaceful purposes and we have exchanged unclassified atomic energy information with Israel. Our bilateral agreement with Israel" provides that our assistance may not be developed into military use and that safeguards, including inspection, will be enforced to this end.

United States cooperation or assistance in any program to develop a nuclear weapon capability would not be possible. Such action would be precluded both by our policy of discouraging the proliferation of independent nuclear weapons capabilities and by the U.S. Atomic Energy Act.

As a result of unofficial reports to the effect that a new and larger nuclear reactor was under construction in Israel, the Secretary of State called in the Ambassador of Israel [Avraham Harman] on December 9 to express his concern and to request information. A response has not yet been received.15

"U.N. doc. A/4434; Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 212–213.

18 Department of State press release No. 702 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin Jan. 9, 1961, p. 45).

14 Of July 12, 1955 (TIAS 3311; 6 UST 2641; 219 UNTS 185).

15 In talks with the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, held Dec. 20-21, the Israel Ambassador gave full assurances that the reactor at Rehoboth, "now in the early stages of construction, is for peaceful purposes only."

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