PROPOSAL FOR "CONVENING A SPECIAL CONFERENCE FOR SIGNING A CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR WAR PURPOSES": Draft Declaration Submitted by the Representatives of Ten Member States in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, November 1, 1960 "

77

PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION OF AN AD HOC COMMITTEE OF NONNUCLEAR POWERS TO FACILITATE RESUMPTION OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF EXISTING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: Draft Resolution Submitted by the Representatives of Six Member States in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, November 10, 1960 78

PROPOSALS FOR DIRECTIVES TO "FORM THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT” WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO “AGREED OR UNILATERAL MEASURES WHICH WOULD CREATE MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS" FOR DISARMAMENT: Draft Resolution Submitted by the Representatives of Twelve Member States in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, November 15, 1960 79

PROPOSAL FOR UNIVERSAL DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR: Draft Resolution Submitted by the Polish Representative in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, November 21, 1960 80

77

"U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3; Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 343-345. The action described in footnote 52, ante, was taken with respect to this draft resolution. The resolution was sponsored by the representatives of Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia.

78

13 U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.255 and Add.1. The action described in footnote 52, ante, was taken with respect to this draft resolution. The resolution was sponsored

by the representatives of Canada, Chile, the Federation of Malaya, Norway, Pakistan, and Sweden.

79

U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.259 and Add. 1-2; Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 345-347. The action described in footnote 52, ante, was taken with respect to this draft resolution. The resolution was sponsored by the representatives of Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal, the United Arab Republic, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

80

U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.260/Rev.1; Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 347-348. The action described in footnote 52, ante, was taken with respect to this draft resolution.

PROPOSAL FOR RETURNING THE QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION: Draft Resolution Submitted by the Representatives of Nineteen Member States in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, December 8, 1960 81

[ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISARMAMENT: Resolution 1516 (XV), Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, December 15, 1960-Ante, doc. 27]

B. The Problem of Effecting a Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests and of Preventing a Harmful Increase in Levels of Radioactivity

344. THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE RIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION TO TEST MISSILES IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC: Reply Made by the President (Eisenhower) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, January 13, 1960 1

1

The United States has always claimed the right in the high seas to use areas there for valid scientific experiment and has, in doing so, notified everybody concerned, and then taken the proper measures to warn away from the areas involved anyone that might be damaged. We did this in the central Pacific. We have assumed that this was within the meaning and spirit of international law; and if there is any contrary view, why, it would have to be, I think, studied in that context as to the requirements of international law. Therefore, it would seem very unusual for us to make a protest [against Soviet testing in the Pacific] when we have done the same thing ourselves and intend to do it again.

81 U.N. doc. A/C.1./L.255/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add. 1-5; Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 366–367. The action described in footnote 52, ante, was taken with respect to this draft resolution. The resolution was sponsored by the representatives of Argentina, Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, Haiti, Iceland. Iran, Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan. Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay.

The reply printed here is taken from p. 22 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61.

345. UNITED STATES PROPOSAL "TO END NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS IN ALL THE ENVIRONMENTS THAT CAN NOW BE EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED": Statement Read and Replies Made by the President (Eisenhower) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, February 11, 1960 (Excerpts) 2

Statement

The United States is today presenting in Geneva a proposal, involving the ending of nuclear weapons tests, to end the apparent deadlock in the negotiations. This Government has stood, throughout, for complete abolition of weapons testing subject only to the attainment of agreed and adequate methods of inspection and control. The present proposal is designed to end nuclear weapons tests in all the environments that can now be effectively controlled.

It would end forthwith, under assured controls:

(1) all nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere; (2) all nuclear weapons tests in the oceans:

(3) all nuclear weapons tests in those regions in space where effective controls can now be agreed to; and

(4) all nuclear weapons tests beneath the surface of the earth which can be monitored.

This proposal will permit, through a coordinated program of research and development, a systematic extension of the ban to the remaining areas, especially those involving underground tests, for which adequate control measures appear not to be possible now.

These are initial but far-reaching and yet readily attainable steps toward a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests. If adopted, they will prevent increases in the level of radioactivity in the atmosphere and so allay worldwide concern. They are steps which offer an opportunity to consolidate the important progress made in the negotiations thus far. It is our hope that the Soviet Union will join with us in this constructive beginning.

Replies to Questions

[Whether the United States would resume underground testing during the period in which American and Soviet technicians were developing the techniques for monitoring underground tests, as contemplated in the new United States proposals] is a question that, of course, itself has not yet been resolved. I have already told you that laboratory testing-not of weapons testing, but of just the nuclear science-goes on all the time. But when it comes down to weapons

2 The text of the statement is taken from p. 327 of the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 29, 1960. The replies to questions are taken from pp. 170 and 173 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61. For the text of the statement made by the U.S. representative (Wadsworth) introducing these formal proposals at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, Feb. 11, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960 (Department of State publication 7172), pp. 33–39.

testing, that is something that we would have to decide with our own allies.

We are not going to make an agreement [to stop underground testing] when we can't know, when we cannot have any information as to whether or not it will be carried out by the other fellow as well as ourselves. That's what the problem is about. You see, we have been asked, time and again, to stop all testing and, indeed, to eliminate all bombs just by everybody unilaterally and voluntarily doing so. This is the kind of a system we will not accept. We say there must be adequate examination, verification, and enforcement.

... I believe that we are probably tackling the most difficult of all problems in this disarmament thing when we put all our attention on nuclear testing and nuclear use. Here is something, our scientists have testified over the years, that even if today you stop manufacturing plutonium and U-235, you could still conceal such an amount of destructive power that, to start at this end of the thing to establish the kind of inspection systems that are necessary, we are probably taking the most thorny thing and allowing that to keep us from other places.

Now, in testing, I think the program that we put forward today is a good one and ought to lead finally to even a better one. But I think that we should look at disarmament on such a broad scale that we can find the areas where we can make progress, but not letting this one [nuclear test area] bar us from some progress along the line. Only as we make progress of this kind is there going to be a real lessening of tension.

346. SOVIET REJECTION OF THE REVISED UNITED STATES PROPOSALS FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN AGREEMENT AND COUNTERPROPOSAL FOR CRITERIA TO DETERMINE SEISMIC EVENTS JUSTIFYING INSPECTION: Statement Made by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, February 16, 1960 (Excerpts) 3

On 11 February the United States presented new proposals which, if they were adopted, would result in a new and serious impetus being given to an intensification of the nuclear arms race. The adoption of the new United States proposal would lead to the resumption of nuclear weapon tests, to the legalization of this highly dangerous course in international relations. The new United States proposal is a serious and dangerous step backwards in the Geneva negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. This proposal openly invites the nuclear Powers to resume nuclear weapon tests which were suspended fifteen months ago. It goes without saying that the new United

U.N. doc. GEN/DNT/PV.172, pp. 3-7 (text as printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 40-44).

Supra.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1357-1360 and 1363.

States proposal, which provides for the resumption of nuclear weapon tests, is unacceptable. It cannot be taken in any way as a basis for reaching any agreement. Undoubtedly the change in the attitude of the United States in regard to a comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, which is shown by its putting forward its new proposal, very greatly hampers the Geneva negotiations. The new United States proposal is the latest in turn of the very serious obstacles along the path of negotiations.

At the one hundred and seventieth meeting on 11 February, speaking after the submission by the United States representative of his new proposal, the United Kingdom representative suggested that we should revert to consideration of the proposal on temporary criteria." The Soviet Union delegation considers that the idea of temporary criteria, put forward by the United Kingdom representative exactly a month ago and actually supported also by the United States representative, deserves attention because this proposal offers a possibility of overcoming the difficulties which our Conference has encountered on the path towards conclusion of a comprehensive treaty and the establishment of a control system.

7

To this end the USSR delegation, on the instructions of the Government, submits the following proposal:

The Soviet Union would be prepared to agree that in the initial phase of the operation of the control organization approximately for a period of two to three years inspection teams shall be despatched on the basis of the simplest criteria which may be agreed upon. During this period the control commission shall, in the light of experience in the operation of the control system, elaborate and make more precise the necessary criteria for identifying the major part of seismic events. The Soviet Union could agree to the despatch of inspection teams during the initial period of the operation of the control organization within quotas agreed upon on the basis of the following general criteria, on which in the main the views of the Soviet and United States experts coincide:

1. An event may be regarded as suspicious and subject to inspection only if it is located according to the data of several surrounding control posts within an area up to approximately 200 square kilometres, in accordance with the recommendations of the 1958 experts' report. If the control posts are situated to one side of the event, that is, where disposition around the epicentre of the explosion is not possible (most often in coastal areas) the event may be located within a greater area.

A seismic event shall be considered to be located when seismic signals, whose frequencies, amplitudes, durations and velocities are consistent with those of waves from earthquakes or explosions, are recorded at a sufficient number of control posts to establish the approximate time and position of the event. This requires at least four clearly measurable arrival times of identifiable phases which are mutually consistent to within 3 seconds. These four consistent arrival times must include P-wave arrival times at three different control posts.

2. A located seismic event shall be ineligible for inspection if, and only if, it fulfils one or more of the following criteria:

(a) its depth of focus is established as below 60 kilometres;

(b) its epicentral location is established to be in the deep open ocean and the event is unaccompanied by a hydroacoustic signal consistent with the seismic epicentre and origin time;

(c) it is established within 48 hours to be a foreshock by the occurrence of a larger event of at least magnitude 6 whose epicentre coincides with that of the given event within the accuracy of the determination of the two epicentres. (d) it is established to be an aftershock of a seismic event of at least magnitude 6 which has been clearly identified as an earthquake by the criteria in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above. For this purpose an aftershock is defined as one of a sequence of earthquakes which occurs less than one week after

"See U.N. doc. GEN/DNT/PV.170, p. 22.

'See Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 22–25.