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they declared their readiness in principle to assume such a commitment. raises the hope that in the very near future differences may be resolved and a treaty on the cessation of testing concluded.

53

Will we succeed in accomplishing this? The answer depends primarily on the length of the moratorium on underground nuclear explosions proposed by the United States of America and Britain. But they continue to hedge on this. We have named our time limit-four or five years. Why have we suggested this period? Dear comrades, I shall reveal a secret to you. When we were discussing this question in the government, we were reminded that Chairman McCone of the American Atomic Energy Commission claimed that it would take at least four or five years to improve the methods of monitoring underground nuclear explosions. So we decided that, rather than complicate matters, it would be better to propose a time limit that would be acceptable to our partners.

But now the Western powers consider a time limit of four or five years "excessive". Further progress in the negotiations on the discontinuing of nuclear tests is now up to the Western powers. Let us hope that the heads of government will at long last succeed in finding a solution to this urgent matter.

Touching on the issues to be considered at the summit conference, I should like to voice a certain wariness. The closer we come to May 16, the day the heads of government meet, the more one-sided the line some of the Western powers' statesmen are taking on the problems facing the conference participants. They are searching out and making much of precisely those sides of particular problems whose accentuation cannot contribute to mutually agreeable solutions. Such an approach, understandably, cannot help in finding a way to settle important international issues. On the contrary, it leads to the sustaining of tension and, accordingly, hinders the normalization of relations between states.

The peoples will judge the sincerity of intentions by what each of the four powers brings with it to the conference, by the contribution each of them is prepared to make to the relaxation of international tension. But if one takes as the starting point the statement by Mr. Dillon-who is, of course, no outsider in U.S. government circles-it turns out that the government of the U.S.A. will show a readiness to reach an understanding on disarmament and the improvement of relations between East and West if its viewpoint on the Berlin question is accepted.

54

What need had Dillon to come out with a statement so clearly out of keeping with the atmosphere that has been established in relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. since my talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David? 55 This may simply be a show of pugnacity by a diplomat who has taken it into his head that the other party will become more tractable if a bit of pressure is brought to bear on it before the negotiations begin. I should like to tell Mr. Dillon and any others who may see things his way that such tactics are least of all suited to dealing with the Soviet Union.

I would not have dwelt on the speech made by the U.S. Under Secretary of State were it not that right now there are other factors that put us on our guard, factors that find expression not only in words but in deeds as well.

First of all, let us turn to the problem of disarmament. What grounds are there for voicing a certain wariness in connection with this question? Unfortunately, very considerable grounds.

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The Western powers-as they did earlier, in the darkest years of the "cold war"-regard the question of control as paramount in importance, and choose virtually to sidestep measures for actual disarmament. If control were established and foreign observers and inspectors were permitted on the territories of states without the adoption at the same time of any measures for disarmament,

52 Text post, doc. 351.

54 See supra.

53

See the Soviet statement of Mar. 21, 1960; post, doc. 349.

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See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 921-931.

such control would constitute to call things by their right names-reconnaissance, espionage, but not disarmament.

We cannot agree and we will not agree to the substitution of control for disarmament. For our part, we shall do all we can to secure disarmament coupled with the most thorough and comprehensive control. The abolition of all means of destruction, including nuclear weapons and rockets, and the disbanding of armies-this is our objective.

The position being taken by some Western statesmen regarding consideration at the pending summit conference of problems bearing on Germany also occasions no little wariness in us. Apparently there are those who hope to reduce this meeting to a noncommittal exchange of opinions, perhaps to mere conversations, and to shirk the framing of concrete solutions either for the disarmament question, of which I have already spoken, or the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

The conclusions of a peace treaty with Germany is [a] question ... wholly within the competence of the victorious powers and has long been ripe for solution. We shall therefore argue the need to settle this question, and the related question of West Berlin. Preservation of the present situation in West Berlin would signify the preservation of a breeding ground of provocations, a breeding ground that may give rise to all sorts of surprise developments and conflicts and may even cause a catastrophe.

If, in spite of all our efforts, the Western powers refuse to seek jointly with the Soviet Union an agreed solution to the question of a peace treaty, and, in defiance of common sense, ignore this question, we shall of course go our own way and conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

It is common knowledge that the signing of a peace treaty puts an end to all the conditions resulting from a country's surrender. Therefore when a peace treaty has been signed with the German Democratic Republic, the conditions resulting from surrender will lapse throughout the territory controlled by the government of that state. Accordingly, the rights obtained by the Western powers as a result of Hitlerite Germany's surrender will become null and void with respect to that territory, including the right to further retention of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

West Berlin is situated within the territory of the German Democratic Republic. With the signing of a peace treaty, the German Democratic Republic will naturally exercise the rights of sovereignty over all its state territory. If, therefore, the Western powers refuse to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, this will not reserve for them the rights on whose retention they are insisting. They will naturally lose the right of access to West Berlin by land, water and air.

We have done and shall continue to do everything we can to avoid being misunderstood. We would like to hope that our partners in the negotiations will also be guided by good intentions, and that we shall succeed in arriving at a working agreement and in eliminating through further efforts the existing tension and disposing of the issues that hinder the normalization of relations.

The Soviet Government believes that common sense will carry the day and that when the negotiations at the summit conference have ended and the conferees have departed from Paris, relations between the countries represented will be better than they were previously, rather than the reverse.

175. FRENCH-UNITED STATES PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE: Joint Communiqué Issued at Washington by the President of the United States (Eisenhower) and the President of the French Republic (General de Gaulle), April 25, 1960 56

The President of the United States and the President of the French Republic have had a series of talks from April 22 to 25 on the occasion of the visit of General de Gaulle." The Secretary of State of the United States, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France and the Ambassadors of the two countries have taken part in these talks.

The exchanges of views which they have had have permitted them to define more precisely the positions which will be taken at the Summit Conference on the questions which will be raised there.

The main purpose of this Conference in the view of the two Presidents is to achieve an easing of tensions in the international situation.

...

176. "THE MOST WE CAN HOPE FOR [AT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE] IS EASE OF TENSION, SOME EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE COMING CLOSER TOGETHER": Replies Made by the President (Eisenhower) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, April 27, 1960 (Excerpts) 58

I don't think that we should take that [Chairman Khrushchev's address at Baku] 59 too seriously; but certainly if he means it as an ultimatum, which I don't believe he does, but if he does, then I would have to reply just as I have to him before, and said to him, I shall never go to any meeting under a threat of force, the use of force, or an ultimatum of any kind. I'm going there as a free representative of a free country if I go, and I'm sure he understands that. Therefore, I don't believe that his statement means a real change in policy. It's just a mere- -more of the same.

Now, you say that you'd like to know about my hopes for the summit. I think the most we can hope for, at this time, is ease of tension, some evidence that we are coming closer together-sufficiently so that people have a right to feel a little bit more confident in the world in which they are living and in its stability.

5 White House press release dated Apr. 25, 1960 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, May 16, 1960, p. 771).

ST Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, President of the Community, made a state visit to the United States April 22-29. President de Gaulle, accompanied by Mme. de Gaulle and party, was in Washington from April 22 to 26 and then began a brief trip in the United States that included stops at New York City, San Francisco, and New Orleans. [Note in source text.] For the text of President de Gaulle's address before a joint session of the Congress, Apr. 25, see ibid., pp. 771–773.

"The replies printed here are taken from pp. 364–366 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61.

"Ante, doc. 174.

How this might come about, I don't know. There are, of course, the subjects of ceasing of tests and with a controlled system for that, for developing some step in disarmament, and for greater contacts, particularly cultural contacts. I think that there are a number of ways in which this might begin, and that's about all you can say.

I reported to you people that Mr. Khrushchev said that he was going to raise this [Berlin] question [at the summit conference], he was going to try to argue it, but that he was not putting any time limit upon an accomplishment.

I think that certainly, at that moment, he meant it. He knows that there are certain events coming around in the world. There are elections here and abroad and every place else; possibly he wants to see what's going to happen, I don't know. For example, there is a German election 60 in which he is unquestionably interested. And he is probably hoping for some closer relations between West Germany and some of the border states, particularly like Poland. So there are other developments that he could expect or would hope to come about that would help to solve his problems from his viewpoint. But I think that is the reason that he sees there is no reason for putting down an ultimatum at this moment, because otherwise you just run into an immovable object and an irresistible force, and there you are. Of course, that would have a very great effect on the hopes that we have.

61

I think our position [on the problems of Germany and Berlin] has been so clearly stated in speeches over the years, just recently one by the Vice President, one by [Under] Secretary Dillon,62 one by the Secretary of State. The point is that we are not going to give up the juridical position that we have.

It doesn't seem feasible or possible to me that any agreement could now be reached that would settle this whole thing; that we have to remember. But that does not mean that some kind of progress cannot be made, the side issue or side effect of which could be making a better approach toward Berlin in the months to come.

61

The Land Baden-Württemberg election, held May 15, 1960.

Apr. 23, 1960, before the American Society of Newspaper Editors; text in the New York Times, Apr. 24, 1960.

62 Ante, doc. 173.

63

Apr. 4, 1960; text in the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 25, 1960, pp. 635-640.

B. The U-2 Incident and the Collapse of the Summit Conference

...

"A NASA U-2 RESEARCH AIRPLANE ... APPARENTLY WENT DOWN IN THE LAKE VAN, TURKEY, AREA.. SUNDAY, MAY 1": Statement of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 3, 1960 1

177. SOVIET PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNITED STATES AIR RECONNAISSANCE OVER THE SOVIET UNION: Address by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) Before the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., May 5, 1960 (Excerpts)2

Comrade Deputies! Upon the instructions of the Soviet Government, I must report to you on aggressive actions against the Soviet Union in the past few weeks on the part of the United States of America.

What were these aggressive actions? The United States of America has been sending aircraft that have been crossing our state frontiers and intruding into the airspace of the Soviet Union.

The next-to-last aggressive act was committed by the United States of America on April 9, 1960. A United States plane intruded into the airspace of our motherland from the Afghanistan side. Of course, no sane person will think or assume that this violation was committed by Afghanistan, a country on friendly terms with us. We are convinced that this plane belonged to the United States of America, and that it was probably based somewhere on the territory of Turkey, Iran or Pakistan, which are linked to the United States through the obligations of the aggressive CENTO bloc.

When this intrusion took place, some of our comrades asked whether the United States of America should not be warned. After all, such actions are not at all in harmony with the negotiations we conducted with the U.S. President and other American statesmen when we were in the United States. We reached an agreement with the U.S. President on a summit meeting, and this meeting, as the saying goes, is literally under our nose. Aggressive violations of the borders of a foreign country are a poor preparation for such a meeting..

...

We had a discussion in the government, and we decided not to take any special measures and not to write any notes or memorandums, since we knew from past experience that this is in fact does not produce any results. The aggressive circles, thinking they are stronger, act according to the principle: the weak complain against the strong; the strong pay no attention to this and continue their brazen actions.

1 Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1960, p. 817. This statement was made orally in response to press inquiries.

The excerpts printed here are taken from pp. 17-19 of the English-language text appearing in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XII, No. 18, June 1, 1960.

'See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 921–931.

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