"THE SEARCH FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE, WHICH PADEREWSKI EXEMPLIFIED IN HIS TIME, LIVES ON IN THE WORLD TODAY AS MEN SEEK TO ACHIEVE OR PRESERVE THEIR FREEDOM": Remarks Made by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) at Ceremonies Dedicating the Ignace Jan Paderewski "Champion of Liberty" Stamp, Washington, October 8, 1960 1 4 UNITED STATES RESTORATION OF MOST-FAVOREDNATION RATES OF DUTY TO IMPORTS FROM POLAND, EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 16, 1960: Announcement Issued by the White House, November 17, 1960 5 Rumania RUMANIAN-UNITED STATES AGREEMENT ON SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS ARISING OUT OF WAR DAMAGE, NATIONALIZATION AND COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL DEBTS, Signed at Washington, March 30, 19601 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPANDED TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUMANIA: Announcements Issued at Washington and Bucharest, March 30 and 31, 1960 2 RUMANIAN-UNITED STATES 3 4 Department of State press release No. 586; ibid., Oct. 31, 1960, p. 677. White House (Augusta, Ga.) press release dated Nov. 17, 1960; ibid., Dec. 5, 1960, pp. 863-864. Most-favored-nation treatment of imports from Poland had been suspended, Jan. 5, 1952; see ibid., Dec. 3, 1951, pp. 913-914. 'TIAS 4451; 11 UST 317; 371 UNTS 163; the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 25, 1960, pp. 670–673. 2 * Department of State press release No. 158; the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 25, 1960, p. 671. 3 TIAS 4642; 11 UST 2544; the Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 26, 1960, pp. 968-972. Yugoslavia YUGOSLAV-UNITED STATES DISCUSSIONS ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, FEBRUARY 27-APRIL 1, 1960: Announcement Issued by the Department of State, April 1, 1960 1 1 YUGOSLAV AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 3 (CLAIMS OF NON-CITIZEN AMERICAN NATIONALS) OF THE UNITED STATES-YUGOSLAV 1948 AGREEMENT ON THE SETTLEMENT OF PECUNIARY CLAIMS: Announcement Issued by the Department of State, May 19, 1960 2 'Department of State press release No. 165; the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 18, 1960, pp. 599–600. 'Department of State press release No. 273; ibid., June 13, 1960, pp. 973–974. For the text of the 1948 agreement, see TIAS 1803 (62 Stat. 2658; 89 UNTS 43). Part VI THE SOVIET UNION A. Preparations for the Summit Conference "LET THIS NEW YEAR BE THE YEAR OF A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUN TRIES": Message From the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (Voroshilov) and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) to the President of the United States (Eisenhower), December 31, 19591 "THE UNITED STATES SEEKS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN A WORLD WHERE ALL QUESTIONS ARE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS ALONE": Message From the President of the United States (Eisenhower) to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (Voroshilov) and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev), January 2, 1960 2 156. "SHOULD ALL OUR EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY WITH THE TWO GERMAN STATES PROVE UNSUCCESSFUL, THE SOVIET UNION... WILL SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, WITH ALL THE ATTENDANT CONSE QUENCES": Report by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) to the Fourth Session of the Fifth Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., January 14, 1960 (Excerpts) 3 The leaders of the Western countries have not yet abandoned the "positions of strength" and "brink of war" policies. Although the chief advocate of these 3 1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 25, 1960, pp. 119-120. 2 White House (Augusta, Ga.) press release dated Jan. 4, 1960; ibid., p. 119. These excerpts are taken from pp. 11-12 of The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XII, No. 2, Feb. 10, 1960. (382) policies has died, his bellicose exhortations have not yet been consigned to the archives or discarded. Chancellor Adenauer is especially zealous. But Mr. Adenauer and those who like to repeat with him that they will continue to pursue the "positions of strength" policy need to look at things realistically. . . . When the Western countries enjoyed economic superiority and a monopoly on so powerful a weapon as the atom bomb, there was a certain logic in this policy, although even then this was no reason to follow a "positions of strength" policy. But now that the Soviet Union possesses atomic and hydrogen weapons, now that our country has demonstrated to the whole world its superiority in rocketry, now that the economies of the Soviet Union and all the countries in the socialist camp are flourishing and now that this camp is cohesive and united and all peoples are striving to unite their efforts to ensure peace in these conditions the "positions of strength" policy is sheer folly. It should be kept in mind that on the eve of the second world war the Soviet Union was the only socialist country, and that it found itself in a capitalist encirclement. At that time superiority in economic and in other resources was not on our side. Today the situation is altogether different. . . . Surely it is plain to see that to follow a "positions of strength" policy with regard to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in present-day conditions means to embark upon a path of disastrous adventures. This adventurist policy is now manifested most clearly in West Germany. . . We have heard Mr. Adenauer's assurances that he is not a revanchist and would not tolerate a single minister in his government who was a revanchist. The German people indeed do not want to have anything to do with revanchists. But how can Chancellor Adenauer's statements be reconciled with the West German government's efforts to revise the state frontiers in Europe, which were established after the second world war, or with the hostile reception it accords any declarations aimed at elimination of the vestiges of the second world war, the signing of a peace treaty with Germany and the establishment of lasting peace in Europe? Or take Adenauer's latest trip to West Berlin' and the provocative speech in which he stated that if it came to atomic war, nothing would be left of the Soviet Union. All this leads us to believe that Adenauer has failed to draw a conclusion from the lessons that were taught the German fascists and is following their path. It is to be assumed that Hitler's final "laurels" cannot be tempting to Adenauer. It should be stated as explicitly as possible that should the out-and-out fascists who are now being given access to positions of authority and command and permitted to create a Bundeswehr and to command the armed forces of NATO gain the upper hand in West Germany, and should this reptile choose to crawl beyond its own borders, not only would it fail to slither as far as Moscow and Stalingrad, as was the case during the Hitlerite attack, but it would be squashed on its own territory. There are extremely dangerous tendencies in the policy of the F.G.R. government, and unless the peace-loving forces suppress these tendencies, they may have very sad consequences and lead to a third world war. All this, comrades, confirms again the urgency of the problem of concluding a peace treaty with both German states, the solution of which has long been urged by the Soviet government. Such a treaty would once and for all mark finis to the second world war, ensure the peaceful and democratic development of all Germany and assure its neighbors that West Germany would not take the path of new aggression. It is the view of the Soviet government that a peace settlement with Germany is an urgent international question, a question of paramount importance. Jan. 11, 1960. We shall exert every effort to see that this question is finally resolved. We are sincerely striving to find, together with our allies in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany, a solution to the German problem. We anticipate, furthermore, that the question of West Berlin will also be settled thereby on an agreed basis. However, should all our efforts to conclude a peace treaty with the two German states prove unsuccessful, the Soviet Union, along with other states prepared to do so, will sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, with all the attendant consequences. [UNITED STATES VIEWS ON "THE SOVIET UNION'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN APPROXIMATE 1.2 MILLION PROPOSED REDUCTION IN ITS CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES": Statement Read to Correspondents by the Director of the Office of News (White), Department of State, January 14, 1960-Post, doc. 327] 157. THE SCHEDULE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION: Announcement Issued by the White House, January 17, 1960 5 As already announced earlier, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N. S. Khrushchev, invited the President of the United States to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union at a time suitable for him. President Eisenhower accepted with pleasure the invitation of N. S. Khrushchev." As a result of subsequent personal exchanges between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, N. S. Khrushchev, and President Eisenhower, it was agreed that the President would make his visit in the Soviet Union from the 10th until the 19th of June 1960. 158. DISCONTINUANCE OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON THE UNSETTLED SOVIET LENDLEASE ACCOUNT: Statement Issued by the Department of State, January 27, 1960 A profound difference of opinion has become apparent between the Soviet and U.S. Governments concerning the terms of reference of the negotiations which began January 11, 1960, on the unsettled Soviet lend-lease account. Following the conversations at Camp David, it had been the understanding of the U.S. Government that these negotiations were to deal with the lend-lease settlement as a separate and independent problem. In conformity with this understanding White House press release dated Jan. 17, 1960 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 1. 1960, p. 147). 5 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 930-931. 7 Department of State press release No. 42 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 15, 1960, pp. 239-240). 8 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 930-931. Docs. 157, 158 |