146. UNITED KINGDOM SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNITY: Statement Made by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lloyd) in the House of Commons, July 25, 1960 (Excerpts) 36

I beg to move,

That this House recognises the need for political and economic unity in Europe and would welcome the conclusion of suitable arrangements to that end, satisfactory to all the Governments concerned.

The first matter mentioned in the Motion is that of European unity, the need for political and economic unity in Europe. I want to make certain points absolutely clear. We in Britain regard ourselves as part of Europe. By history, by tradition, by civilisation, by sentiment, by geography, we are part of Europe.

I speak not only of Western Europe. It is true that at the moment there is a tragic division between East and West, a line which runs from Stettin to the Balkans. It is only too true that there are now ancient parts of Europe, formerly closely tied by culture and religion to the centre of Europe which are now on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Russia herself has played a great part in European history. We must accept the fact that many countries of Europe are now temporarily estranged, and, facing reality, in speaking of Europe in my speech today, I shall, for the most part, be referring to Western Europe.

My first point is that if Britain were to be regarded as outside Europe we could not fulfil our complete role in the world. Nor do I believe that Europe would be complete without us.

My second point is with regard to the European Economic Community, the Six. We have, from the beginning, welcomed the formation of the Community of the Six as a step towards European unity. We welcome the economic strength and the political cohesion that the Community of the Six is bringing about. In particular, we welcome the new relationship between France and Germany. But although we have welcomed the Six from the beginning, we have always been conscious of the danger that it might lead to a political division between us.

Faced with this problem of the possible division between the Six and the rest of Europe, we tried to solve the problem by putting forward, in 1957, proposals for a European Free Trade Area." We did this with the support of many Governments. Indeed, we did it with the support of all of the Governments of the Six. I was repeatedly assured by my French colleagues at that time that they favoured that sort of plan, although they were quite frank about the difficulties which they thought they would have with their Parliament over its ratification. But each of the Governments of the Six declared that they thought that the complement to the Treaty of Rome was the formation of a Free Trade Area in Europe.

However, as we know, in the event those negotiations failed. The plan did not prove acceptable to the Six, although there was a wide measure of support for our proposals. I think that we have to recognise that fact and realise that another set of proposals of the same nature have no chance of acceptance. I think that it is important to make up our minds on that point if we are to make progress in the future.

"Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series, vol. 625, House of Commons, cols. 1099-1110.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, pp. 578–585.

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See ibid., 1958, pp. 539–557, and ibid., 1959, pp. 530–575.

Because of the failure of those negotiations, it was natural that some countries outside the Six, who, during the negotiations, had shown that they were able and willing to adopt free trade arrangements, should act together, and this led to the formation of the European Free Trade Association-E.F.T.A.— by the Stockholm Treaty."

We see three advantages in E.F.T.A. First, it is an association of countries with populations of over 90 million, with high living standards, with highly developed industrial and agricultural skills, and it is in itself a powerful economic unit with great opportunities for expanding trade. Secondly, the formation into a group of these seven European countries has helped to preserve cohesion in the European economic system. I am sure that that will be proved to be so in any forthcoming negotiations. Thirdly, the successful negotiation of the Treaty of Stockholm shows that it is possible for us to belong to a purely economic European association consistent with our Commonwealth membership.

Our purpose is a united Europe, and we accept the need for some political organisation as an element in this unity. That being our objective, what are the problems and how should we seek to proceed?

First, the Commonwealth. . . . The strength and cohesion of the Commonwealth is, in part, buttressed by its economic pattern, and we have a duty to see that no action of ours in the economic field endangers the immense political potential of this association.

That is where the first problem arises, because acceptance of a common tariff of the Six, as laid down in the Treaty of Rome, would be the end of the principle of Commonwealth duty-free entry of goods and commodities. It would mean not only putting a tariff on the Commonwealth, but giving free entry to European producers and so a preference to them over the Commonwealth producers except for items on which the common tariff is nil. This would affect a large part of the Commonwealth sales in this country.

If, in addition, we adopted the common agricultural policy of the Six, embodying protection not only by tariffs but by various other means, this would be a further blow to one of the most important parts of Commonwealth trade. . . . The second problem is agriculture. The nature of the common agricultural policy which the Six propose, just as the kind of agricultural policies currently in operation in the individual countries of the Six, is basically different from our agricultural policy in the United Kingdom. Broadly speaking, theirs is a system under which the consumer pays the cost of farm support directly through the price of food in the shop. Ours is a system under which the cost of farm support is met directly by the Exchequer, and, therefore, by the taxpayer. As a result, we have much lower consumer prices in general than the Six. Indeed, we have cheaper food than most countries in the world.

A switch to the system proposed by the European Commission could have a severe impact on both the consumer and the producer in this country, and the extent of that impact could be uneven for different farm products, and its effects unpredictable. I think that a switch would involve for us fundamental readjustments in the farm support system, which, I think, has been recognised in this country as being best suited to our particular conditions. . .

The third matter is our commercial relations with third countries. Under the Treaty of Rome, apart from the question of the coordination of common policies within the Community, by 1970 members would have to abandon their direct commercial relations with third countries. In our case that would mean, amongst others, the countries of the Commonwealth, and the political consequences of such a development would be far-reaching. We have to remember that we do 84 per cent., I think it is, of our trade with countries outside the European Community, but, by their rules, by 1970 we would have to abandon our direct commercial relations with third countries.

There is also the question of the position of E.F.T.A. We attach great importance to our membership of that Association and we shall always act in the closest consultation with our E.F.T.A. partners. In loyalty to them we must ensure that any plan to secure political and economic unity in Europe takes 40 Text ante, doc. 142.

care of their interests and their preoccupations and is formulated after full discussion with them.

The last problem I wish to raise is that of institutions. It is no use trying to burke this issue and to say that there is not a problem, because there is. What is not yet clear is how the institutions of the Six are to work out. For us, with our traditions in this Parliament, with the contribution it has made to Parliamentary democracy, if the plan is to make this Parliament subordinate to some higher Parliament, it is no light matter. . . . If the higher Parliament were to control the whole social and economic life of the people, the fiscal policies, the financial systems, the commercial policies, I think that we, as Parliamentarians, would have to think very carefully about what our position would be. The abdication of our powers on these issues is not a matter lightly to be brushed aside. . .

I shall try to put before the House what I think is the course of action we should take. First, we have to develop in every way we can our trade and other relations with E.F.T.A. Secondly, there is no reason why E.F.T.A. trade with the Six should not expand, in view of the general prosperity in Europe. . . .

Next, it is in our interest from every point of view to try to reduce so far as possible the discrimination between the two groups and to play a full part in the G.A.T.T. conference this winter in order to bring about a useful reduction in the level of world tariffs. In addition, and perhaps most important of all, we have to do all in our power to strengthen the political will in Western Europe directly towards achieving satisfactory and suitable arrangements.

There is growing evidence of the political will to find a way to the goal of European unity in some form. I say this quite frankly: I think that it would help if we could be given some indication of the attitude of the Six towards the special problems which I have mentioned-particularly the problems of Commonwealth free entry, support for United Kingdom agriculture, and the possibilities of meeting the special needs of our associates in E.F.T.A. I repeat that we are anxious to discuss these matters.

We recognise, however, that none of these courses is a full substitute for a thoroughgoing European solution. In the present state of the world-the current difficulties in East-West relations, the explosive happenings in Africa, the dangers elsewhere it is obvious that Western Europe must come closer together. I therefore ask the House to state in the clearest possible terms that we recognise the need for political and economic unity in Europe and would welcome the conclusion of suitable arrangements to that end satisfactory to all the Governments concerned." We, for our part, are prepared to work wholeheartedly for that conclusion.

"The House of Commons, following a debate, later this same evening adopted the motion as phrased in the initial par. of the Secretary's statement by a vote of 215 to 4.

147. "A SOLUTION SHOULD BE FOUND OF THE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE EXISTENCE OF TWO ECONOMIC GROUPS IN EUROPE": Communiqué Issued at Bonn by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Adenauer) and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (Macmillan), August 11, 1960 *

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At the invitation of the Federal Chancellor the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Home, visited Bonn on Aug. 10 and 11.

They were accompanied by Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Under Secretary in Charge of European Questions in the Foreign Office, and Sir Roderick Barclay. Adviser on European Economic Affairs. This visit continued the series of meetings which have taken place on several occasions during the last few years. During the talks which the British ministers had with the Federal Chancellor and with the Federal Foreign Minister, Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, they raised in a frank and friendly manner the important questions of common concern to the two countries.

The two heads of government attach particular importance to this meeting because the latest developments in the international situation make the close cooperation of the free world essential.

They found themselves in full agreement in the broad objectives to be followed in the interest of Europe and the free world. They agreed that it is essential in the interests of European unity that a solution should be found of the problems arising from the existence of two economic groups in Europe. They undertook to study, in cooperation with their respective partners, all possible solutions of these problems, and to exchange ideas.

Both Governments see in the unity of the free nations and the peace of the world the overriding objectives to which the solution of other problems should contribute.

148. FRENCH CONCEPT OF THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Reply Made by the President of the French Republic (General de Gaulle) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, Paris, September 5, 1960 "

With the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and, moreover, conforming with the policy perfectly defined and followed by the [French] Government, we have in fact recently inaugurated a series of consultations with the heads of state or government of the countries of Western Europe, more specifically those of the Europe called "the Europe of the Six", which has not preventedand we hope will not prevent-seeing again the British Prime Minister on an occasion which will be necessarily a good occasion.

Assuredly, while awaiting that the problem of Europe is tackled as a whole, and hand to hand, it is true that it has been possible to institute certain organisms more or less extra- or supra-national. These organisms have their technical value, but have not and cannot have authority and, in consequence, political efficacity.

To assure the regular cooperation of the states of Western Europe, that is what France considers as being desirable, possible, and practicable in the political, economic, cultural domain, and in that of defense.

What does this involve? It involves an organized, regular concert of the

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Text as printed in the New York Times, Aug. 12, 1960.

Reuters English-language translation as printed in the New York Times, Sept. 6, 1960.

Docs. 147, 148

responsible governments and then the work of specialist organisms in each of the common domains and subordinated to the governments.

It involves the periodic deliberation of an assembly which would be formed by delegates of the national parliaments and, to my way of thinking, it must involve, as soon as possible, a solemn European referendum so as to give to the launching of Europe the character of popular approval and intention which is indispensable to it.

It is a fact that the states of Europe have at present between them and in common together very great means of action and also, moreover, very great problems.

It is a fact that their former enmities are reduced to minor proportions. In short, it is a fact that the occasion thus presents itself to organize this cooperation between themselves. That is what France proposes.

B. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration

MIGRATION FROM EUROPE IN 1960: Report of the Adviser on Refugee and Migration Affairs (Warren), Department of State, on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Sessions of the Executive Committee and the Twelfth Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Geneva, January 5-14, April 26-May 4, and May 5-14, 19601

THE 1960-1961 PROGRAM FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION: Report of the Adviser on Refugee and Migration Affairs (Warren), Department of State, on the Sixteenth Session of the Executive Committee and the Thirteenth Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Geneva, November 23-30 and December 1-9, 1960 2

C. The Problems of Germany and Berlin

[NOTE: Because of the fact that, for 1960, the problems of Germany and Berlin became an integral part of the preparations for and aftermath of the unsuccessful summit conference, the documents which could otherwise have been carried in this section (a feature of the preceding annual volumes) are printed in sections A, B, and C of Part VI, "The Soviet Union."]

Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 15, 1960, pp. 254–258. * Ibid., Mar. 13, 1961, pp. 386-389.