into the picture, sometimes with very modest means, sometimes in strength, so as to eliminate a political, economic and social, or military vacuum.

The view expressed here as to the special possibilities and responsibilities of the Organization in situations of a vacuum has reached an unusually clear expression in the case of the Congo. There, the main argument presented for United Nations intervention was the breakdown of law and order, the rejection of the attempt to maintain order by foreign troops, and the introduction of the United Nations Force so as to create the basis for the withdrawal of the foreign troops and for the forestalling of initiatives to introduce any other foreign troops into the territory with the obvious risks for widening international conflict which would ensue.

Whether the Congo operation is characterized as a case of preventive diplo macy, or as a move in order to fill a vacuum and to forestall the international risks created by the development of such a vacuum, or as a policy aimed at the localization of a conflict with potentially wide international repercussions, is not essential. Whatever the description, the political reality remains. It is a policy which is justified by the wish of the international community to avoid this important area being split by bloc conflicts. It is a policy rendered possible by the fact that both blocs have an interest in avoiding such an extension of the area of conflict because of the threatening consequences, were the localization of the conflict to fail.

Those who look with impatience at present day efforts by the United Nations to resolve major international problems are inclined to neglect, or to misread, the significance of the efforts which can be made by the United Nations in the field of practical politics in order to guide the international community in a direction of growing stability. They see the incapacity of the United Nations to resolve the major bloc conflicts as an argument against the very form of international co-operation which the Organization represents. In doing so, they forget what the Organization has achieved and can achieve, through its activities regarding conflicts which are initially only on the margin of, or outside, the bloc conflicts, but which, unless solved or localized, might widen the bloc conflicts and seriously aggravate them. Thus the Organization in fact also exercises a most important, though indirect, influence on the conflicts between the power blocs by preventing the widening of the geographical and political area covered by these conflicts and by providing for solutions whenever the interests of all parties in a localization of conflict can be mobilized in favour of its efforts. The Organization in this way also makes a significant contribution in the direction of an ultimate solution of the differences between the power blocs, as it is obvious that it is a condition for an improvement in the situation that the area to which those differences apply, as a minimum requirement, is not permitted to expand and, so far as possible, is reduced.

It is with this background that the initiative for United Nations intervention in the Congo conflict was taken under Article 99 of the Charter," for the first time applied fully, according to its letter and in the spirit in which it must have been drafted. It is also in this light that one has to view the fact that not only the first but also the subsequent decisions in the Security Council regarding the Congo have been taken by votes in which the power bloc conflicts have not been reflected.

These observations are of special interest when we turn to the consideration of questions regarding which the power bloc interests openly clash. I have in mind especially disarmament. In general terms, it is not surprising that, in the case of problems so deeply related to the security of many nations and to the predominant powers within the different blocs, negotiations have presented extraordinary difficulties. On the other hand, it is also evident that there is a latitude within which a shared interest in avoiding an aggravation of the situation overrides the specific security interests of any one party and within which, for that reason, agreement may be possible.

19 Which reads: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

De facto, we have seen such an agreement developing in the field of nuclear tests. I believe that there are also other questions within the field of disarmament regarding which success is possible for new efforts to reach agreement, on at least so much of a common de facto policy as is indicated by the mutual interest to avoid a widening of the substantive basis for the present day race towards a world crisis. Approached in this way, disarmament seems to offer important possibilities, still incompletely explored, of a gradual reduction of the area in which clashing security interests so far have rendered formal agreement impossible.

There is no contradiction between this application to the disarmament problem of the philosophy and practices successfully tried by the United Nations in specific conflicts and the view that there can be no solution to the disarmament problem short of the acceptance of total disarmament under satisfactory control by both sides. The pragmatic approach and the, so to say, global one are not at variance, for it is obvious that efforts to avoid a widening of the field of conflict and to reduce the area in which concrete agreement for the moment is impossible should at all events be integrated into a wider, more far-reaching plan under which the security interests of the parties can be balanced out against each other in ways that will make it possible for the parties to reach the ideal target of total disarmament.

It is certainly not productive to approach the disarmament problem solely on a pragmatic basis, without integration of the steps taken into a plan ultimately aiming at full disarmament. Likewise, however, it seems unrealistic to approach the total problem oblivious of the fact that all political experience and all previous negotiation show that the road to progress lies in the direction of efforts to contain and reduce the area of disagreement by mobilizing such common interests as may exist and as may override other and special interests tending in the opposite direction.

The Members of the General Assembly will excuse me for presenting these general observations on a problem to which the Assembly has devoted so much attention. I have done so only because it seems to me that the experiences from other political fields in which the United Nations has acted with success have a bearing also on a field like this one where, so far, the Organization has failed to achieve results.

IV

The responsibilities and possibilities of the Organization in the exercise of preventive diplomacy apply also to the economic sphere. Far less dramatic in their impact as the economic activities must be, they are of decisive long-term significance for the welfare of the international community. In the end, the United Nations is likely to be judged not so much by the criterion of how successfully it has overcome this or that crisis as by the significance of its total contribution towards building the kind of world community in which such crises will no longer be inevitable.

This aim, naturally, cannot be reached overnight, nor can it be considerably furthered by any institutional or constitutional reforms of the United Nations. It cannot even be achieved by the political resolution of the conflicts which today divide the major Powers. Essential though such a political resolution would be, it would not by itself ensure stability and peace in the face of the dangerous economic and social vacuum created and maintained by the enormous gap which separates countries at different stages of development.

In the enduring task of bridging the gulf between countries, all Member nations, whether developed or under-developed, whether in the East or the West, have a common interest. This common interest is recognized by everyone. It is clearly stated in the Charter of the United Nations, in which countries pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization to promote "higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development". It is reflected in all of the debates of the Economic and Social Council as well as of the General Assembly on the relevant items. It has borne fruit in a host of activities within the United Nations and its sister institutions. And yet, in considering the rate of progress that has been made in relation to the task that remains to be achieved, it is difficult to escape a feeling of disappointment.

It is true that the mere recognition of the community of interest in the economic development of under-developed countries itself represents a major step forward. And the expressions of common interest in economic development are no lip service. The achievements of the United Nations family in the economic and social field, as generously supported by Member Governments, demonstrates their seriousness. However, it must, in the context of a newly emerging Africa, be registered, in a spirit of candid realism, that the rate of achievement is not at all commensurate with the needs.

The coincidence of interest in the economic field stems from the economic interdependence of the world community. The degree of interdependence has been increasing rapidly, partly as the inevitable outcome of an accelerating rate of advance in science and technology, partly owing to the emergence of the countries of the continents of Asia and of Africa to independence and full participation in the affairs of the world at large, but, to a significant degree, also as a result of economic forces making for a growing integration of the world community.

For the first time in history, the concept of a world economy has come to take on a significant meaning not only for the student of economics but also for the statesman and the layman.

Unfortunately, this growing interdependence has recently been reflected much less in efforts and activities within the United Nations than outside it. The United Nations can welcome regional arrangements among neighboring or likeminded countries; as long as such arrangements are so designed as to reinforce rather than to supplant the common effort towards establishing conditions of economic and social progress, they have an important role to play. A real danger arises, however, when such regional arrangements are so envisaged as to make them fall within the sphere of bloc conflict. In that case, efforts which properly should embody and be supported by a common interest may instead lead to a weakening of the uniting force of that interest and aggravate the split. This, obviously, is the reverse of the major purpose and function of the United Nations in its efforts to provide for a growing measure of political stability.

Just as it is clearly within the interests of the entire world community to prevent the widening of the area of conflict in cases of political crises, so it must be in the interest of all constantly to seek to widen rather than to restrict the area of coincidence of economic interest within the United Nations. Unless this is done, the entire world, and not just one or the other side, is bound to lose. As I noted in my statement to the Economic and Social Council at its thirtieth session, "the United Nations Organization remains the only universal agency in which countries with widely differing political institutions and at different stages of economic development may exchange views, share their problems and experiences, probe each other's reactions to policies of mutual interest, and initiate collective action".20

It was this recognition of the growing area of coincidence of economic interest which was at the basis of my proposal and of the Council's decision that it hold its thirtieth session at the Ministerial level in order to undertake, at the beginning of a new decade, a broad examination of the direction to be taken by the United Nations to meet the challenge of both national and collective responsibility for economic growth and development."

2

At its thirteenth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1316 (XIII) calling upon Member States to undertake a review of accomplishments to date and to chart their future courses of co-operative action for the purpose of giving further impetus to the economic development of the less developed countries. At the national level also, many countries, both developed and underdeveloped, have found it useful to establish long-term plans for economic growth as guide-lines for economic policy, and others have established national commissions on economic and social goals and policies.

20 Statement of July 11, 1960. See U.N. doc. E/PV.1117.

92

See post, doc. 23.

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 151–152.

In the light of these events, and in the light of the changes that have taken place in the national economic and political landscape since the Charter was first signed, it was my belief that the Economic and Social Council might usefully explore the question of the desirability and feasibility of some United Nations undertaking to chart the future course of co-operative action to implement the economic and social objectives of the Charter.

A common stand has not yet been reached on the possibility or advisability of harmonizing and co-ordinating national economic policies. Even the idea of regular and systematic consultation with a view to achieving fuller knowledge of the facts and the issues is new. In view of the very modest and very recent progress in harmonization of national economic policies, even within regional groupings of like-minded countries, it is not surprising that no consensus on the possibility or desirability of harmonizing or co-ordinating national economic policies within the framework of the United Nations should as yet exist.

And yet, though the objective is not within immediate reach, and though I do not wish to underestimate the obstacles, the importance of a harmonization of national economic development policies within the United Nations must be stressed. Even though the session at the Ministerial level did not produce the results that some may have hoped, it did represent a beginning. It did lead to a useful exchange of views. It did provide an opportunity for contacts between Ministers in charge of economic questions, some of whom have only limited alternative possibilities of making such direct contacts. It did lead to at least one important step looking towards better co-ordination in the future of policies of economic projections. Thus, this meeting, with its achievements and its shortcomings-may be regarded as opening the door to new efforts to explore and utilize for common ends the wide area of common economic interests, at the same time as it demonstrates the difficulties we encounter and the early stage of evolution at which we still find ourselves.

Until now, the economic analyses undertaken by the Secretariat and consequently the debates within the Ecomonic and Social Council and the General Assembly have been concerned essentially with past and present trends. Now, with the programme of work in economic projections initiated by the Council, we may hope that, as we succeed in ascertaining the constituent elements of policies of economic growth, the Organization will be able to make an important contribution towards widening the bounds of the area of coincidence of interest within the United Nations, thus helping to harmonize decisions of Governments in the field of national policy and in the promotion of rapid and stable economic development for all.

V

In the Introduction to my Report to the General Assembly at its fourteenth session 2 I discussed the role of the United Nations. In that context I said: "The work of today within and for the United Nations is a work through which the basis may be laid for increasingly satisfactory forms of international co-operation and for a future international system of law and order, for which the world is not yet ripe."

I continued:

"It has so often been said that the world of today is one which requires organized international co-operation on a basis of universality that one repeats it with hesitation. However, there are reasons to do so. It still seems sometimes to be forgotten that-whatever views may be held about the United Nations as an institution-the principle of organized international co-operation on a basis of universality which is at present reflected in this Organization is one which has emerged from bitter experiences and should now be considered as firmly established."

In the previous parts of this Introduction I have tried to outline my views on some specific problems arising for the Organization at the present juncture, which may well, in the perspective of history, come to be regarded as a turning

" Text ibid., 1959, pp. 60–64.

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point. Especially, I have wished to draw the attention of the Members to the scope for possible diplomatic and political action by the Organization in a split world and to the desirability of the widening of that scope by patient and persistent action, using as the lever the community of interests which is created by the desire of everybody to limit the area of conflict, to reduce the risk of conflicts and to create a basis for joint action for solution, or at least localization, of conflicts.

Recent developments-reflected in a revolutionary technical evolution of arms for destruction, in the entry of new major regions of the world in full strength into international politics and in new and world-wide economic interdependence have given to the Organization, and what it represents as an instrument in the hands of Member Governments, greatly increased responsibilities, but also increased usefulness.

The Organization and its activities can be viewed on different levels. It provides Member Governments with a highly developed, continuously operating conference and negotiation machinery. However, to a growing extent it has provided them also with an effective executive organ for joint action. In this latter respect, the evolution has taken a course somewhat different from the one envisaged in San Francisco, but, as recent developments have shown, the departure as to methods is not considerable and the conformity as to aims is complete. Finally, the Organization is also the embodiment of an ideal and the symbol of an approach to international life which recognizes the common interest of all in the rejection of the use of force, in any form, as a means for settling international disputes and in adherence to the principles of law, justice, and human rights.

The Organization has often in the past been faced, and is likely in its continued work again and again to be faced, with situations in which a compromise with these last-mentioned principles might seem to facilitate the achievement of results in negotiations or to promise an easier success for the Organization in its executive efforts to resolve a problem. It is for the Members themselves to judge to what extent the Organization, in particular cases, has accepted such compromises and to what extent it has remained faithful to the principles and ideals which it embodies.

It is my firm conviction that any result bought at the price of a compromise with the principles and ideals of the Organization, either by yielding to force, by disregard of justice, by neglect of common interests or by contempt for human rights, is bought at too high a price. That is so because a compromise with its principles and purposes weakens the Organization in a way representing a definite loss for the future that cannot be balanced by any immediate advantage achieved.

The United Nations has increasingly become the main platform-and the main protector of the interests-of those many nations who feel themselves strong as members of the international family but who are weak in isolation. Thus, an increasing number of nations have come to look to the United Nations for leadership and support in ways somewhat different from those natural in the light of traditional international diplomacy. They look to the Organization as a spokesman and as an agent for principles which give them strength in an international concert in which other voices can mobilize all the weight of armed force, wealth, an historical role and that influence which is the other side of a special responsibility for peace and security. Therefore, a weakening of the Organization, resulting from an attempt to achieve results at the cost of principles, is a loss not only for the future but also immediately in respect of the significance of the Organization for the vast majority of nations and in respect of their confidence in the Organization on which its strength in our present day world ultimately depends.

There are in the Charter elements of a thinking which, I believe, belongs to an earlier period in the development of the world community. I have in mind especially the concept that the permanent members of the Security Council should not only, as is natural, be recognized as carrying special responsibility for peace and security, but that, further, these permanent members, working together, should represent a kind of "built-in" directing group for the world community as organized in the United Nations.