3 1. Article 86, paragraph 1, of the Charter states that the Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations: (a) Those Members administering Trust Territories; (b) Such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering Trust Territories; and (c) As many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer Trust Territories and those which do not. 2. On 1 January 1960 the composition of the Trusteeship Council was as follows: (a) Members administering Trust Territories: Australia Belgium New Zealand United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States of America (b) Members mentioned by name in Article 23 and not administering Trust Territories: 3. On 27 April 1960, upon the attainment of independence by the Trust Territory of Togoland under French administration (now the Togolese Republic), France ceased to administer any Trust Territory. France remains, however, a member of the Trusteeship Council as a member mentioned by name in Article 23 of the Charter. 4. On 1 July 1960, upon the attainment of independence by the Trust Territory of Somaliland (now the Republic of Somalia), Italy ceased to administer any Trust Territory and is no longer a member of the Trusteeship Council. 5. The Trusteeship Council is therefore presently not composed in accordance with the provisions of Article 86, paragraph 1c, of the Charter. 6. The question of the composition of the Trusteeship Council was discussed at the 857th plenary meeting of the fourteenth session of the General Assembly on 12 December 1959. The changes in the composition which have occurred since 1 January 1960 require that the fifteenth session of the General Assembly review the question anew in the light of the provisions of the Charter." For the text of the U.N. Charter, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, pp. 134–161. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 82-83. * Action taken at the resumed 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly by way of followup on the Secretary-General's explanatory memorandum will be indicated in the 1961 Current Documents volume. 5. THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION: Introduction to the Annual Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold) on the Work of the U.N. Organization During the Period June 16, 1959-June 15, 1960, Submitted August 31, 1960 (Excerpt) II The African developments are putting the United Nations to a test both as regards the functions of its parliamentary institutions and as regards the efficiency and strength of its executive capacity. The considerable increase in the membership of the United Nations stemming from a region with short independent experience in international politics has led to doubts regarding the possibility of the General Assembly and its committees to work expeditiously and in a way which truly reflects considered world opinion. In this context the question of the voting system has again been raised. In previous reports to the General Assembly I have touched on this problem, indicating as my conviction that there is no practical alternative in keeping with the basic tenets of the Charter to the present system of equal votes for all sovereign Member States. Naturally it may be said that the irrationality of such a system is demonstrated when a new voting balance can be achieved through a sudden expansion of the number of Members by some 20 per cent. However, this fails to take into account realities to which reference has likewise been made in previous reports. The General Assembly is a body which reflects in its decisions on major questions the results of long and careful negotiations and consideration. During this process, common lines are elaborated and compromises reached which give to the decisions the character of a confirmation of a negotiated approach rather than of a solution achieved through the mechanics of voting. Furthermore, the background of the decisions of the General Assembly, which, of course, anyway have the character of recommendations, should be analysed in order to arrive at a true evaluation of their significance. A voting victory or a voting defeat may be of short-lived significance. What is regarded as responsible world opinion as reflected in the voting and in the debates is in many respects more important than any formally registered result. There is in the views expressed in favour of weighted voting an implied lack of confidence in the seriousness and responsibility with which newly independent States are likely to take their stands. Such a lack of confidence is not warranted by the history of the United Nations and must be rejected as contrary to facts. Neither size, nor wealth, nor age is historically to be regarded as a guarantee for the quality of the international policy pursued by any nation. It is my conviction that the addition of a great number of new Member States will widen the perspectives, enrich the debate and bring the United Nations closer to present-day realities. I also believe that this development will exercise a sound influence in the direction of a democratization of proceedings by lessening the influence of firm groupings with firm engagements. However, the widened membership does create certain practical problems. It may tend to lengthen debates, and it may make the General Assembly proceedings seem too cumbersome in cases where speed and efficiency are of the essence. For that reason, the development directs attention again to the possibilities for improving the methods applied in the parliamentary institutions of the Organization. Thus, I feel that Member nations may wish to consider a greater role for the General Committee, so that it can assume a wider responsibility for the conduct of the work of the General Assembly and eventually ease the burden of the Assembly and its substantive committees. 7 6 U.N. doc. A/4390/Add. 1, pp. 2-8. * For the first section of the Secretary-General's introduction, see post, doc. 224. If and when the question of Charter revision comes up for consideration, the evolution of the General Assembly also is likely to add weight to the question of the role, composition and procedures of the Security Council. During the Suez and Hungary crises, a development took place through which increased responsibilities were temporarily transferred from the Security Council to the General Assembly. Since it is difficult for the General Assembly to act expeditiously if it is required to engage in detailed consideration of complicated legal and technical problems, the Assembly found that the most adequate way to meet the challenges which it had to face was to entrust the Secretary-General with wide executive tasks on the basis of mandates of a general nature. Especially in the Suez crisis, when all the executive work was entrusted to the Secretary-General, this put the Secretariat to a severe test. However, it proved possible, in close interplay between the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, assisted by the Advisory Committee appointed by the General Assembly,10 to work smoothly and swiftly towards a speedy achievement of the established aims. The value and possibilities of the Secretariat as an executive organ were thus proved, a fact which has in significant ways influenced later developments. Without going into detail, I wish to recall that in the Lebanon crisis the General Assembly came into the picture only at a very late stage," while executive action in the earlier phases of the crisis was guided by the Security Council, which for the purpose availed itself of the services of the Secretary-General." Likewise, the first part of the Laos crisis was entirely in the hands of the Security Council.18 This year has seen a further return of the Security Council to its central role as the organ of the United Nations which carries primary responsibility for peace and security. Thus, the question of South Africa" and especially the question of the Congo have been major tasks with which the Council has been exclusively seized. The reason for this return to the Security Council from the General Assembly is, naturally, that both these questions have been of a nature which has to a degree placed them outside the conflicts of today between the main power blocs. The shift of the emphasis back from the General Assembly to the Security Council has, however, not led to a change of working methods, as the Council, following the recent procedures of the Assembly, has used the services of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General as its main executive agent. The Congo crisis has put the Secretariat under the heaviest strain which it has ever had to face. The organization of a sizable military force under very difficult geographical and physical conditions, the creation of the necessary administrative framework for the military operation, and the development of a farreaching civilian programme to meet the most urgent needs of the country's economy have proved possible only thanks to the unstinting willingness of all Secretariat members to assume added burdens and the availability of a great number of people of a sufficiently general background to take up new assignments, some times far beyond and far different from their normal professional work. I wish on this point to pay a tribute to all those members of the Secretariat who have made the Congo operation possible. The activities entrusted to the Secretariat by the Security Council in the case of the Congo have been widespread and have required an unusual combination of elements which normally would have required a much bigger and more specialized machinery than the one of which the United Nations disposes. The interplay between parliamentary operations in the United Nations, political action, "With respect to General Assembly responsibilities during the Suez crisis, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 651-679 and 696–703; for its responsibilities during the Hungarian crisis, see ibid., pp. 467-488. See ibid., pp. 659-661, 663-665, 667–674, and 684–693. 19 See ibid., pp. 674–675. "See ibid., 1958, pp. 1028–1062. 12 See ibid., pp. 945-992. 13 See ibid., 1959, pp. 1223–1245. 14 See post, docs. 296–301. 15 See post, docs. 233 et seq. diplomatic negotiation, military operations and administrative measures has been subtle and exacting. To the extent that it may be said to have worked and to have led to the desired results, it bears witness of a flexibility in the organization of the work of the United Nations which is encouraging for the future. Naturally, however, the experiences have demonstrated also weaknesses in the organization of the Secretariat. It does not dispose of a sufficient number of highly qualified senior officials for all the tasks that now have to be met-in spite of the feeling sometimes voiced that the Organization is "top-heavy". There is, generally speaking, within the Secretariat not enough of a diplomatic tradition or staff with training in political and diplomatic field activities to meet the needs which have developed over the years. And it is, finally, a considerable weakness that the Secretariat has not in its ranks a highly qualified military expertise which is able, on a current basis, to maintain a state of preparedness for the kind of situation which the Organization has suddenly had to face. It is, of course, not my intention that in these various respects the Secretariat should be normally organized so as to be able to meet without difficulty or added strain a crisis of the Congo type. What I have in mind is only that it is desirable to have within the Secretariat a nucleus which can be switched over to the present type of task with full knowledge of the requirements and proper preparation, while leaving the normal work of the Organization intact because of the availability of sufficient second-line reserves. I have mentioned the need for some strengthening of the Secretariat on the military side. This, in the light of recent experience, would be my reply, as regards actions by the United Nations, to those who have found in the Congo developments new reasons for the organization of a standing United Nations force. As I have already clarified my views on this problem in earlier reports to the General Assembly," I have no reason to go into the matter in any detail here. It should, however, be stressed that the Congo experience has strengthened my conviction that the organization of a standing United Nations force would represent an unnecessary and impractical measure, especially in view of the fact that every new situation and crisis which the Organization will have to face is likely to present new problems as to the best adjustment of the composition of a force, its equipment, its training and its organization. It is an entirely different matter if Governments, in a position and willing to do so, would maintain a state of preparedness so as to be able to meet possible demands from the United Nations. And it is also an entirely different matter, for the Organization itself, to have a state of preparedness with considerable flexibility and in the hands of a qualified staff which quickly and smoothly can adjust their plans to new situations and assist the Secretary-General in the crucially important first stages of the execution of a decision by the main organs to set up a United Nations force, whatever its type or task. The value of such preparedness can be seen from the fact that the organization of the United Nations Force in the Congo was considerably facilitated by the fact that it was possible for the Secretary-General to draw on the experience of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza" and on the conclusions regarding various questions of principle and law which had been reached on the basis of that experience." The Congo operation being far more complicated and far bigger than the Gaza operation, it is likely that it will lead to a new series of valuable experiences which should be fully utilized by the United Nations, by appropriate informal planning within the administration. III On various points the preceding observations have touched upon the ideological conflicts and the conflicts of power which divide our world of today. There is no reason to elaborate here the way in which these major conflicts have influenced proceedings within the United Nations and even the constitutional pattern which has developed in practice. One word may, however, be 10 See, e.g., American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 81–90. 17 See ibid., 1959, pp. 1052-1059. 18 See footnote 16 above. said about the possibilities of substantive action by the United Nations in a split world. Fundamental though the differences splitting our world are, the areas which are not committed in the major conflicts are still considerable. Whether the countries concerned call themselves non-committed, neutral, neutralist or something else, they have all found it not to be in harmony with their role and interests in world politics to tie their policies, in a general sense, to any one of the blocs or to any specific line of action supported by one of the sides in the major conflict. The reasons for such attitudes vary. That, however, is less important in this special context than the fact that conflicts arising within the non-committed areas offer opportunities for solutions which avoid an aggravation of big Power differences and can remain uninfluenced by them. There is thus a field within which international conflicts may be faced and solved with such harmony between the power blocs as was anticipated as a condition for Security Council action in San Francisco. Agreement may be achieved because of a mutual interest among the big Powers to avoid having a regional or local conflict drawn into the sphere of bloc politics. With its constitution and structure, it is extremely difficult for the United Nations to exercise an influence on problems which are clearly and definitely within the orbit of present day conflicts between power blocs. If a specific conflict is within that orbit, it can be assumed that the Security Council is rendered inactive, and it may be feared that even positions taken by the General Assembly would follow lines strongly influenced by considerations only indirectly related to the concrete difficulty under consideration. Whatever the attitude of the General Assembly and the Security Council, it is in such cases also practically impossible for the Secretary-General to operate effectively with the means put at his disposal, short of risking seriously to impair the usefulness of his office for the Organization in all the other cases for which the services of the United Nations Secretariat are needed. This clearly defines the main field of useful activity of the United Nations in its efforts to prevent conflicts or to solve conflicts. Those efforts must aim at keeping newly arising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differences. Further, in the case of conflicts on the margin of, or inside, the sphere of bloc differences, the United Nations should seek to bring such conflicts out of this sphere through solutions aiming, in the first instance, at their strict localization. In doing so, the Organization and its agents have to lay down a policy line, but this will then not be for one party against another, but for the general purpose of avoiding an extension or achieving a reduction of the area into which the bloc conflicts penetrate. Experience indicates that the preventive diplomacy, to which the efforts of the United Nations must thus to a large extent be directed, is of special significance in cases where the original conflict may be said either to be the result of, or to imply risks for, the creation of a power vacuum between the main blocs. Preventive action in such cases must in the first place aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties, the initiative for which might be taken for preventive purposes but might in turn lead to counter-action from the other side. The ways in which a vacuum can be filled by the United Nations so as to forestall such initiatives differ from case to case, but they have this in common: temporarily, and pending the filling of a vacuum by normal means, the United Nations enters the picture on the basis of its non-commitment to any power bloc, so as to provide to the extent possible a guarantee in relation to all parties against initiatives from others. The special need and the special possibilities for what I here call preventive United Nations diplomacy have been demonstrated in several recent cases, such as Suez and Gaza, Lebanon and Jordan, Laos and the Congo. A study of the records of the conflicts to which I have just referred shows how it has been possible to use the means and methods of the United Nations for the purposes I have indicated. In all cases, whatever the immediate reason for the United Nations initiative, the Organization has moved so as to forestall developments which might draw the specific conflict, openly or actively, into the sphere of power bloc differences. It has done so by introducing itself |