#Assessments for members who joined during 1960 after the original schedule was worked out are not included in the total.

58. AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES 24 AND 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Adopted by the Twelfth World Health Assembly, Geneva, May 28, 1959, Entered Into Force, October 25, 1960 (Excerpt) 32

ANNEX B

ENGLISH TEXT

In Article 24 substitute the word "twenty-four" for the word "eighteen"; delete the whole Article 25 and replace by:

"These Members shall be elected for three years and may be reelected, provided that of the twelve Members elected at the first session of the Health Assembly held after the coming into force of the amendment to this Constitution increasing the membership of the Board from eighteen to twenty-four the terms of two Members shall be for one year and the terms of two Members shall be for two years, as determined by lot."

J. Developments in International Law

[See also the unnumbered title which precedes doc. 4, ante, and the subsection on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization in Section I, ante.]

THE REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY FOR UNITED STATES RATIFICATION OF THE 1958 CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: Statement Made by the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (Dean) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 20, 1960 1

"TIAS 4643; 11 UST 2553. For the original text of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949, pp. 337-351.

'Department of State press release No. 26; Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 15, 1960, pp. 251-261. See also American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 249–288; S. Ex. J, K, L, M, and N, 86th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 9, 1959; Conventions on the Law of the Sea: Hearing [Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate], 86th Congress, 2d Session, on Executives J, K, L, M, and N, 86th Congress, 1st Session, January 20, 1960; and S. Ex. Rept. 5, 86th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 27, 1960.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the four conventions by a vote of 77 to 4, taken May 26, 1960. The Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, approved in the original vote, was then reconsidered and rejected by a vote of 49 to 30.

59. UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS AND THE QUESTION OF THE BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA: Statement Made by the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (Dean) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 20, 1960 (Excerpt)2

In conclusion let me turn briefly to the preparations for the second Law of the Sea Conference, Geneva, March 17, 1960.3

Two important questions which were extensively debated at the conference, i.e. the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits, were unresolved because no proposal received the required two-thirds majority. These matters were referred back to the United Nations General Assembly, which has called a second conference to meet in Geneva on March 17, 1960, to consider them further."

The United States is making extensive preparations for that conference with the hope that agreement on some formula for the breadth of the territorial sea and fisheries rights in a contiguous zone, acceptable to the United States, will result.

Our Navy would like to see as narrow a territorial sea as possible in order to preserve the maximum possibility of deployment, transit, and maneuverability on and over the high seas, free from the jurisdictional control of individual states. Admiral Arleigh Burke links seapower, mobility, and freedom in this manner:

Naval forces are more important in the missile age than ever before. Mobility is a primary capability of navies. Support of our free world allies depends upon the ability of the Navy to move, unhampered, to wherever it is needed to support American foreign policy. This is the great contribution of United States seapower toward the progress of free civilization.

U.S. security interests would therefore be ideally served by retention of the 3-mile limit for territorial seas. There is fairly general agreement here and abroad, however, that international agreement on a 3-mile limit may not be obtained and that such agreement by a two-thirds vote is probable only on a 6-mile territorial sea and a 6-mile contiguous fishing zone.

There is opinion also to the effect that, if agreement is not achieved at the next conference on the width of the territorial sea and the contiguous fishing zone and the rights of nationals of other states therein, the individual practice of states may, in time, tend to establish a territorial sea of 12 miles.

U.S. defensive capabilities would be so profoundly jeopardized by our acceptance of a greater than 6-mile territorial sea that those re

'Department of State press release No. 26 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 15, 1960, pp. 251-261).

4

8 See doc. 60, post.

I.e., the first U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 249–288.

Б See U.N. General Assembly Res. 1307 (XIII) of Dec. 10, 1958; text ibid., pp. 291-292.

sponsible for planning for our defense have concluded that we must take a position against such a course in any event. Each extension of the territorial sea also reduces the fishing rights of foreign nationals in such territorial sea.

The choice had to be made ultimately upon the basis of whether U.S. defensive capability could be reasonably maintained if a 6-mile limit were accepted.

The primary danger to the continuance of the ability of our warships and supporting aircraft to move, unhampered, to wherever they may be needed to support American foreign policy presents itself in the great international straits of the world-the narrows which lie athwart the sea routes which connect us with our widely scattered friends and allies and admit us to the strategic materials we do not ourselves possess.

It is in those narrows that an undue expansion of coastal states' territorial seas could entirely wipe out existing passageways over free high seas and, by creating national sovereignty over one segment of a vital route, subject to the coastal states' interference the transit of our warships or terminate transit of our aircraft in the overlying airspace.

There are approximately 116 important international straits in the world which could be affected by the choice of a limit for territorial seas. All would become subject to national sovereignties if a 12-mile rule were established. Fifty-two would become subject to national sovereignties if a 6-mile rule were adopted.

Initially, therefore, the choice lies between subjecting our arteries of communication to individual national severance or harassment at 52 points or at 116. Closer analysis reveals an even more critical distinction. Of the 52 straits which would become subject to national sovereignties under a 6-mile rule, only 11 would come under the sovereignty of states which would appear likely to claim the right to terminate or interfere with the transit of our warships or aircraft. While denial of passage through these 11 straits would present a defense capability impairment, that impairment is believed to be within tolerable operating limits.

On the other hand, under the 12-mile territorial sea rule, 18 straits would come under the sovereignty of states which possibly would claim the right to terminate or interfere with the transit of our warships or aircraft, and, of conclusive importance for defense purposes, the denial of passage through these additional straits would present for us a completely unacceptable impairment of our defensive mobility and capability.

In addition, while extension of the breadth of the territorial sea has the effect of exposing the mobility of our warships and aircraft to crippling jurisdictional restrictions, it actually adds to the mobility of a primary Soviet weapon-the submarine. The territorial sea of a neutral state is a neutral area in time of war, and belligerents are obliged by international law to avoid such areas for hostile operations. Though required to operate on the surface, a submarine, however,

could transit such areas submerged, even though illegally, and unlikely to be detected by neutral states.

In the event of belligerent action enemy submarines could use such so-called neutral areas of territorial seas for transit, relatively safe from our attack, to reach the scene of their attack-the routes of our surface supply convoys. Such territorial-sea areas, especially if wider than 6 miles, would also certainly be used after their attack by the present large fleet of modern, long-range submarines possessed by the Soviets, including units currently being added which have missile launching capability, as a relatively safe haven from counterattack.

It is believed that the rapid evolution of new and changing weapons systems is not reducing, and will not in the foreseeable future reduce, our dependence upon our seapower capabilities. Indeed, the development of surface missile ships and nuclear powered submarines capable of launching missiles from under water, such as the Polaris, makes this a power of greatly increased and growing effectiveness.

This power to defend ourselves must not be hamstrung by an undue extension of the breadth of the territorial sea.

A complete analysis and comparison of the effect of a 6-mile versus a 12-mile territorial sea has led to the conclusion, concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the U.S. should strive to achieve agreement on as narrow a territorial-sea breadth as possible, but in any event not to exceed 6 miles. We must endeavor to accomplish this with a minimum of damage or detriment to our commercial fishing interests. Throughout the negotiations at Geneva the fishing industry advisers at all times cooperated fully and unselfishly and always recognized that security interests were paramount.

[THE CASE CONCERNING RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY (PORTUGAL v. INDIA)-MERITS: Judgment [of the International Court of Justice] of April 12, 1960 (Excerpt)-Post, doc. 310]