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by her marriage to an alien ineligible to citizenship. Even if she had lost it in the former manner she must be naturalized as provided in section 2, which placed a further limitation upon her becoming a citizen by specially providing for her naturalization only "if eligible to citizenship."

The net result of this act was that only a white woman or one of African blood who had lost her citizenship by marriage to an eligible alien could regain her lost citizenship.

It further provided that no woman of the white or any other race could be naturalized while remaining married to a person ineligible to citizenship and that after the date of this act "any woman citizen who marries an alien ineligible to citizenship shall cease to be a citizen of the United States." There remained no way by which a woman, born here and who had lived here continuously since birth, could regain lost citizenship unless she were "white" or of African blood. The act remedied the former effect of marriage to an eligible alien by providing that after its passage a woman citizen did not thus lose her citizenship. remedied the act of 1907 by allowing a woman to be naturalized, even before the termination of the marital status, but only if her marriage was to an eligible alien, and only if white or of African blood. Not only was the effect of the 1907 act only partially remedied but it created a distinction between marriage to an alien eligible to citizenship and one ineligible.

Section 4 of the act of Congress approved March 3, 1931, states:

It

"SEC. 4. (a) Section 3 of the act entitled 'An act relative to the naturalization and citizenship of married women,' approved September 22, 1922, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"'SEC. 3. (a) A woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of the United States by reason of her marriage after this section, as amended, takes effect, unless she makes a formal renunciation of her citizenship before a court having jurisdiction over naturalization of aliens.

"(b) Any woman who before this section, as amended, takes effect, has lost her United States citizenship by residence abroad after marriage to an alien or by marriage to an alien ineligible to citizenship may, if she has not acquired any other nationality by affirmative act, be naturalized in the manner prescribed in section 4 of this act, as amended. Any woman who was a citizen of the United States at birth shall not be denied naturalization under section 4 on account of her race.

"(c) No woman shall be entitled to naturalization under section 4 of this act, as amended, if her United States citizenship originated solely by reason of her marriage to a citizen of the United States or by reason of the acquisition of United States citizenship by her husband.'

"(b) Section 5 of such act of September 22, 1922, is repealed."

The hardship of the effect of former statutes was further remedied by providing a more simple method of naturalization under section 4 (46 Stat. 854), and that“(1) A woman should not lose her citizenship after that date by marriage to an ineligible alien.

"(2) If she had lost her citizenship by residence abroad after marriage to an alien or by marriage to an alien eligible to citizenship, she might be naturalized in the manner prescribed in section 4, as amended.

"(3) She could not be denied naturalization under section 4 if she was a citizen of the United States at birth.

"(4) Allowed her naturalization even while still married to an ineligible alien." This act, however, denied the benefits of section 4 to a woman if her United States citizenship originated solely by reason of her marriage to a citizen or the naturalization here of her husband.

That the clause "Any woman who was a citizen of the United States at birth,' standing alone, means that she was born within the physical boundary of what was the United States at the time of such birth, can not be contradicted. Considering all the laws on the subject, with their history and the evil to be remedied, can it be said there is no doubt as to the legislative intent?

When from a reading of statutes in pari materia a doubt arises that Congress intended what the words appear to mean, resort may be had to the consideration of other related laws or decisions which reasonably may be expected to throw light on the intention of the lawmakers.

By the above joint resolution of annexation, the sovereignty of the Republic of Hawaii passed to the United States and the permanent allegiance of her citizens passed at the same time. On April 30, 1900, Congress passed an act "To provide a Government for the Territory of Hawaii," which took effect 45 days after its approval, except section 52. By section 4 it provided:

"That all persons who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August twelfth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States and citizens of the Territory of Hawaii.

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It is clear from the above that, individually, the citizens of the former Republic had no voice or choice as to their citizenship. The United States had annexed the entire nation, not merely a part. Much as a citizen desired, he could not adhere to his former government. It had ceased to exist. He became a citizen of and owed permanent allegiance to its successor, the United States, regardless of color or racial characteristics.

A woman born here prior to annexation became a citizen of the United States and of the Territory of Hawaii by naturalization, it is true, but she became such by reason of birth in the Hawaiian Islands, which place of birth became by such annexation "a part of the territory of the United States. She was a citizen at birth of the very territory of which she later became a citizen by naturalization. Her birthplace remained the same, her residence remained the same, her allegiance to the place of her birth remained the same. She remained and continued

to remain a "Kamaaina" (Hawaiian word meaning a child of the land; a native born in any place and continuing to live there); her allegiance to her government remained the same. Only the government to which she owed allegiance had changed.

When Congress passed the law of 1907, to the effect that upon her marriage to a foreigner she would take his nationality, it promised her in the same paragraph that upon the termination of the marital status she might resume her American citizenship, if residing in the United States, by continuing to reside therein.

Her permanent allegiance was thus to be changed only during the continuance of her marital status; her temporary allegiance was unchanged; she still remained a "Kamaaina." She now, after the passage of the act of March 3, 1931, applies to the place of her birth to again enjoy the privileges of citizenship of the place of her birth. Shall she "be denied naturalization under section 4 on account of her race"? Congress having opened the doors to persons not white, born within the United States, has it kept it closed to one born in Hawaii, within what is now the United States, who has known no residence but the place of her birth? Having in mind the nineteenth amendment to the Constitution adopted in 1920, I believe that, by the enactment of the law of March 3, 1931, it was the intent of Congress to complete the final remedy to the evil caused by the act of 1907 and later acts and to place the American woman, so far as possible, where she would have been had such adverse acts never been passed.

Generally it is true that if the words of a statute are free from ambiguity there remains no field for judicial interpretation, but can we rightfully say the act of 1931 is free from ambiguity? When all former laws on the subject are considered, is it too much to state that the words "any woman who was a citizen of the United States at birth" create a judicial doubt whether Congress meant "United States" as constituted at the date of birth or as constituted at the passage of the act? If such doubt is not unreasonable then resort may be had to aids in construction.

I do not believe such doubt unreasonable, especially when Congress by using the words "shall not be denied naturalization" showed that it expressly intended that she should not be excluded, if by any reasonable interpretation she might be included.

If it should be decided that Congress actually intended that of two women, both living in the United States at the time of the passage of the act, and each living at the place of her birth, and each neither white nor of African blood, and each having lost her American citizenship by marriage to an alien, and each having applied at a court in the place of her birth to regain the citizenship of the place of her birth, one could be naturalized and the other "denied naturalization" on account of her blood, would that not be deciding that Congress intended to disregard the Constitution and to establish a rule of naturalization which should not be "uniform" throughout the United States?

I believe the words "citizen of the United States at birth" were used not in the restricted sense of being limited to a woman who was born within what was the United States at the date of her birth, but was used in contradistinction to one who was born an alien outside of what is now the United States. A woman may

be a citizen of the United States at birth and not be born within the Territorial limits of the United States within the fourteenth amendment, as, for instance, one who is such by virtue of the law which states: "All children born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers may be at the time of their

birth citizens of the United States, are declared to be citizens of the United States." (R. S. 1993, as amended by 34 Stat. 1229; 8 U. S. C. sec. 6.)

I therefore conclude that when, in 1931, Congress provided that "any woman who was a citizen of the United States at birth shall not be denied naturalization under section 4 on account of her race" it had in mind the United States as it was comprised at that time, including the Hawaiian Islands as an integral part, and that a woman who was born in these islands prior to annexation and was declared to be a citizen of the United States by the Hawaiian organic act, who lost her citizenship by marriage to an alien and had continued to reside in the Hawaiian Islands, and therefore was a citizen of what is now the United States at birth, who should apply to this court to regain the lost citizenship of the place of her birth, should “not be denied naturalization under section 4 on account of her race.'

In view of the conflicting interpretations of the various courts, and in order that the intent of the Congress might be better expressed, this bill has been introduced for the clarification of existing law.

This bill does not create any new and continuing immigration exemption; most of those affected are now in the United States and the time of birth referred to is all in the past.

In compliance with the rule, there follows the statement of the law showing the new law in italics:

SEC. 100. That for the purposes of citizenship, naturalization, and immigration under the laws of the United States birth or residence in the Hawaiian Islands prior to the taking effect of this act shall be deemed equivalent to birth or residence in the United States and in the Territory of Hawaii, and the requirement of a previous declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States and to renounce former allegiance shall not apply to persons who have resided in said islands at least five years prior to the taking effect of this act; but all other provisions of the laws of the United States relating to naturalization shall, so far as applicable, apply to persons in the said islands.

All records relating to naturalization, all declarations of intention to become citizens of the United States, and all certificates of naturalization filed, recorded, or issued prior to the taking effect of the naturalization act of June 29, 1906, in or from any circuit court of the Territory of Hawaii, shall for all purposes be deemed to be and to have been made, filed, recorded, or issued by a court with jurisdiction to naturalize aliens, but shall not be by this act furthe validated or legalized.

HR-72-1-VOL 1-6

COMPACT PROVIDING FOR APPORTIONMENT OF WATERS OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER AND TRIBUTARIES

JANUARY 7, 1932.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

Mr. LEAVITT, from the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H. R. 5649]

The Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 5649) "To extend the life of 'An act to permit a compact or agreement between the States of Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and Montana respecting the disposition and apportionment of the waters of the Columbia River and its tributaries, and for other purposes,"" report thereon with recommendation that it do pass with the following amendments:

Page 1, line 8, substitute "1268" for "1264" in the statutes reference.

Page 1, line 8, after the statutes reference insert "and the amendatory acts of April 13, 1926 (44 Stat. L. 247) and March 3, 1927 (44 Stat. L. 1403)".

Neither amendment alters the purpose of the bill; the first corrects a typographical error in the reference to the statutes; the second supplies references to laws which have previously amended the original enactment.

The sole purpose of this bill is to extend from December 31, 1930 (originally January 1, 1927), to January 1, 1935, the time during which the States of Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and Montana may enter into a compact or agreement respecting the disposition and apportionment of the waters of the Columbia River and its tributaries, as provided in the act of March 4, 1925 (43 Stat. L. 1268), as amended. It is necessary that these States reach an agreement as to the disposition and apportionment of the waters of the Columbia River in advance of the carrying out of various improvements having to do with navigation, irrigation, and other purposes. Some preliminary conferences were held among the representatives of these States in accordance with the original act, but the terms of the compact have not been agreed to finally.

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