ployment to an individual who has been suspended or expelled from the organization on some ground other than nonpayment of regular dues." See also committee report accompanying the House bill in which it is said: "In brief, a union may deny membership to an employee upon any ground it wishes, but the only ground on which it can have him discharged under a union security clause is nonpayment of dues and initiation fees." The House Conference Report noted no difference in the import of the language used in the Senate Bill. 44 It stated, ✶ ✶ conference agreement adopts the language of the Senate amendment," and observed that this protects "the individual worker against arbitrary action by the union" in that, among other things, discrimination is forbidden if "membership is denied or terminated for reasons other than failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required`as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. We now consider the contention that the proceedings before the Board were invalid because, it is claimed, the complaints were based on charges not properly sworn to. The argument is that the charges were executed in violation of § 203.11 of the Board's Rules and Regulations which provides that the charge shall be in writing and sworn to before a person authorized by law to administer oaths, or shall contain a declaration, under the penalties of the Criminal Code, that its contents are true. It is undisputed that at the time Ralph signed the amended charges he stated to the Board agent that "it was against my religious obligation to swear or affirm, but it was 'Yea, Yea'." Ralph solemnized his signature with the Biblical reference to St. Matthew, Chapter 5, verses 34, 35, 36, and 37, and the Board agent signed the jurat. Thus Ralph made an affirmative declaration as to the truth of the contents of the amended charge. [5, 6] Section 10(b) of the Act requires the filing of a charge before the Board 2. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., in 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Gov. Print. Off., 1948) 57-58, 184-185.. . may proceed in an unfair labor practice case, but there is no requirement that it he signed or sworn to. And it has been said that the purpose of the rule just quoted is to apprise the Board of the nature of the unfair labor practices alleged so as to enable it to determine that the charges are substantial and not frivolous, Consumers Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 6 Cir., 113 F.2d 38, 42, and that the role of the charge is merely to set in motion the machinery of an inquiry, National Labor Relations Board v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 318 U.S. 9, 18, 63 S.Ct. 394, 87 L.Ed. 579. It is addressed to the Board for the purpose of acquainting it with sufficient facts to enable it to intelligently direct its investigation. The Board decided that Ralph's reference to the Bible upon signing the amended charges, and his explanation that his religious convictions were opposed to an oath were equivalent to an oath, The Board was satisfied with` this procedure. We do not understand that the Company or the Union was in any way misled or prejudiced by this procedure. In this situation we see no merit in the contention. Compare National Labor Relations Board v. Popper, 3 Cir., 113 F.2d 602, 603. In any event, even if the Board erroneously construed its rules, the error was harmless.. It did not affect the substantial rights of the Company or the Union, and should therefore be disregarded. See § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C‚A. § 1009 (e). Finally it is contended that the Board exceeded its authority in issuing an order which required that the Company and the Union "jointly and severally" make whole the discharged employees for any loss of pay suffered because of their discriminatory discharges. The Board's order was 'issued under the broad remedial language of § 10(c) of the Act as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c), which provides that upon finding an unfair labor practice, the Board shall issue a cease 3. H.R.Rep.No.245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 82 4. H. Conf.Rep.No.510, 80th Cong., let Sess., 41. 447, 18 L.Ed. 243; In re Gayle, 5 Cir., 136 F.2d 973, 976; Thompson v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 198 Miss. 515, 23 So. 2d 539, 540; Parks v. West, Tex.Civ.App., ' 108 S.W. 466, 471. Congress manifested no intent to restrict the remedial powers of the Board to a compulsory choice between the parties responsible for the discrimina and desist order requiring the guilty party "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or with out back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter: Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination_tion suffered by the discharged employees. suffered by him * " We have been told that the remedial powers given the Board by this section were fashioned for the "Attainment of a great national policy through expert administration in collaboration with limited judicial review [and] must not be confined within narrow canons for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancellors in ordinary private controversies." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 188, 61 S.Ct. 845, 850, 85 L. Ed. 1271. Accordingly, it is uniformly recognized that the variable pattern of discriminatory practices revealed in cases before the Board requires a correspondingly variable set of remedial orders, if the Board is to fulfill its duty of taking appropriate steps to dissipate the effects of unfair labor practices, Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 319 U.S. 533, 63 S.Ct. 1214, 87 L. Ed. 1568. Nevertheless, the Company makes the point that although the Company and the Union may both be responsible for the unlawful discharge, the amended § 10 (c) contemplates "that either one or the other would be responsible for the back pay, but not both." [7-9] We disagree. The word "or" has no such function. It is well established that the conjunctive and disjunctive are signified interchangeably by the use of "or" "if to do so is consistent with the legislative intent." See Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, p. 451 (3rd ed. 1943), and Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 392, 22 S.Ct. 181, 46 L.Ed. 236; United States v. Fisk, 3 Wall. 445, 70 U.S. 445, 8. HR. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., in 1 Leg.His. 68, 195... 6. H.Conf.Rep.No.510, 80th. Cong., 1st Sess., 54 On the contrary, we think the amended section correlates the remedial parts of the Act with those substantive provisions of the amendments, and must be construed to permit the Board to hold an employer and a union jointly and severally liable for back pay where it finds them both responsible for the loss suffered by the discharged employees. We are fortified in our conclusion that Congress did not intend to restrict the rem edial powers of the Board to a compulsory choice between the employer and the labor organization by a brief examination of the legislative history of § 10(c). It shows a determination to maintain the full scope of administrative discretion that had been established in fitting remedies to violations. Thus, a provision in the House bill which would have restricted a Board order to the relief asked for in the complaint was not accepted by the Conference Report. In a similar vein, a provision in the House bill specifying a particular remedy in nonback-pay cases and thereby implying a restriction of the Board to that remedy, was deleted by the Conferees, who declared that Congress should not "by implication, limit. * the Board in its choice of remedial orders.". The Conferees instead adopted the language of the Senate amendment which expressly preserved the broad wording of the original Act authorizing the Board "to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act," and which also contained the reference to union liability for back pay, as it now reads. Thus it is apparent that “* 7. H.Conf.Rep.No.510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 54. 8. Sen. Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 39. See H.Conf.Rep.No.510, 80th Cong.,. 1st Sess., 13. Congress intended Section 10(c) to extend the power of the Board so as to provide it with a means to remedy the union unfair labor practices newly established by the Labor Management Relations Act, comparable to the means it already had to remedy the employer unfair labor practices established by the National Labor Relations Act." H. N. Newman, 85 N.L.R.B. 725, 732. Other questions are raised in the briefs including the Company's contention that the order holding the Company jointly and severally liable for back pay constituted an abuse of its discretion. To discuss the points urged would unduly lengthen this opinion. It will be enough to say that we have considered all the questions raised, and find them without merit. The petition to set aside the order will be denied and a decree for the enforcement of the order will be entered. It is so ordered. KEY HUMBER SYSTEM under Alaska Workmen's Compensation Law, notwithstanding general character of employer's business. Judgment affirmed. 1. Admiralty I The obligations and correlative rights of owner of vessel to members of her crew constitute one of the most important of the "characteristic features of the general maritime law" which must not be modified by state legislation. 2. Seamen —11(1), 29(1) To deckhand on vessel used by canto and from scows which receive the catches nery for purpose of towing fishing boats who was injured in service of ship, but who suffered from no negligence or unseaworthiness, the cannery is liable under maritime law for no more than deckhand's wages to end of fishing season and his maintenance and cure. Jones Act 46 U.S. C.A. § 688. ALASKA INDUSTRIAL BOARD et al. v, et seq. Proceeding by the Alaska Packers Association against Alaska Industrial Board and Alfred J. Peterson, claimant, to set aside an award of the Alaska Industrial Board to the claimant. The United States District Court for the territory of Alaska, First Division, Folta, J., 88 F.Supp. 172, entered a judgment setting the award aside, and the Alaska Industrial Board and claimant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Denman, Chief Judge, held that injuries sustained by deckhand on vessel used by cannery for purpose of towing fishing boats to and from scows which re ceive the catches are within exclusive admiralty jurisdiction, and are not compensable J. Gerald Williams, Atty. Gen. of Alaska, for appellant Alaska Industrial Board. Henry Roden, Roy E. Jackson, and Wm. L. Paul, Jr., Juneau, Alaska, for appellant, Peterson. Faulkner, Banfield & Boochever and R. Boochever, Juneau, Alaska, for appellee. Before DENMAN, Chief Judge, and ORR and POPE, Circuit Judges. DENMAN, Chief Judge. Peterson and the Alaska Industrial Board, hercafter called the Board, appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Territory of Alaska holding that the Board is without jurisdiction to award Peterson disability compensation under the Senator PROUTY. Mr. Secretary, in your statement you say, and I quote: There is no violation of freedom in a minority having to accept a majority's fair judgment fairly arrived at. That is a pretty strong statement in favor of the majority rule. Do you believe that the majority of the American people are in favor of the repeal of section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act? Secretary WIRTZ. Yes. Senator PROUTY. In view of this belief, and your adherence to majority rule, would be in favor of a national referendum in which all qualified voters are eligible to participate on the question of 14(b)? Secretary WIRTZ. I would be if that referendum could be held sufficiently quickly that it would not slow up what I consider to be the Congress discharge of its obligation at this point, and if that issue could be fairly cast so that it would be understood. I hope it will not seem presumptuous to take advantage of this opportunity to tell a brief story. When I was teaching labor law in law school the first day of each semester was one in which neither the students nor I was prepared, so I used to give them a series of questions to try to find out what their attitudes were about the various matters we were going to take up, and then the reply in kind as far as my own were concerned. Question 7-this is a group of third year law students, question 7 was from year to year, "are you in favor of the State "right-to-work" laws? And year after year they answered 2 to 1 that they were in favor of State "right-to-work" laws, which is a greater compliment to whoever developed that phrase than anything I know. Then about question 14 I asked them: "Would you or would you not be in favor of a law which prohibited an employer a majority of his employees from making an agreement that all employees represented by the union should pay a proportionate part of the costs of representation?" And they always answered 2 to 1 that they would oppose a law which prohibited that private agreement. Two answers absolutely inconsistent, and the relevance is, of course, to your question. I am quite confident that a majority of the country voting on this issue free of the semantic overtones of all of the phraseology, and there has been phraseology on both sides, would feel this is a decision which should be privately made and that any law about it should be national law; therefore, I would think such a testing of the popular will would be a good thing, but again I say only if it could be done under circumstances and in time that would permit the discharge by the Government of what seems to me its obligation, at this point. Senator PROUTY. I agree with you, Mr. Secretary, and I am certainly well aware of the fact that this question has been distorted to a high degree by both sides. Secretary WIRTZ. That is right. Senator PROUTY. I have proposed an amendment which will provide for a national referendum which I hope would clear this question up once and for all. If I were in my own State I would certainly urge the voters there to favor the repeal of 14(b) but I think it is a national question now. This might be one means of clearing the air and learning just what the opinion of the American people is. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Senator MCNAMARA. Well, Senator Prouty, and Mr. Secretary, I am afraid the record this morning might leave the inference that the Congress does not represent the American people. I am sure that that was not the intent of the question and answer to it. Senator PROUTY. I am not sure it always does. Senator MCNAMARA. Certain legislation has to be handled by the Congress and not by national referendum, and I hope the record will not reflect the question as to whether the Congress represents the American people properly or not. Secretary WIRTZ. You will know my views on that, Mr. Chairman, you will know that the form of my answer was deliberately for the purpose of not being misinterpreted as being opposed to a national expression of viewpoint on this because I think the national view is that way. I would concur completely in the view that this is a matter appropriately subject to congressional determination. Senator MCNAMARA. Senator Fannin, do you have any questions? Senator FANNIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment. I am going to testify tomorrow but I would like to comment while the Secretary is here. Senator MCNAMARA. You go right ahead. Senator FANNIN. Mr. Secretary, I do want to thank you for your very interesting comment on your feelings in regard to this law and the repealing of the law, but I cannot say that I agree with you in many instances. For example, in your published testimony, a copy of which I have here with me, you say that the question is whether there is to be a right to decide on the part of the union officials and management. Secretary WIRTZ. Not union officials Senator FANNIN. That would be my interpretation of what you infer. In my view, however, this ignores a larger question of the public interest as well as the forced followers in a union-shop situation who most certainly do not have the right to decide, and I think that was very well brought forth in the question of the distinguished Senator from New York. As I understand it you are saying that these forced followers of the union must be compelled to pay tribute to keep their job in the interest of maintaining a proper labor claim at stability. The freedom of many individuals is removed by this assumption. Then you refer to the public interest and public policy. You say in effect that compulsory unionism is all right in the absence of any contrary public policy consideration. Secretary WIRTZ. Compulsory unionism appears where, Senator Fannin? Senator FANNIN. It says: The making of a union security agreement is a reasonable decision; it should not be prohibited by law unless there is some other overriding public policy consideration, and there is no such contrary public Secretary WIRTZ. But I do not find my reference to compulsory unionism and, of course, I do not think it is there. |