Mr. Secretary, in all States regardless of whether they have "rightto-work" laws or not, and in situations where a board election is conducted, is it not necessary that the union obtain a majority vote of the employees who vote in the unit?

Secretary WIRTZ. Majority of employees who vote in the unit? Mr. BENEDICT. Yes, sir.

Secretary WIRTZ. With reference to those situations where elections are required, that is the law.

Mr. BENEDICT. The other basis for recognition is voluntary recognition based upon a union having established its uncoerced majority in such unit as it seeks to represent; is that correct?

Secretary WIRTZ. These questions now are being stated with the advantage which your long service with the Board gives you.

I expect that what you say, Mr. Benedict, is right, but I do not believe, I am not sure that your statement did include those situations in which the occurrence of an unfair labor practice results in the Board's identification.

Mr. BENEDICT. You are getting into a different area, the Joy Silk Mill area, where the union must have had a majority at one time.

Secretary WIRTZ. I do not think so. If your question did include this third point then my understanding of the law is as you stated it. Mr. BENEDICT. Including the third possibility?

Secretary WIRTZ. All right.

Mr. BENEDICT. And I will try to simplify this a little bit.

Is not the basis for recognition of a union anywhere in this country based upon majority status of the union?

Secretary WIRTZ. Yes.

Mr. BENEDICT. And that requirement is applicalbe in right-to-work States the same as it is in any other State?

Secretary WIRTZ. Yes.

Mr. BENEDICT. So, with that background I return to the Senator's question: Do you agree with the claims of the organizations that the repeal of 14(b) would make union organization easier, and if so, in

what matter?

Secretary WIRTZ. That is again the point I was making. If you separate out the legal question, legally it would not change the one single bit.

Mr. BENEDICT. They would still have to organize a majority of the people one way or the other.

Secretary WIRTZ. Sure, no question about that. I went beyond that to add the practical recognition that there is no question about the fact that the union shop does increase the strength of unions in general, including their effectiveness

Mr. BENEDICT. Does an open shop make organizing more difficult? Secretary WIRTZ. As a matter of law or practical effect? The reason I ask you that, Mr. Benedict, the question is obviously put in very careful legal terms. And restricting the answer to the careful legal terms it does not change those rules one single bit.

The change in the procedures for the determination of whether there is or is not to be a union shop does not affect the rules with respect to the basis for determination of majority representation, but the question is cast in a combination of legal rules about the union shop issue and the organizing effectiveness, and I will answer again, legally no connection, practically a very real connection.

Senator PROUTY. Mr. Secretary, as you say in your statement-a union is under the legal obligation to represent all employees as a bargaining unit equally regardless of whether or not they are members of the union.

In view of this fact, how would repeal of section 14(b) improve economic conditions such as wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of rank-and-file employees working under collective-bargaining agreements between unions and employers in States which have mandatory open shop laws?

Secretary WIRTZ. Again, Senator Prouty, the difficulty that I see is a combination of the legal question and the practical question. Again as in the preceding question, the answer is that legally there is no connection at all between those two points; and again, the answer would be in my judgment practically, that it should be made quite clear that in my judgment at least, I think in experience generally, the union shop does give the union increased economic strength and that that would result probably in an increase in an improvement from their standpoint in the terms and conditions of employment.

Again, if the question is a legal question, in specific answer to the question as put, the repeal of 14(b) would not as a legal matter affect the present obligation of a union to represent fairly all employees within a union.

Senator PROUTY. I would like to have you comment on this question.

It is sometimes said that members of the union in a union shop in a "right-to-work" State are protected by virtue of the fact against the practice of the union leadership to which they object by virtue of the fact that they can threaten to resign from the union without losing their jobs.

Now, is there any validity to that claim?

Secretary WIRTZ. Sure, complete validity.

Senator PROUTY. That it does protect the union members?

Secretary WIRTZ. Well, it is quite clear that in a "right-to-work" State any individual may resign from the union, stop paying dues, without there being any effect on his job. That is the whole issue. So that really what we have in the question, I think, is simply a putting of the basic question of the effect-if I understand it

Senator PROUTY. Let us assume I am a member of the union, I wanted to become a member of that union in a "right-to-work" State, but after I had been a member for a while I am very much dissatisfied with the way the affairs of that union are being conducted and, therefore, if I and enough of my fellow union members threaten to resign unless that condition to which we object is changed it affords me a certain amount of protection, does it not?

Secretary WIRTZ. Yes.

Senator PROUTY. And also will give me a great deal more influence over the union.

Secretary WIRTZ. I think the second would not follow from the first. In any State any individual employee may at any point resign from a union if he wants to.

Now, in the "right-to-work" States his doing so could not become a basis for the termination of his employment. In the other States it could if the employer and a majority of the employees has agreed that it should.

You added one other point in your last statement, and you added that if you and a sufficient number of other employees develop that view--in any State, again, if employees decide they do not like the present union representation, they are free to change it.

They probably could not change it in some circumstances during a collective-bargaining agreement. There would be some questions. They probably could change it, but it probably would not affect the terms of the contract.

I think the heart of the question is whether in a "right-to-work" State there is a larger protection of the individual's right not to become or to remain a member of the union, and it is true that there is.

Senator PROUTY. If an employee joins the union and is fined and refuses to pay, and the union sues him for the fine under State contract law, can the union recover, or would Federal law affect that suit?

Secretary WIRTZ. Whether the union could recover is a matter of State contract law unaffected by Federal law.

(The information furnished follows:)

United Automobile, A. & A. I. Workers v. Woychik, 5 Wis. (2d) 528.

UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (C.I.O.-A.F.L.) LOCAL 756, Respondent, v. WOYCHIK, Appellant.

November 6-December 2, 1958.

Labor: Constitution and by-laws of union as contract between union and members: Authority and procedure in levying fine against member: Construction of union constitution by union itself: Noninterference by court.

1. Matters of internal management of a labor union and its disciplinary power over its members are governed by the union's constitution and by-laws, which constitute a contract between the union and its members. pp. 530, 531.

2. So far as concerning the case of a union member against whom a fine had been imposed for failure or refusal to picket an employer during a strike, a provision in the constitution of an international labor union, authorizing local unions to levy. fines against members for nonattendance at membership meetings and for other reasons if the fines did not exceed a dollar, was not illegal and unenforceable as violating a provision in sec. 8 (b) (2) of the National Labor Management Relations Act, 29 USCA, sec. 158, declaring it to be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in certain respects and in certain situations, since such statutory provision had no application in the premises. p. 531.

3. A union member who knows that he has failed to fulfil his picketing assignment cannot claim that he did not receive any notice of the levying of a fine for such failure when he refused to accept delivery of a certified letter containing the notice, and refused to accept such notice when it was personally handed to him and he was personally told of the fine by a union representative. p. 532.

4. Under the union constitution in question, if a member disputed the application of the levy of a fine as to him, then the union. would be required to file charges against such member and proceed with a trial, but where, as here, the member, although knowing about the fine, did not dispute its application as to him, he thereby foreclosed himself from a trial and the benefits of certain appeal procedure to which he otherwise might have been entitled. pp. 532, 533.

United Automobile, A. & A. I. Workers v. Woychik, 5 Wis. (2d) 528.

5. With reference to interpretations by the international executive board, to the effect that the board was not required by the union constitution to pass on each and every fine levied by a local union in every instance, the admission of such interpretations in evidence by the trial court, in the instant action to collect such a fine from a union member, was not error; and such interpretations, deemed reasonable and permissible, showed that the local union had sufficiently complied with the conditions set forth in the constitution. pp. 533, 534. 6. Any reasonable or permissible construction which a labor organization or union gives to its own constitution, laws, or rules will govern unless clearly subversive of personal or property rights, which latter was not the case here. p. 534.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: HARVEY L. NEELEN, Circuit Judge. Affirmed. Action by the plaintiff Labor Union against the defendant Woychik, one of its members, to collect fines which it imposed for the alleged failure of Woychik to picket during a 'strike.

In 1954 the plaintiff union went out on strike against the Le Roi Company in Milwaukee. The defendant, a dues-paying member of the plaintiff, was employed by the Le Roi Company for approximately eleven years prior to the strike and belonged to the union for approximately eight years. Prior to the strike the plaintiff adopted a procedure for assigning picket duty. This procedure required each member of the union to draw by lot from a drum a picket ticket which listed the picket assignments. Such assignments required each member to picket once each fifth day during the strike. · The defendant picketed on one occasion and missed the rest of his assignments. The union prior to the strike also adopted a motion providing for a $1 fine for each picketing assignment missed. In accordance therewith a $9 fine was assessed against the defendant, who did not pay it.

The by-laws of the union provided for a reinstatement fee of $8 for any member becoming delinquent. The total amount claimed in this action by the union therefore was $17.