I strongly believe in unions, and just as strongly that union membership must be a matter of free choice. I also believe that every union man has a right to express his personal views on voluntarism, or any other subject involving individual freedom. So, although the IAM was on record as being opposed to a "right-towork" law in a California election in 1958, I and other union members felt we were within our rights to speaking out as individuals in favor of the law to prohibit union contracts with compulsory membership clauses. We were doing what we felt would strengthen our organization. We backed proposition 18 ("right-towork") because we were convinced that if we didn't do something to clean up our unions, they would die of self-destruction or eventually destroy our democratic form of government.

I was hauled before a trial board of lodge 727 and expelled on the grounds of "disloyalty" and "conduct unbecoming a member." I appealed the ouster to IAM President Al Hayes. In ruling against me, Hayes said:

"While it is agreed that the right freely to express one's views is a privilege guaranteed by the Constitution, this does not mean that a member of our association is entitled to openly denounce the considered position of the labor movement ***"

Believing that I was being deprived of my constitutional right of free speech, I appealed to the courts for reinstatement in the IAM. After a 3-year legal battle, the California Supreme Court ruled that the union must reinstate me.

I am an engineering research mechanic and have been with Lockheed's Research Center at Saugus, Calif., for approximately 20 years.

My interest in protecting the right of individual workers to choose union membership continues unabated. I was one of the organizers of a new group, "California Employees for Right To Work," which is conducting an educational campaign leading to enactment of a voluntary unionism law in that State, and serve as its president.

I urge retention of section 14(b).

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BERNARD SIMUNICH, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

I thank the chairman and the committee for the privilege of submitting this statement.

In keeping with the rules of the committee I will briefly outline my testimony-which is my experience as a member of a voluntary union which became a compulsory union, controlled by the same union officials in the same plant, operated by the same management.

This testimony will show that union security of the individual worker can best be had in a voluntary union, in which a membership card is a worker's sign of distinction, and more than just a "right-to-work.' It also shows that security

for union officials lies in a compulsory union.

What I say here is substantiated by minutes from grievance meetings, NLRB letters, Justice Department letters, records from the Circuit Court of Cook County, court reporter transcripts, a union legal admission of criminal conspiracy to defeat the act, miscellaneous papers signed by union stewards, chief stewards, assistant chief stewards, management letters and other management documents.

In our 1948 voluntary union the worker's rights to job security under the union constitution were best protected on a do it ourself basis; so that most of our troubles with union representation stopped almost as soon as trouble began; because for example, if union officials betrayed the union constitution by failing to process a grievance, we would talk about stopping the payment of dues as a corrective action. The threat of withdrawing from the union was enough to insure better concern over the union membership.

To that extent we controlled our officials. We never had such a basic problem as a refusal to process a grievance.

In 1950 it was different after the men voted in the compulsory union with automatic collection of dues for the union by the company. No free riders. I talked against compulsion and went on record against it. I refused to join the union. Finally the company and union called me into the office and told me that if I didn't join the union immediately, I lost my "right-to-work."

It was a shotgun union which turned the union gentry into tall men, and made shadows out of the worker.

Once compulsion was established, the same union officials openly tolerated the company's violations of the labor agreement. Relief through grievance procedure was more uncertain. The threat of withdrawing from the union was useless because that meant the loss of their "right-to-work." Compulsion gave company and union the chance to discipline any worker who disagreed with them. That expalins the treatment of my grievance in 1951.

My steward tried to process my 1951 grievance on seniority violation but the chief steward kept it in his pocket. The steward body of 30 men ordered the chief steward to process it, and were ignored. The local membership in quarterly meetings directed the grievance committee to process the grievance and they were ignored. The membership was ineffective-they were shadows.

In April 1952 my relations with top company and union officials became so harassing to me that I offered to quit my job as soon as the 1951 grievance was heard-regardless of the outcome; and I asked management for a letter of recommendation. The letter was short, very conservative, but nevertheless a good recommendation dated April 25, 1952. However, the company made no effort to clear away my grievance; so I talked to NLRB about it.

On June 2, 1952, the officer of the day wrote a Taft-Hartley charge in my name against company and union for refusal to process the grievance. He assurred me that the grievance would have to be processed. The case was turned over to Lawyer-Investigator I. M. Lieberman who repeated that assurance to me.

Ten weeks later the NLRB advised me that my charges were dismissed because there was "insufficient evidence" of violations. My repeated appeals to Washington NLRB were so useless that I wondered if my letters to Mr. Lieberman and Director Ross Madden were actually in the file sent to Washington on appeal. The files were secret and no information was given me-except unbelievable explanations of the meaning of the simple worded section 9(a).

In 1953, during a plant meeting-still determined to have my grievance processed-I paraded a placard bearing the legend "Hear my grievance" down the middle aisle of the meeting. My pleas to the membership were overcome by the officials' malicious and slanderous replies.

At this point union and company could have smothered my activities by posting information they allegedly had concerning my grievance.

In 1954 new department stewards tried to investigate the 1951 grievance, and were confused by the papers which the company and union showed them, but not What were they trying to hide? The chief steward threatened to expel me from the union if I pursued the matter further.

me.

It seemed that my relief would have to come from the courts.

I think I talked to every labor lawyer in town. Some turned the case down flat; others, who would take the case, asked for a retainer of about one-third my yearly wage. They didn't want the case either. General practitioners shied away from it. Finally I found a couple of young men who would work for a reasonable retainer. They filed case No. 55C 2224, Circuit Court of Cook County in February 1955. The suit charged six union officials and the company with conspiracy to defeat the labor contract.

The company's answer contained a photostat of minutes of a grievance meeting held secretly 7 weeks after I filed Taft-Hartley charges for refusal to process the grievance; thus the company confessed that my NLRB charges were true, and that the NLRB dismissal of the charge contradicted the evidence when it ruled against

me.

It seems that the necessity for secret files is to protect NLRB personnel in the conspiracy they practice to defeat the law they are hired to enforce. My attempts to bring those facts into the open failed when Associate General Counsel McGuiness wrote to me on November 9, 1955, as follows: "I am unable to grant your request to examine our files nor will Mr. Lieberman be authorized to testify in circuit court action 55C 2224.”

The union was not sued because the membership was helpless in its dealings with the officials. Only six union individuals were sued.

Labor Lawyer Irving Friedman, of the law firm Katz & Friedman, answered for three of the individuals-failing to file for the business agent and two of the individuals.

Six months later, when my attorneys started to enter a motion for default, Attorney Friedman filed appearance for the business agent and Joe Bafia, without the consent of Bafia. He failed to file for the remaining individual.

In June of 1956, after my lawyers had withdrawn from the case, and I had filed an amended complaint, pro se, I brought the defendants into court on motion of refusal to obey Judge Fisher's order for discovery.

Defense Attorney Friedman stood mute when the court asked him to explain; then the court on his own initiative, neglecting the contempt before him, and without reading the complaint, dismissed the cause for lack of the jurisdiction Judge Fisher himself and all parties had accepted in previous appearances before the court on the grounds that an employee may not sue his employer. He ruled contrary to fundamental Illinois law. Judge Fisher's order of dismissal was incorrectly drawn by Defense Attorney Friedman to read that the motion to dismiss came from the defense, whereas it was the motion of the court itself. Judge Fisher signed the incorrect order. He refused to correct it for the record when my motion of March 3, 1957, brought all parties before the court for that purpose-ruling that the time for appeal had passed, the term of court having ended, and therefore nothing was before the

court.

The clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court had refused to docket my appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to entertain my petition for mandamus.

The legal costs of that suit for the individual defendants was paid out of union funds, part of which came out of my dues. One of the trustees warned the officials that such payment was illegal but was out voted. The NLRB advised me that the payment was a violation of section 1001, title 18, but my petition to the U.S. district attorney to investigate, signed by six union members, was turned over to the FBI who advised me that the payment was a proper union expense. In October 1957, the chief steward who threatened to expel me from the union in 1954, now gave me a legal admission that the grievance meeting of July 25, 1952, was faked to prevent a hearing of my grievance. That John Farrell, president of the local, collaborated, and that the other two members of the union girevance committee had no knowledge of the hearing.

Since 1952 I had been corresponding with IUE President James B. Carey, seeking an investigation of the local and the district. He has never been willing to carry out his constitutional duties in that respect. For example: The quarterly membership meeting of June 10, 1956, chose delegates to the convention. During that meeting first I, then my assistant steward, tried to serve written charges of misconduct against union officials; but the written charges were brushed off the table and onto the floor and ignored. Among the union officials on the platform was the president of the district, Alan Palmer, who was also vice president of the international in Washington; and who in 1949, on the very first hour of the strike he talked and pleaded for, went back to work with his followers at our No. 2 plant, leaving those of us who talked and voted against the strike, pounding the bricks for 4 weeks in a lost cause.

My constitutional charges against the good and welfare were then delivered through registered mail by my assistant chief steward. Three days later I wrote President Carey for international assistance to hold a trial on the charges; but was told by Secretary-Treasurer Hartnett who answered for Carey, "to comport myself within the terms of our union constitution." Copy enclosed.

A photostat of the union legal admission to prevent the hearing of my grievance was sent to IUE Assistant General Counsel Ed Rovner; but President Carey refused to take any action on the grounds that "the matter had become too stale" for his further consideration.

Our 1959-60 labor contract allowed layoff outside of seniority. Although I was the last remaining man in my job classification and somebody had to do my work, union and company decided to lay me off because, they said, my workload was diminishing. I protested, but the contract was brought out and I had to accept layoff with recall rights to 1972.

About January 1, 1965, I found out that the company had given my job to somebody else. I filed a grievance which was ignored by both union and company. I then filed Taft-Hartley charges under section 9(a) of the act; and got the usual turndown from Director Ross Madden, of the NLRB.

The Director of Appeals in Washington advised me just last week that union and company drew up a new labor contract after my layoff which took away my right to recall and my right to work. He noted further that the company and union had discussed my grievance, and agreed that the grievance lacked meritbesides, the 6-month statute of limitation prevented further consideration of the matter.

Up to 1960 I had filed numerous grievances with the company through my steward on the violations of my seniority and loss of pay because of denial of overtime work. The union and company played with those charges, shifting the blame for my loss of overtime to one another. I could not win a grievance because they wouldn't let me listen in on their meetings-much less have anything to say.

Up to 1960 before layoff, I filed several Taft-Hartley charges of bad faith in bargaining, which Director Ross Madden dismissed because of "insufficient evidence" or that the charges of bad faith in bargaining did not constitute a violation of the act.

All of this indicates how little union security the work man has under NLRB protection; and how necessary it is for all States to have "right-to-work" laws. In 1952 I called the late Senator Taft's attention to the outrageous interpretations the NLRB was giving to section 9(a) of the act. In his reply he stated that, "the act was not getting sympathetic administration."

"I am

In 1956 I wrote to Congressman Velde about it, and he answered: inclined to agree with you that the section you refer to needs amending and urge you to continue your efforts when Congress convenes next year.'

Section 9(a) gives the individual worker the right to deal directly with the company on grievances in the presence of a union representative; but it does not give the individual worker the right to be present when union and company determine the worker's rights.

The NLRB insists there is nothing in the act which forces the companyunless it so chooses-to deal with the individual in his right to process a grievance directly; and the company can therefore accept the grievance and thereafter ignore it. NLRB insists that section 9(a) is not operative unless discrimination is involved.

Gentlemen of the committee, I believe that union security and the security of the individual worker are inseparable; but when the livelihood of a man depends upon the patronage of union officials, that worker has lost his right to act as a freeman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LUTHER SIDBURY

In the city of Philadelphia, Pa., there exists two motion picture operators unions, local 307 consisting of an all-white membership, and local 307-A consisting of an all-Negro membership. Between the two unions, men are compelled to join local 307 if they are white and if you are a Negro, you join local 307-A. For years, this has been the practice of the two labor unions. During the year of 1961, I began a series of picketing at all local 307 downtown theaters as well as their local theaters. The management of these theaters got an injunction against me to stop me from picketing. After receiving these preliminary injunctions, I needed legal counsel. I got a lawyer to represent me in the court at city hall. During the trial proceedings, it was brought out that local 307 never admitted a Negro into its organization and 307-A never admitted a white person into their local-and both unions are chartered by the same international.

On about March 2, 1965, I went to local 307 headquarters, 1317 Vine Street, and asked for an application to join the union. I was refused by Harry J. Abbott, president of the local. Again on March 31, 1965, I returned to local 307 and made the same request, again it was refused by Harry J. Abbott. The same day I went to the National Labor Relations Board and reported local 307 as maintaining a closed shop, one in which only members having a union card can get work. On April 1, 1965, the National Labor Relations Board dismissed the case on the grounds that a labor union doesn't have to admit no one person to membership if they don't want to and if the theater owner hired a man as a projectionist, he had to join the contracting union 30 days after. All my days as a projectionist and a member of local 307-A, an employer never hired a projectionist outright. The business agent of the local just about controls the whole union. The system they use to control the union is simple. They give certain keymen in the organization the best jobs in exchange for his vote. Labor unions are good for the workingman but the men who represent these unions frequently run their unions for their own benefit and not for the benefit of the rank-and-file workers.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY CRABTREE, INDIANAPOLIS, IND.

I oppose the repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley law because it contains the spirit of the American idea of personal liberty. As a worker who benefits from membership in Local 1048, IBEW, I would not advocate anything harmful to good unionism.

The privilege to force membership is a source of power not given to or sought by any other organization outside of government. This fact alone would cause

me to question compulsory unionism. Where, today, I have responsible union leaders using wisdom and restraint, tomorrow there may be new leaders with far less judgment. There are already signs of change in leadership in the labor movement nationally and in my own local. Section 14(b) allows each State to declare its own public policy on the matter of sovereign rights and personal choice.

There is no way to eliminate rivalry for union leadership or between unions. "Right-to-work" laws do not insure labor peace, nor do they cause a lack of it. I can remember two unsuccessful raids against local 1048 long before a "right-towork" law was passed in Indiana, and I believe an attempt is still underway which was started before the law was repealed early this year.

There is no way for a "right-to-work" law to harm a union's legitimate business, which is bargaining with an employer. Because unionism has a legitimate purpose and does much good for its members, it does not require police force to attract members. I feel very strongly that it is degrading to unionism for its leaders to publicly declare that they must force membership.

There are persons whose religious convictions prevent them from joining any organization. That they are a tiny minority does not alter the question, "Is it right to deny even one a job?"

I have been very disturbed by the violence that occurred during contract negotiations last year at the RCA plant at Marion, Ind. The IBEW represents this plant; and though my own local was not involved in the violence, it has brought the question of morality in union conduct very close to my conscience.

I could not willingly support a union whose leaders were dominated by Communists. I could not willingly support a union whose leaders provoked or condoned violence against management or its own members.

Any union member is likely at some time during his working life to be faced with one or both of these situations. Since the leadership of the AFL-CIO has not dealt effectively with either of these moral problems, what other way is left for dealing with a local whose activities violate your conscience except by withdrawing from membership?

Where there is no "right-to-work" law, there is no way to keep from supporting criminals except to lose your job. Where compulsory unionism is enforced the law rewards the criminal and punishes the law-abiding citizen. It is needlessly cruel and unjust to ask a man to give up a job to do what law should do for him. I believe forced riding creates more hardship and unfairness to the worker than free riding creates for the union. The labor movement is a minority group. It should be and is protected by law, but who is the tiniest minority of all? When the guarantees of liberty are traced from the Bill of Rights, who finally holds them? No group holds rights-just the individual citizen. Personal liberty is still highly prized, even by union members. Therefore, I am strongly opposed to the repeal of section 14(b).

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TED ENGEL, SANTA MARIA, CALIF.

As a former business agent of the Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers Union in the local at Santa Maria, I came out for enactment of a "right-to-work" law in California in 1958. Because I advocated voluntary unionism, the top echelon officials of the painters' union attempted to remove me from the position of business agent. I resisted and was able to hold on as business agent, although the union officials stopped the salary I had been receiving in that job. I took my case to court and there was considerable litigation on the issue. Eventually, union officials were successful in removing me as business agent.

I believe in "right-to-work" and I am a living example of what can happen to an employee when he disagrees with union bosses, for whatever reason.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DALLAS WILBORn, San Diego, Calif.

I am a former member of the International Association of Machinists (AFLCIO). From 1956 to 1961 I was employed at Convair and for a year and a half of that time served as shop committeeman for my IAM local. Objecting to compulsory membership, I gave up my position as committeeman and withdrew from the union when the IAM began a drive to get rid of the "escape clause" in its contract. The "escape cla use" permitted members of the union to withdraw from membership at certain times and upon giving required notice. From 1961