ferent supplies. Also, according to the Surgeon, Thirteenth Air Force Service Command, there was poor coordination between the SOS and the Air Forces.

143

Military medical units designed for use primarily by Air Force personnel were drawn up by the Service Commands of the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces and the Far East Air Service Command. These suggested units varied one from another to a considerable degree, again demonstrating the need for a flexible supply procedure, which could cope with all conditions rather than a fixed one which could not. None of these medical military units was put into operational use. Medical supply distributing points forced to accept the standard medical military units on a troop strength basis frequently found themselves overstocked with certain items of equipment and perishable supplies of which it was sometimes difficult to dispose. It was also felt that such distributing points should stock equipment peculiar to the Air Forces such as phorometers, and depth perception apparatus, which could be shipped to units requiring them or to hospitals designated for Air Force patients. These hospitals were ordinarily not issued such equipment when they were caring for Ground Force troops.

Efforts to rectify this situation were made during the latter part of 1943 and early 1944. The situation was relieved when permission was granted by USAFFE for the medical supply distributing points to draw expendable items in bulk lots on the basis of troop strength. Class II and IV supplies were furnished upon requisition from each depot based on actual or estimated requirements, which were to be approved by the Air Service Command of the Fifth Air Force. Following repeated requests for at least two additional medical supply platoons (aviation) because of the unsatisfactory supply situation, a second medical supply platoon (aviation) was finally assigned to the Fifth Air Force in March 1944.' 144 With the formation of the Far East Air Forces in June 1944, these two medical supply platoons were assigned to the Far East Air Service Command. Medical supplies, however, continued on a hand-to-mouth basis in the forward areas, with distributing agencies almost entirely dependent upon base medical supply depots or the Sixth Army for replenishment of their stocks. Services of Supply medical supply depots were not usually among the first installations to enter new areas. Supplies were, therefore, almost always scarce between D plus 30, when the unit stock was depleted, until D plus 120.

To improve the supply situation the medical supply platoons (aviation) were assigned to the Far East Air Service Command during late 1944 and authorized to act at main supply bases as medical supply depots for the Air Forces. These units, attached to air depot groups and coordinating closely

262297°-55-50

with Air Force supply and the Surgeon's Office, FEASC, drew all Air Force requirements from SOS medical supply depots. Each medical supply platoon (aviation) was allotted a certain area and was responsible for the supply of all medical supply distributing points therein. Since these medical supply platoons were located at main Air Force maintenance bases, air transportation was available for the distribution of medical supplies to the various air service groups operating medical supply distributing points located within their area. A 60-day stock level was authorized the supply platoons and Class II and Class IV supplies were requisitioned on the basis of estimated needs upon approval of the Surgeon, FEASC. Each medical supply platoon operated a pharmacy which made up prescriptions required by the distributing units serviced. This procedure removed a considerable load from the medical section in tactical groups. The tactical squadrons and groups continued to draw supplies from their designated distribution points. A 30-day stock level was authorized the distributing points with the exception that in emergencies or in preparation for future operations a 60-, or in unusual circumstances, a 90-day supply could be obtained. The necessity for this extra quantity of supplies had been demonstrated in the invasion of Leyte and Luzon, when the medical supply platoon was unable because of its relatively unwieldy nature to set up and operate within D plus 30. At Leyte the medical supply platoon was not in operation until three months after D Day, 20 October 1944.

This plan for the distribution of medical supplies worked satisfactorily and relieved a considerable burden from SOS medical supply depots, with the exception that there was an insufficient number of medical supply platoons (aviation) assigned to FEAF to cope adequately with all requirements.145 In January 1945, of the seven medical supply platoons (aviation) assigned to the theater, only two were assigned to the Far East Air Forces, the others being assigned to the Sixth and Eighth Armies, and SOS.146 In March 1945 FEAF still had only two of these platoons assigned for its use, yet there was a total of thirteen medical supply platoons (aviation) assigned to the theater. Efforts of the Air Forces Surgeon, FEAF, and the Air Surgeon, AAF, to have more of these units assigned to the Far East Air Forces resulted in the assignment of two more in May 1945. This improved the distribution of medical supplies considerably, but it was felt that at least four more platoons were required at this time. Of the four units assigned, one was based at Biak supplying all Air Force units in the New Guinea area; one was located at Nichols Field, Manila, caring for all units in the Philippines; one was located at Okinawa to take care of units in this area; and one was being held for use in future operations. The personnel of the last platoon were used in the interim to augment

the platoon operating in the Philippines which carried too great a load to fulfill its mission adequately with the personnel authorized.

The medical supply distributing points operated by the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces varied somewhat in organization. In the Thirteenth Air Force all service groups operating under T/O & E 1-412 were reorganized under T/O & E 1-452T. Each reorganized air service group in the Thirteenth Air Force operated with a single tactical group and was responsible for all medical supplies to that unit. Small stocks of medical supplies were kept prior to this reorganization by tactical groups of the Thirteenth Air Force for the use of assigned squadrons. In addition, in some instances a small pharmacy was organized. An analysis of these reorganized air service groups shows that the medical sections were responsible for the distribution of supplies to approximately 5,000 troops. This required one officer and three enlisted personnel for whom there was no authorization. While the medical administrative officer was utilized as the medical supply officer, the enlisted personnel were not available except by seriously depleting the medical section. As a consequence, the operation of a dispensary with beds, X-ray, laboratory, and pharmacy, and other facilities, were forced to reduce to an absolute minimum.'

148

In the Fifth Air Force the air service groups responsible for the distribution of medical supplies were operating under T/O & E 1-412. These distributing points serviced all Air Force units within specified areas and were therefore responsible for the distribution of medical supplies to troops varying from 10,000 to 45,000, as was the case at Clark Field in June 1945. Ordinarily the servicing of such a large number of troops would place a serious strain upon the authorized personnel of the medical sections of these units. However, the Surgeon, Fifth Air Service Command, maintained a flexible program whereby excess personnel in other units were attached to the distributing points as needed. The majority of these personnel were drawn from attached airdrome squadrons. In this way air service groups in the Fifth Air Force were able to render efficient distribution of medical supplies to large numbers of troops when necessary.'

149

The supply of medical items near the close of the war was satisfactory. Certain items such as tincture of benzoin and hydrogen peroxide had always been scarce. At various times during the 32-year period, the supply of aspirin, salycylic acid, foot powder, methiolate, dimethylphthallate, DDT, fungicides, and benzedrine inhalers had been limited.150 At one time during the early days of the war atabrine was so scarce that deliveries were made by safehand courier. Effective adhesive tape was also difficult to procure.

In conclusion the medical supply platoon (aviation), with 2 officers and 19 enlisted men, proved adequate for its mission. Inasmuch as the platoons in this

theater operated pharmacies, it was recommended that a medical administrative officer, trained as a pharmacist, should be authorized, and that pharmacy equipment be included in the Table of Equipment. It was also found that the tonnage authorized was insufficient to care for the large stock carried, and that these organizations were frequently delayed in setting up for operations because of the low priority allotted them for the construction of buildings. During this period of time considerable supplies deteriorated or were subject to pilferage. It was therefore recommended that tools and equipment be provided so that the personnel assigned to those units might construct their own facilities. No equipment was authorized for the crating of supplies or handling of boxes, such as power saws, rollers, and lifts. The transportation authorized proved insufficient for the movement of supplies from depots to the platoon and the platoon to leading points. It was felt that a 21⁄2-ton truck was needed for this purpose.'

Air Evacuation

151

Air Evacuation in the Pacific areas gradually attained a position of major importance in the care of sick and wounded personnel.152 The intra-theater evacuation of almost 250,000 patients during a 3-year period is ample proof of the important part it played in the medical services provided military personnel.153 It was in this theater that the first challenge of air evacuation had to be met, and it presented many interesting and serious problems to personnel in the South and Southwest Pacific Theaters. Unfortunately, however, the full potentialities of air evacuation were not realized even with the limited troops and facilities available, for the problems of direction, coordination, and organization, which were essential for successful operation, were not fully appreciated by all commanders concerned, and the necessary steps to correct deficiencies were not always taken.

Air evacuation in both theaters began as an emergency measure, and, despite the haphazard and relatively undirected operations during this period, it provided for the evacuation of patients who could not have been removed from the combat area by any other means.

154

The first large-scale evacuation of sick and wounded during World War II occurred at Guadalcanal in August and September 1942.' The troops who invaded the island on 7 August 1942 were soon cut off from water-borne sources of supply by superior Japanese naval forces. One Army and two Marine troop carrier squadrons of the South Pacific Combat Transport Service