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unit of weight, and secondly, that the habit of standing on the suit left the vital parts of the body exposed to missiles from all angles. Nevertheless, the practice spread and, in due course, became so serious that a letter was drafted to the commanding generals of all commands, requesting that they expedite indoctrination to dissipate the erroneous assumption and to emphasize the use of the flak suit in the prescribed manner." A communication to this effect was not favorably reviewed by Headquarters for the following reasons:

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The practice of placing body armor on the floor seat, rather than wearing it, may not constitute the maximum protection for men in all crew positions but may be desirable for some, i. e., tail gunners in B-17's and, possibly, waist gunners. The general notion. that flak fragments enter aircraft mainly from below is not a mistaken belief.

The current program to install flak curtains on the floor and sides of heavy bombers should go far to reduce the present danger to flying personnel. Until it is accomplished, it is doubtful whether crew members should be ordered not to place suits on the otherwise unprotected floor. When such protection has been accomplished, and sufficient resulting experience has been obtained, it may then be well to review again the extent to which flak suit protection will be needed.

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The medical officers never relinquished their efforts to persuade the crews of the efficacy of the proper use of the flak suit and continued to present to them facts and substantial opinions bearing on the subject. They showed that case histories in a flight surgeon's office did not justify the idea that most flak penetrated through the bottom surface of the ship or that more came from one direction than another, with the exception that downward flak was rare." Data compiled in the Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, from Eighth Air Force records on the frequency of flak hits and the number of casualties resulting therefrom during the month of July 1944 was utilized. The figures showed that among heavy bomber aircraft returning from missions with casualties aboard the ratio of side to bottom hits was 3.1:1 for B-17's and 6.6:1 for B-24's. Similar ratios were found for all flak damaged aircraft. Of greater significance, however, was the fact that the relative frequency of casualties caused by flak hits from the sides and flak hits from the bottom stood at the ratio of 12:1. Many crew members apparently remained unconvinced. In April 1945 an inter-office memorandum was circulated recommending that "a strong directive be issued from Headquarters, Army Air Forces, forbidding the improper use of the flak suit as a floor mat."

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The emphasis placed upon the proper use of the suit should not lead to the conclusion that no significance was attached by higher authorities on the scene to the idea of averting casualties by placing armor on the bottom of heavy and medium bombardment aircraft. Group Commanders concurred in the opinion that if pads, constructed from the same material as the body armor, were placed

The electrically-heated muff shown here was developed by the Medical Department of the Eighth Air Force after much experimentation and service-testing. A number of prototypes were designed before a satisfactory one was finally developed.

The heated bag shown in these photographs was developed by the Medical Department of the Eighth Air Force for the transportation and care of wounded bomber crews.

in as many positions as possible over the floor of the aircraft and attached to the seats of the pilot and co-pilot, more crew men would wear the body armor as it should be worn. Consequently, a memorandum was submitted to the Ordnance Section, ASC, USSTAF, on 11 November 1943, with a definite recommendation as to the number and size of the pads for the B-17, B-24, and B-26 airplanes. General Grow believed that they would “very considerably decrease casualties." 46

On 3 April 1945 it was reported that approximately 4,000 flak pads for experimental tests and for use in C-47 aircraft and gliders had been manufactured in England but, in view of the high priority on helmets and certain other items, it was decided that pads for use in the B-17, B-24, B-26 and A-20 aircraft should be manufactured in the United States. In response to a specific request from General Grow on the progress of this project, it was also stated that no pads had been received from the United States.*

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The material was eventually received in England but not cut into pads as officially requested. Time and circumstances made it impossible to carry out this step of production in England.**

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The efficiency of body armor was indicated or measured in the comparative results of studies made on the fatality rate, the location of wounds, and the trend of the casualty rate among armored and unarmored combat crew members. In the 6-month period prior to the introduction of the flak suit on 15 October 1943, 169,249 individuals of the Eighth Air Force embarked on operational missions over enemy and enemy occupied territory. Reports on the missions revealed that 699 individuals or 0.41 percent of the total were wounded. During the period extending from November 1943 to March 1944, following the introduction of the suit, 373,230 crew members took off on combat missions. Of this number, 914 or 0.24 percent were casualties. This decline of 41 percent in the incidence of wounds between the two periods may be due in part either to decreased enemy action or to more effective methods of combat on the part of the Eighth Air Force crews, but the major factor was the effectiveness of body armor. Another study, limited to the crew members of heavy bomber aircraft, covering 7-month periods prior and subsequent to the introduction of the flak suit, brought to light a percentage more favorable to the suit. During the period prior to 15 October 1943, 137,130 combat crew members of heavy bomber aircraft were dispatched over territory under the jurisdiction of the enemy. Eight hundred sixty-nine wounds were received by 746 individuals among those on the missions. The ratio of wounds received compared to crew members taking off was 0.646 percent. During the succeeding November 1943-May 1944 period, 1,766 wounds.

were received in combat by 1,567 crew members from among the 684,350 dispatched. In this instance, the percentage of wounds compared to crew members was 0.248-a decline of 61 percent compared to the former period. In order to ascertain whether this decrease was due to normal combat circumstances or to the use of body armor, data on battle damage to aircraft were obtained from the Statistical Control Unit, Headquarters, USSTAF. Prior to the introduction of body armor 26.46 percent of aircraft returning from operational missions were found to have battle damage. Since the introduction of body armor, 21.47 percent of aircraft returning from operational missions were damaged by the enemy. Thus, battle damage showed an 18 percent decrease during the latter period as compared with the former. It would thus appear that the 61 percent reduction in wounds during the periods compared was not due entirely to combat conditions but, to a great extent, must be due to the use of body armor.

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The uncertain factors pertaining to combat conditions mentioned above in determining the efficiency of the flak suit were virtually eliminated by studies on the location of wounds and the fatality rates associated therewith. As a preliminary step in making comparisons, the body was divided into various areas or regions, e. g., extremities, head and neck, thoracic, and abdominal regions. During the six months preceding the introduction of the suit, it was found that 13 percent of all wounds were of the thoracic region and 5.5 percent were of the abdominal region. During the subsequent period (November 1943 to March 1944) of armor use, 6.6 percent of the total wounds were of the thoracic region and 4.5 percent were wounds of the abdominal region. Thus it is evident that there was a reduction among Eighth Air Force combat crew personnel of 50 and 18 percent of the wounds in the thoracic and abdominal regions respectively, during the two periods covered by the study. A second study covering longer periods (March to September 1943; November 1943 to May 1944) revealed very similar results. During the former period, unarmored combat crew members incurred 13.28 percent of all wounds in the thoracic region and 6.26 percent of all wounds in the abdominal region. During the later period, protected crew members incurred only 6.45 percent of the wounds in the thoracic region and 4.58 percent in the abdominal region. The decreased incidence of wounds in regions of the body covered by the flak suit, along with a relative increase of wounds in the area (extremities) not covered by the armor, indicated that the flak suit had considerably reduced the total number of wounds in these vital regions.

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The case fatality rate, which indicates in this instance the percentage of individuals killed in relation to the number of individuals struck and receiving