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'Ltr., Col. M. C. Grow, Surg., VIII AF, to Col. Eldred L. Gann, AFTAS sub: Force Troop Requirements (Medical), 20 Dec 43.

128

139

'Memo for Col. M. C. Grow, Hq. VIII AF from Capt Elmer W. Weatherstone, Pers. Off., VIII AFSC,

3 Feb 44.

140

141

142

Memo for CG, ASC, USSTAF, from Brig. Gen. M. C. Grow, Surg., ASC, USSTAF, 22 Mar 44. 'Ltr., Brig. Gen. Grant, TAS, to Col. Grow, Surg. VIII AF, 23 Feb 43.

'Ltr., Col. Wood S. Woolford, Ch. Operations Div., AFTAS, to Col. Grow, Surg., USSTAF, APO

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See also n. 126.

See also "The Air Force in Theaters of Operations," Chap. 18, Appen. 11, 1943, p. 12.

146 'Ltr., Maj. A. M. Bassett, Asst. Surg. VIII AF, to TAS, Hq. AAF, thru: Surg. ASC, USSTAF, sub: Modification of VIII AF Med. Service, 11 Aug 44.

1 Ltr., Maj. Gen. Grant, TAS, to Col. Harry G. Armstrong, VIII AF, 12 Jul 44.

148 Ltr., Maj. Gen. D. N. W. Grant, TAS, to Col. E. J. Kendricks, Surg., IX AF, 29 Jan 1945. IX AF (Colonel Kendricks) in files of Operations Div, AFTAS. In order to secure an increase in medical personnel it was necessary to justify the request for it by stating the purpose for which the increase was needed and to show how its services would be utilized, by showing that other facilities or units in the vicinity were already operating beyond capacity or that they did not exist; and, if the personnel request was for a service ordinarily performed by the SOS in the theater, by presenting a statement to show that it could not be accomplished and that the need for it was recognized. The requests for officer personnel had to give the number, grade, and MOS of each. It was necessary to justify in detail the requisition for MC and DC officers above the grade of captain and of MAC officers above that of lieutenant. In the case of medical officers, the requests for any MOS other than 3100 had to indicate why a specialist was required and to state whether or not an AME or flight surgeon was required in each instance. The number, SSN and grade of each enlisted man called were necessary. Each rating above that of corporal had to be justified individually.

149 Annual Rpt., Med. Dept. Activities, IX AF, 1944, p. 9.

150

'Ltr., Col. M. C. Grow, Surg., VIII AF, to Brig. Gen. Grant, TAS, 28 Aug 1943. See also undtd. Memo for Maj. Richard L. Meiling, from Col. George R. Kennebeck (DC), and Ltr., Col. John Hargreaves, to TAS, Attn: Col. Woolford and Col. Ledfors, sub: The Knerr Plan, 7 Aug 43.

151 See n. 150, The Knerr Plan.

102

Ltr., Col. M. C. Grow, Surg., VIII AF, to Brig. Gen. D. N. W. Grant, TAS, Hq. AAF, 28 Aug 43.

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158 Ibid., p. 96, The morale of the Dental Detachment at Large was somewhat low. The personnel were on detached service and attached to the various service and tactical groups for rations, quarters and duty. Often they were not considered as being members of a permanent organization. Since no provisions were authorized for the administration of the Detachment, it was a constant source of annoyance to the Machine Records Units, to station surgeons, and all administrative channels with which its personnel came in contact. Ibid.

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164

165

This section incorporates, with slight editing, the histories of the IX AF.

Ltr., Brig. Gen. Crawford Sams (MC) Surg. Hq. I Army Governors Island, N. Y., to Maj. Gen. Harry G. Armstrong (MC), Surg. Gen, USAF, 3 Mar 1954.

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168

Incl. No. 1, Memo for Gen. Somervell fr. TSG, 26 Feb 1944, sub (Incl.) Evacuation and Hospitalization Scheme for the ETO, Particularly AAF.

109

Excerpt of Report, Air Evacuation of Casualties Prior To and During the Sicilian Campaign, by Col. W. F. Cook.

170 Ltr., Col. Malcolm C. Grow, Surgeon, VIII AF, to Lt. Col. William F. Cook, Hq, NW African Air Force, 7 July 1943.

11 General plan for Operation OVERLORD, 9 Mar 1944, in SHAEF 580-MED Air Evacuation. 172 The report covered 47 days for water and 44 days for air.

173

Memo for Chief Administrative Officer, thru AC/S, G-4, from Maj. Gen. A. W. Kenner, Chief Medical Officer, SHAEF, sub: Evacuation of Casualties by Air, 26 July 1944.

174

Comment No. 1 (Memo, Major General Hawley, to Chief Medical Officer, SHAEF, 21 Aug 1944) Maj. Gen. A. W. Kenner, Chief Medical Officer, SHAEF, to Chief Administrative Officer, thru AC/S, G-4, sub: Air Strips for Evacuation of Casualties by Air, 21 Aug 1944.

175

Memo for Chief Medical Officer, SHAEF, from Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, Chief Surgeon, ETO sub: Evacuation by Air, 30 Aug 1944.

176 Ibid. 1 lbid.

178

'Ltr., Brig. Gen. M. C. Grow, Surgeon, USSTAF, to Chief Medical Officer, SHAEF, 2 Sept 1944, sub: Air Evacuation of Casualties, with 1 incl., Ltr., General Spaatz, CG, USSTAF, to Supreme Commander, AEF, undated, sub: Air Force Responsibility in the Air Evacuation of Casualties.

179 '2nd Ind. (Ltr., General Spaatz to Sup. Com., AEF, 3 Sept 1944) sub: Air Force Responsibility in Air Evacuation of Casualties, Hq, ETO, to CG, USSTAF, 21 Sept 1944.

180 Comment No. 1, Chief Medical Officer, SHAEF, General Kenner, to AC/S, G-4, sub: Evacuation by Air, 2 Sept 1944.

181

Comment No. 2, AC/S, G-4, SHAEF, to AC/S, G-3, sub: Evacuation by Air, 2 Sept. 1944.

182 Memo, sub: Critical Situation of Evacuation, 20 Sept 1944.

188 Ibid.

184

185

186

Memo for Lt. Gen. J. C. H. Lee, from AC/S, G-4, sub: Air Evacuation of Casualties, 20 Sept. 1944.
SHAEF cable FWD 14969.

Memo for Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, CG, Com Zone, from Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith, C/S, SHAEF, sub: Medical & Evacuation, 21 Sept 1944.

187 Ibid.

188

Memo for General Kenner from General Hawley, sub: The Evacuation Situation, 21 Sept 1944. 189 Memo for Supreme Commander, AEF, from General Bradley sub. Aircraft for Casualty Evacuation,

25 Sept 1944.

190 Ibid.

191

Ltr., Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith, C/S, SHAEF, to CG, 12th Army Group, sub: Evacuation of Casualties,

30 Sept 1944.

192 Interview with Col. Ehrling L. Bergquist, former Surgeon of the IX Troop Carrier Command, 18 Apr 1947.

193

Rpt, Med. Dept. Activities, USSTAF, Aug through Dec 1944.

194 "Notes from the Air Surgeon's Office, J. Avn. Med., August 1945, pp. 281-282.

195 Health Status USSTAF.

196

197

Ibid.

Memo No. 25-5, Hq. IX, TCC, sub: Standing Operating Procedure Medical Air Evacuation of Casualties, 18 Oct 44, p. 8.

198

Air Evacuation Report, IX Air Force for July 1944. Also, Air Evacuation Report, IX, TCC, May 1945. Memo from Maj. C. B. Stackhouse, sub: The following facts cover all accidents since D Day involving Aerial Evacuation from the Continent to the U. K., 1 Mar 1945.

199

I

Chapter VIII

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

OF AVIATION
MEDICINE IN EUROPE

Protective Armor

As in all previous conflicts, World War II was marked with efforts to reduce to a minimum the incidence of combat casualties. In the pursuit of this objective, body armor was a concern not only for the imaginative layman, but of the soldier, statesman, engineer and the scientist whose skill compared favorably to that displayed in the manufacture of modern missiles. The diligent research involved in the origin and development of the flyer's flak suit (soldier's term for body armor), helmet, curtains, pads, and other protective devices for the body constitutes a subject no less fascinating than the statistical records of their use and effectiveness in averting injuries and the loss of life.

The most important body armor for the flyer, namely, the flak suit, was predicated in part upon extensive studies made by the British in an effort to find some practicable means to reduce the casualties among their ground forces operating in Syria and North Africa. A report made by the committee appointed by the Royal Society of Medicine to devise some form of physical protection for members of the fighting forces revealed that the incidence of wounds due to low penetration missiles in the Middle East Campaigns had varied from approximately 40 to 75 percent. This finding suggested that the incidence of relatively low velocity wounds in aircraft would be as high if not higher than that of ground personnel owing to the fact that the volume of fire from rifles and machine guns should be greater for ground troops than for aircrews. Consequently, when sufficient material on wounds among American bomber crews became available early in October 1942, an investigation was made

which proved the assumption. It revealed that approximately 70 percent of the wounds incurred by Eighth Air Force combat personnel were due to relatively low velocity missiles.3

The combined results of these studies, plus two opinions later found untenable-that wounds in the chest and abdomen, an area equivalent to about one-third that of the total body, caused by low velocity missiles, would constitute about one-third of the total and be fatal in about 70 percent of the cases *—made it appear to Brigadier General Grow, then Surgeon of the Eighth Air Force, that some form of light armor over this vital region would avert numerous injuries and save a considerable number of lives among combat crews.5

Preliminary steps in the production of the armor were accelerated by previous English experiments along the same line. They had demonstrated that I millimeter 20-gauge manganese steel would meet the essential requirements for a metal. It did not shatter, was comparatively light, and possessed high resistance. For example, it was found to resist the penetration of a .303 caliber service bullet when the velocity was reduced to approximately 1,250 feet per second which would occur at a range of about 650 yards.

The material having been decided upon, General Grow, after consultation with a designer from the Wilkinson Sword Company, drew plans for a bulletproof vest and instructed the company to make one with plates so arranged that a 8-inch overlap was effected.' When finished, it was placed around a dummy approximately the circumference of a man's chest and a .45 caliber U. S. Army pistol using Service ammunition was fired from various positions at 30 paces into the vest. Penetration of the vest did not occur, even when the bullet struck at the intersection of the plates at an angle. As a result of the experiment, General Grow, not to be deterred by the fact that an effort to reinstate a "coat of mail" would produce many unbelievers, presented his plans along with the above pertinent facts to a commanders' meeting. Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force, was favorably impressed by the evidence and stated that any plan which foreshadowed the saving of so many lives was far too significant to abandon because of theoretical objections. He, therefore, on 15 October 1942 approved the recommendation that the crew of one B-17 airplane be furnished body armor for experimental flights. Upon receipt of ten suits, which weighed less than 200 pounds total, a crew servicetested them at an altitude of 20,000 feet. The plane was put into violent evasive movements while the crew simulated their various activities. It was found that the rip cords placed on the armor in such a manner as to be made readily detachable in case of emergency would permit each crew member to escape without undue delay. As a result of this experiment, the Commanding Gen

10

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Armored suit-familarily called "Flak Suit"-developed personally by Grow.

262297-55- 41

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