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just been passed, and hopefully will not again be vetoed. This refers to governments found to engage in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." Either House of Congress may request the President to furnish a report setting forth all the available information about the observance of human rights in any specified country receiving such military assistance. Then both Houses of Congress may adopt a concurrent resolution which could require a termination of security assistance to such a country. This is important new legislation, but it is not now applicable as far as India is concerned because the U.S. gives no military assistance whatsoever to India.

One type of quasi-military aid being given or sold by the U.S. to India is nuclear expertise, machinery, and fuels, including uranium and heavy water. Given India's decision in 1973 to go nuclear-whatever India's own description of her nuclear pregnancy-I think all U.S. nuclear aid of whatever sort to India should cease, as Canada rightly if belatedly ceased her nuclear aid to India some weeks ago. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently deciding whether to permit export of 40,000 pounds of uranium to India. This should be denied, for reasons of arresting nuclear proliferation, which is as crucial to human survival as arresting totalitarian proliferation. If India is the sixth member of the Nuclear Club, it is a member of the larger Totalitarian Club; the world community must be equally troubled about India's membership in both.

What other concrete levers are available to U.S. policy makers? The most obvious is food aid. We Americans are now shipping many millions of dollars and tons of food grains to India, even though at the moment the grain harvest in India is abundant. Under Public Law 480, the U.S. is shipping to India food grains as follows: under Title I, $119 million through long-term, low-interest loans during fiscal year 1976 and $61 million in 1977, while under Title II, $92 million in gifts during 1976 and $21 million in 1977. There will undoubtedly be periods in the near future when we must again ship even much larger amounts of food to India. We should do so-willingly, eagerly-whatever the state of human rights in India. Food should never be used as a political weapon-against any regime, against any people, including our own American poor! The prompt adoption by Congress of the pending concurrent resolutions declaring as national policy the right to food could help insure policy for a continuing flow of food to India and other needy countries.

What about economic aid to India? In March, it was announced here in Washington that the Ford Administration was breaking off the embryonic negotiations with India for bilateral economic aid because Mrs. Gandhi sharply criticized some things American. At the time I sent a letter of protest to Secretary Henry Kissinger and received a reply from Adolph Dubs of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He denied that talks were "broken off," but said that they were merely postponed; he also denied that "to defer talks on economic aid" is a "policy of 'economic reprisal.'" He did write, however, that "recent unfounded remarks by high Indian Government leaders which were critical of the U.S. have perplexed us and led us to conclude that caution is necessary regarding the pursuit of some programs which require that mutual trust and confidence exist between us before they can be carried out successfully." This finely-wrought sentence confirmed widespread fears that the U.S. apparently operates on pique-hurt pride-but I would hope that pique would not be decisive in American policy formulation, either in the Administration or here in Congress. I would hope that this Administration would, in earnest, begin again to negotiate broad economic and social aid to the Indian people, as much through multilateral agencies as possible, but also some bilateral aid in the near future. (I understand that $62 million in economic aid is in the 1977 economic budget earmarked for India if negotiations can begin and are successful.) India is one of the most severely affected nations, especially because of the fuel and monetary crises of the 1970's. India needs and deserves all the economic aid she can find anywhere in the first and second worlds.

What is, however, the relationship of economic aid to the violation of human rights? This is a more difficult area, ethically, since cutting off economic aid often affects, not only the ruling Party and its leaders, but the common people. The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, adopted by Congress last December, does assert that no development assistance should be provided to governments which have a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" unless such assistance "will directly benefit the needy people in such country." This is, of course, a big exception, and hard to determine. I would not be adverse to cutting off automatically economic

aid-but not food aid-to those countries which maintain a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. I would make one important exception: those nations on the official U.N. lists of least-developed or most seriously-affected States. India is on the second. I myself would welcome the enforcement of the human rights section of the Development and Food Assistance Act on the more relatively affluent nations which are notorious violators of human rights norms. We should additionally eliminate any favorable terms of trade, let alone aid, not only to Chile and the Republic of South Africa, but to such nations which violate human rights as the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea. If there is not legislation on the books to make this possible, let new laws be written.

In the meantime, U.S. economic aid to India should be increased, both bilaterally and especially multilaterally, and through the International Monetary Fund and other fiscal forms far beyond the traditional concepts of developmental assistance. The Indian people need such aid, however much this may unfortunately bolster the political party in power which is violating human rights.

Finally, there are general positive levers the U.S. can pull which might impinge on the internal direction India may take. These involve other aspects of American foreign policy. To the degree that we can loosen our alliance with Pakistan, to the degree that we can abandon our effort to build a military base on Diego Garcia, to the degree that we can include Delhi as one of the six or seven world capitals with which we must always confer, to that degree we can exert positive influence which can make democracy more possible in India.

Now let me turn to my fourth question. If the U.S. Government speaks out generally against violations of human rights in India, if the U.S. tries to use the U.N. system to underline the Indian situation, if the U.S. continues not to give India conventional arms and refuses to give any nuclear aid whatsoever, but resumes economic aid-will these actions, some countervailing to be sure, make any difference to the policies of India?

There are those who argue that the U.S. does not have leverage with its allies, let alone with States such as India. With India having a close relation with the Soviet Union today, and with Mrs. Gandhi having been especially critical of the U.S. in recent years, is it conceivable that the U.S. could have any leverage with India?

The case against the U.S. having any influence with India is easy to make. The U.S. tilted against India not only during the 1971 war (which resulted in the independence of Bangladesh) but also since the independence of India in 1947. "The two largest democracies in the world”—tragically, this phrase can no longer be used-these two great nations have never really had warm relations, at least not on a sustained basis. The chronic coolness, even in Nehru's time, could lessen any receptivity of Mrs. Gandhi toward any U.S. pressures. A second reason why the U.S. might not have much leverage with India today is the work-alleged or real-of the American C.I.A. For months Mrs. Gandhi herself implied that the C.I.A. somehow was responsible for many of the ills besetting India. Of late she has abandoned the C.I.A. theme, but in March she told a rally in Calcutta: "Let me, as Prime Minister, tell the foreign powers that we will not tolerate interference in our internal affairs. The more they interfere in our internal affairs, the more rigid and determined we will be in dealing with them."

Yet if a case can be made that the U.S. does not have much influence on India today, the opposite case also demands a hearing. I am one who does believe that American public opinion and official U.S. policy can make a difference in Delhi. There is a legacy of goodwill toward America which selectively can be called upon. Some months ago Mrs. Gandhi went out of her way to praise the U.S. as "a dynamic nation of dynamic people constantly giving birth to new ideas." One positive memory certainly of Indira Gandhi, but also of the people of India, is that the U.S. for so many years has sent huge amounts of food grains to India. Whatever the motivation of this food aid-and it was no doubt mixed-we did help feed millions of starving Indians over almost three decades. This will be remembered in the long run, if often it is forgotten in the short run and even if most peoples are not automatically grateful for such help. A second positive element is that the American experience was one of the ideological bases for the independence of India. While higher education in England was a decisive personal experience for both Gandhi and Nehru, such American examples as Henry Thoreau, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt greatly inspired the fathers of India-Gandhi and Nehru-and the literate Indian

people generally. This legacy of America will also not be forgotten over the long run, if sometimes it is not instantly remembered.

Whatever America can do about the violation of human rights in India-will it make a difference? I can only conclude that whatever America and other nations can do will at least not be counterproductive. And it just might lead to a lessening of the violations of human rights in India today.

Finally, why should the U.S., but also the world community, be concerned about human rights in India today? The struggle for priority between social and economic rights and civil and political rights is age-old, and has been hotly debated centuries before these instruments were fashioned by the U.N. system. Liberty versus justice are ancient themes of ethics and politics. There are no final answers, only continuing insights. My own conclusion, more firm today than in the recent past, is that both kinds of rights are essential in achieving even a minimum existence on our own planet, or any section thereof. Not either/or, but both. Civil and political rights are not a luxury in the Third World, even when people go hungry, for policy formulation to prevent continued starvation depends upon a consideration of the widest possible choice of alternatives and that requires the exercise of civil and political rights. One remains suspecious of those leaders who cherish civil rights, but do not give people enough to eat-as some present leaders of our own country! But also one remains suspicious of those leaders who say they are trying to find enough for their people to eat, but cannot allow their people freedom and postpone elections.

There is one unique reason for the continuance of democracy, especially in India. That is that India needs democracy to keep together. Rajni Kothari in the January 1976 issue of "Seminar," published in New Delhi, perceptively asserted that any prolongation of the Emergency "will push the country on a dangerous course which will only lead to its demise as a nation, as a polity, and perhaps even as a civilization. The 'democratic experiment' along which the nationalist leadership embarked-and indeed took long strides is the only viable system for a country so large, so diverse, and with such a long history of strife and disunity." Democracy can constitute cement to make a strong economic and social society.

It is, however, gratuitous for any individual or any government to suggest to another individual or government what social system is best for them, including the quality of civil liberties or human rights permitted. That is their sovereign decision. We have learned to cherish pluralism in social systems. The cold war is over. We Americans do not want to make the world in our image. Practically, we now know we can't. The Marxists, to be sure, have not officially given up their hope for worldwide communism if no longer by overt conquest. However, pluralism does not mean that we can acquiece to violations of human rights in different societies. Since Wold War II, the world community has devised international standards of human rights. Furthermore, we know that human rights are attached, inherent, to the individual and not to the State in which he or she at the moment might live. Thus the International Declaration of Human Rights is a standard for the treatment of individuals, whether they live in the first, second, third, or fourth worlds. Indeed, this standard applies to Russians, Chinese, South Africans, Chileans, Americans, Arabs-Indians. As a matter of fact, India voted for the adoption of the International Declaration 16 months after its independence.

A final reason why Americans should be concerned about human rights in India today is the effect this overt concern may have on members of the Opposition who are trying to relight the flame of freedom. It is important that their morale be considered and enhanced. If it is right to sustain the spirit of freedom fighters in the remaining colonial lands-and much of the U.N. system is committed to do this it is also right to sustain the spirit of those fighting for freedom in independent nations which are totalitarian. If the U.N. is buoying the spirit of those fighting for the freedom of Zimbabwe and Namibia, the U.S. and someday the U.N. should hold high the spirit of a Sarkarov in the Soviet Union, a Kim Chi Ha in East Asia, or a J. P. Narayan in South Asia. Perhaps morale-building is a proper function of non-governmental organizations more than governments. But we know that editorials critical of the Indian Government, news stories of demonstrations in front of Indian consulates, and other evidences of overseas criticism of the erosion of human rights in India are eagerly awaited by members of the Opposition who pass such evidences from person to person. I can attest to this practice among the Opposition in India today. This, then, is an additional reason for world and American concern.

In conclusion, let me acknowledge that some Americans who know India better than I do arrive at a position on human rights in India today—and what should be done about them-far different than my own. However, an increasing number of Americans whose lives in one way or another have been touched by India are rising above their loyalty to India, or acting out of this loyalty, and are publicly opposing the violation of human rights in India today. One group of 80 Americans issued a statement which was published in "The New York Times" on March 5, 1976. I submit this statement as another Exhibit (No. 3) of my testimony. As a final Exhibit, No. 4, I submit two editorials from "The New York Times" to reflect some American public opinion on this issue.

Since the Vietnam War concluded, many Americans have slipped into the pattern of not feeling deeply about issues. True believers are a vanishing species. This is good in that it eliminates sloganeering, irrationality, and stubbornness. It also encourages pragmatism, accomplishment, and realism. Yet something is missing if advocacy and conviction disappear. I feel deeply about the loss of liberty in India today. I wish more Americans felt similarly. When they do, I hope this concern will increasingly be reflected in U.S. policy.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Dr. Jack. It is a very helpful statement.

Our next witness today is Dean Embree.


Mr. EMBREE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, will skip some of my written testimony.

Mr. FRASER. We will include the entire statement in the record. Mr. EMBREE. In a recent press release, the Government of India argued that the condition of civil liberties in India is not the business of the rest of the world; that a government has the right to make such laws as it deems necessary for the welfare of the state. The Government continually stresses that the restrictions on civil liberties were not unconstitutional; that the President was exercising powers accorded him in the Constitution. It is also argued that Parliament has approved all the new laws and constitutional amendments, and that Parliament is supreme. These arguments will not seem very impressive to many who remember that all totalitarian regimes have made similar claims, but nonetheless they are of importance in judging the Indian situation.

The argument is also made that it is especially presumptuous of outsiders to criticize India, when clearly the present rules are in accordance with the will of the majority of its citizens. All of us with a concern for human freedom are pleased that your committee takes as broader view of a human responsibility, and that hearings such as these indicate that we do not believe a government can do what it likes with its own people, without criticism from the outside world. That this argument now comes from India is especially disappointing, because, for example, no government in the world has opposed apartheid in South Africa so long and so consistently as has the Government of India. South Africa has always used the argument that India now uses: That such matters are matters of internal politics, and the rest of the world has no right to interfere.

It must be stressed that the curtailments on civil liberties in India occurred in a country that once was one of the most open societies in the world. Nor were the civil liberties of which India was justly proud recent acquisitions. Long before India achieved her independence in

1947, India had a legal system characterized by an independent judiciary. The press, too, had remarkable freedom. The proof of both the reasonably fair working of the legal system, and of the freedom of the press, speech and assembly, was that the Indian National Congress, which played the major role in opposing British rule in India and winning freedom, operated openly for 60 years. It is true that political leaders like B. G. Tilak were arrested and imprisoned; but they received open trials. The same was true at a later period for such men as Mahatma Gandhi. I stress this point because there has been a tendency in the foreign press, and indeed in India itself, to suggest that civil liberties had existed for only a few years and so their loss does not greatly affect the society as a whole, since what was being taken away had no deep roots in Indian social and political institutions.

But having asserted our right and duty to be concerned with the condition of civil liberties in India, it is only fair to admit that the situation as it now exists in India is not comparable to that of Russia or Chile or Malawi. India is not at the present time a political demoeracy as it was before the imposition of the emergency decrees, but it has not become a police state, with power exercised arbitrarily without reference to law or where torture is institutionalized as a normal method of social control. It is true that there have been some allegations of torture in India, but there does not appear to have been any officially sanctioned use of torture.

There are three assessments that are frequently made about the situation in India that prevent understanding to what is happening in a country of great importance to the United States and to the world. One assessment is to see the actions of the Government of India as a reign of terror that, having overthrown the constitutional liberties of the Indian people, maintains itself through organized repression and fear. Another assessment has already been alluded to: That the idea of civil liberties had little place in Indian culture, and that it was inevitable that the facade of political democracy should be replaced by a system more in character with the nature of Indian society. A third assessment argues, in effect, that nothing has happened; that India is still a functioning democracy, and that after a few salutary checks on the activities of antisocial elements in the society, that freedom of the press and assembly, habeas corpus, and all the other customary freedoms will be restored. All of these assessments do a disservice both to India and to the United States by concealing the complexity of the issues. It would be especially regrettable if a failure to examine with care the forces at work in India at the present time led us to take actions which may lead to further curtailment of civil liberties. This might come about either through too ready support of the present Government, leading it to suppose that we preferred authoritarian regimes to democratic ones or, at the other extreme, hostility on our part might isolate the people from contact with the free countries of the world.

It is impossible to state the facts of the Indian situation in a way that would be acceptable to everyone, but an assessment of somewhat different character from those noted above suggests the possibility of looking at what has happened in the past year without either condemning it or approving it, but rather seeing it as a responsible act of a government, that, while having a genuine commitment to demo

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