Submission may be virtuous for many reasons, but not because it is due to the oppressor. Resistance might entail more discord, or bloodshed, than the evil resisted. It might serve to perplex the judgments of many, who cannot distinguish between what is unjust and what is only disagreeable. It might be very culpable to overturn an authority otherwise lawful, for one's own sake alone: and there are few questions harder to decide, than to know when the pressure of tyranny is so great, so universal, and so capable of remedy, as to overbalance the mischiefs that would arise from the resistance of an ignorant and passionate multitude. But the virtue which endures wrong rather than create mischief, the prudence and integrity which yield in sincerity, to a power which has no probability of being resisted successfully, are quite different from the duty of obedience to authority, because it is just. A just right to command involves a just right to the submission of others, and to withhold obedience would be morally wrong, though no means of enforcing it could be called into action.

I must be allowed to digress from the direct subject for a few moments, to guard against the idea, that the view herein taken of animal life holds out the least excuse for cruelty. It has only unfolded the reasons, which render a common measure for the ministration of benevolence to animals and to man, impracticable. The duty of sparing them every suffering the furtherance of our own interest permits, is an essential branch of that benevolent principle, which it is a peculiar prerogative of rational crea

tures to feel, without which wisdom loses all its grandeur, and power becomes pure evil. Notwithstanding the ferocity of man, compassion is there, planted by the hand of the Creator, and if we owe it not to the inferior, to the dissociated creature, must we not shudder at the inference that the greatest of all beings may not owe it to us! Is not their right to the enjoyments that nature provided for them, as clear as our own? And if that law of existence, by which animals live much at the expense of each other, justify us in taking their service or their lives as we need them, is it the less clearly a dictate of justice, to give them in return all the happiness that we can? No vice in the dark catalogue of human depravity is so detestable as cruelty, in all its forms. And if the law of benevolence enjoin us, in furthering our own purposes, to spare the inferior animals every annoyance we can, with what language shall we stigmatize making sport of their sufferings? To take pleasure in the misery of others is the definition of a demon, and nothing that tends to such a horrid distortion of human nature, should be endured by the laws of a Christian country.

Field sports, though derived from a natural instinct, would be scarcely defensible in our highly civilized condition, if the infliction of suffering were the source of the pleasure, as in cock-fights and bull-baiting. We find persons of a contemplative cast (accompanied, in most instances, with some degree of indifference towards every active pursuit), in whom the instinctive propensity to the chase is entirely obliterated. These can see nothing in it, but the

incomprehensible humour of first terrifying, and then killing a defenceless animal. But though there be something remarkably delightful in this cast of mind, yet it may be doubted whether it be not rather one of those delicate varieties, which a state of high refinement draws out of simpler feelings, than a moral improvement of much importance, likely to lessen materially the sufferings of the brute creation. Want of taste for the chase often proceeds from mere bodily indolence, and is by no means attended with peculiar humanity in other respects.

In a state of nature the chase is so obviously justifiable, that the only question which can arise is, whether civilization ought to supersede it, as a mode of destruction that might be spared. But when we consider the safe and abundant harbour, this taste provides for the animals till the moment that deprives them of existence, and the large proportion who are destroyed instantaneously, compared with those who are wounded and left to linger, the animals are perhaps considerable gainers compared with those which remain in their native wilds. It should not be overlooked, that in the latter condition they are equally exposed to destruction from other animals; and that to those who escape, a natural death, though less terrible, is certainly more lingering. These remarks apply also, and perhaps more strongly still, to the domestic animals that supply our tables.

When we take into account the intense delight people take in field sports, the safe channel into which they let out the restless animation of youth,

the vigour and hardiness they generate, and the tide of health and energy they restore to the pale victims of sedentary professions, or over zeal in the noblest intellectual pursuits, we may well question the eventual gain to the cause of humanity, by discouraging this taste. Men themselves are, in some respects, great sufferers by the evils that are suffered to attend upon field sports. A very serious objection to them is to be found in the game laws.

These considerations upon animals have been extended to a length that may scarcely seem pardonable. But who that has ever watched this interesting part of creation, their beautiful forms, their affectionate natures, their useful properties,-who that has ever felt his heart bleed, and his bosom burn with indignation at the usage they too often receive, could pass the subject, leaving behind the remotest suspicion of having contributed, by anything said, to lessen the defective sympathy they receive? Neither was it desirable to leave the arguments urged in their behalf, open to an overstrained application, which might have shaken the influence of the whole.

NOTE H, (p. 200.)

The supposed fact here alluded to is, that the sense of justice originates in the selfish principle.

It is expedient to warn the reader that, in this place, the word selfish is not used in an ill sense, but merely as a philosophical distinction. Whatever is a

virtue, must have either ourselves or our fellow creatures for its object*. Thus temperance, fortitude, industry, are useful chiefly to ourselves. Charity, generosity, pity, &c., chiefly to other persons. Sometimes the good of both parties may be concerned. But it is not necessary in this place to enter into the subject more deeply. It is evident that if we had no regard to our own interest, no appeals to us in favour of temperance, industry, or any other prudential virtue, would have any effect. Even the rewards of religion could have no influence. And if we had no natural sympathy with our fellow creatures, we should not have even a notion of the meaning of compassion, friendship, charity, or any social affection. We should be equally incapable of taking interest in the events of a poem or a play. But as nobody is destitute of some interest for the fate of his fellow creatures, whatever course of action promotes their happiness is the object of natural approbation. And again, this very sympathy with the good of mankind, leads us also to feel that each man ought to conduct himself so as to insure his own real happiness. We condemn him strongly, when he cannot command his impulses so far as to sacrifice some trifling present enjoyment, for a greater and more permanent advantage.

* It is scarcely necessary to observe that the present inquiry relates solely to the principles of morals, and therefore our duty to our Creator does not come within its scope. Religion gives the highest sanction to moral duties, but the moral duties are in the first instance agreeable to the perfection of our nature, or religion would not have commanded them. An inquiry into the principles of morals, therefore, is an inquiry what principle in our nature each virtue springs from.