for force and fraud, which tend to mutual destruction*.

Since the essence of justice is to overrule the predominance of mere strength, weakness is so far from defeating the claim to social rights, that where such rights are denied to the weak, it is justice itself which is destroyed. It is, therefore, a violation of justice to deprive women of any means of enjoyment which nature has given, except on the same ground that would justify depriving men of their enjoyments; namely, the necessity of compelling the surrender of some lesser, for some greater social advantage. Sacrifices of this nature constitute the very essence of social institutions. To yield up the trifling for the important, or the interests of the few for those of the many, is just; and they who suffer, may lament their misfortune, but cannot complain of being wronged. Inequality is the condition of existence. It is carried through all nature, where, as far as we can see, (and we can reason no farther,) every order of animal has different powers and means of enjoyment. Among men, the diversity of capacities, of constitution, and of habits, arising from climate, or other causes equally out of control, render their conditions almost as various, as if they were different species. The object of justice is not to over-rule this natural law; social institutions are most perfect, which secure to each individual, the fullest enjoyment of every advantage which nature or natural circumstances may have given him. They are unjust, only when artificial arrangements destroy the enjoyment that might

*See Note K. at the end of the volume.

have been left, or the abilities that nature bestowed. The superior has the same right to every advantage he can secure without robbing others, as the inferior; but he has no right to increase the difference in his favour, by laws or customs that cripple the exertions of others.

: The social pre-eminence of the male sex to a certain degree, is essential to the well being of society, but can be justified no further than as it is so. Whatever tends to sacrifice one sex to the other, to diminish the happiness, the social utility, or the moral and mental improvement of the weaker, is grounded solely on violence, and is really an injustice. The right of the superior to rule the inferior, as a general proposition, depends altogether on the assumption, that the views and decisions of the stronger mind will be wiser and juster, in other words, more useful to all, than those of the weaker. This they assuredly will. If one party must yield to the other, there can be no doubt with which to intrust the interests of society. Power has an almost inevitable tendency to corrupt the benevolence of the possessor. Its influence over the weaker, would be still worse, (as a general rule,) than over the stronger minds. Yet the corruptions of the latter may be very oppressive and hard to restrain; and just inasmuch as the male sex are tempted to use their power for their own advantage alone, regardless of that of women, they lose their moral right to submission. Whenever submission to the abuses of power, is a duty or a merit, it is on grounds totally different from those of the right of the superior.

In many cases it is neither a merit nor a duty to yield to oppression. This is a truth which is always acknowledged, except among those by whom human beings are reduced to the condition of mere property.

Let it not be overlooked, that the inequalities of condition which are derived from nature, are compensated by a proper adaptation of the creature's desires to its condition. Nature apparently withdraws from each animal, even the knowledge of those pleasures, for the acquisition and enjoyment of which she has given them no appropriate faculties. It is evident, that animals can feel no more regret for the powers they never knew, than man himself; probably less; for by his power of abstraction and combination, man can perhaps form some notion of unknown enjoyments, from their possible analogy with those known. Such notions however are but vague and uncertain. How different are the conditions of a man born blind, and of one who has had the misfortune to lose his sight! But the privations inflicted by human institutions, fall upon those whose faculties and desires have been called forth enough, to make them miserable under their loss. It is therefore important, to be sure that no arbitrary privations are inflicted on any branch of the community, except for some advantages, greater than those which are sacrificed.

The subordination that ought to exist, is as clearly deducible from these principles as the freedom. For as we cannot reasonably doubt, that every part of nature is so constituted with respect to every

other, that some good results from the apparent inequalities of happiness; it follows that human institutions, framed without any regard to such natural differences, could not be for the true good of any. Institutions framed without any regard to the inferior strength, mental and bodily, of one sex, would certainly not be for the benefit of society, nor consequently for that of woman herself as a part of society. She is the weaker party, and it is the weaker in every case who benefit most by the perfection to which society may be brought. It is only required that we should ascertain fairly, how far her weakness, with its attendant defects and sufferings, is brought about artificially, by bad education and bad principles.

A bad state of society, may render it expedient to maintain for a time, laws and customs quite indefensible on general grounds, but the sooner we can correct that vicious state of society, which justifies the maintenance of such laws, the better for all parties.

SECTION IV.

Natural Subordination of Women.

The third proposition to be examined, is that the custom of keeping the female sex in a state of subjection is universal, whence it may be thought to be a law of nature. Propositions partly true and partly false, require careful consideration. The subordination of women is a law of nature, their slavery or their depression is not.

In the sketch of their condition contained in the

two first chapters of this work, a sufficient number of instances have been adduced, to prove that the practice of enslaving or depressing the female sex, though very prevalent, has not been quite universal. It is referable to nature, only in the same sense as are wars and cruelties, all our worst vices, and our most odious passions. All spring from nature unregulated by the most essential and distinguishing attribute of humanity-reason. Our passions and affections invite, tempt, solicit; reason only commands. It carries with it an inherent perception, that its dictates ought to be obeyed preferably to all others; so that the naturalness of other motives, however it may palliate our guilt in yielding to them, can never justify such conduct. In a word, inflicting useless privations on women is a vice, just on the same grounds as inflicting them on men. It is natural in no sense except as vice is natural; and accordingly, we find in the varieties of human condition, that as some communities have been exempt from other particular vices, so also some have been exempt from this, or nearly so. But we can find no instance of a community much advanced in civilization, in which that sex is not in some degree subordinate to that of men. By no law of nature, could the weaker in body and mind, be placed precisely on the same footing of social importance, as those who can much better direct the great interests of society. And there is no law of reason why they should.

There are obvious and radical distinctions of character and ability between men and women, which ought to regulate their occupations and their rights.