I have been deeply concerned about-and I think Mr. Campbell has as well-the manner in which the Congress over a period of years has simply ceded power to the President with respect to war powers, and there's been a very serious erosion of our power because of our unwillingness to act. And so it's good to force this Committee, as Mr. Campbell has done, to address the question.

Now I'm not going to support Mr. Campbell's resolution, and that causes me some personal pain, and as I've suggested to you, I think there are good reasons to question this resolution. I think my objections are basically two. One is a policy objection, and the second is a legal objection. Let me address the policy question first.

Whether the resolution before us, the underlying resolution, is amended or not, I believe that this resolution really does jeopardize U.S. policy in Bosnia. I'll address the legal question in just a moment. This resolution is not a freebie for Members. This is not just a sense-of-Congress resolution. It is a resolution that will direct the President to remove U.S. forces from Bosnia. The important thing here is that Mr. Campbell argues that 5(c) is constitutional, and that is why he wants to move this resolution out of Congress and into the courts. If his argument prevails, the resolution would be binding on the President, and it would require the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia. An aye vote on the Campbell resolution, then, has enormous policy consequences for this country, and I think those consequences are largely negative.

I think that U.S. participation in so-called SFOR is absolutely vital to the peace and the stability of Bosnia. We are the acknowledged leader in Bosnia. Let's be very clear about it. If U.S. troops leave, the other nations will leave. There will be no NATO force in Bosnia without the United States. We are the backbone of that force in Bosnia, whether we have 30,000 troops or whether we have 7,000, or whatever the figure is, after June.

I think there are very grave risks to the United States if we withdraw these troops, and the resumption of war is likely. I also believe that a withdrawal of these troops at this particular moment puts at risk a lot of very impressive accomplishments of the last few months-more so, I think, than most Americans are perhaps aware. We've stopped the fighting. We've demobilized the armies. Local governments have been elected. There is steady progress in the formation of Bosnian institutions. Refugees are returning in larger numbers. Local police forces are being established, and training is going forward. As we read in the paper this morning, war criminals are being indicted and convicted, and there is for the first time, even in the Bosnian Serb leadership, support for the Dayton peace process.

A vote for the Campbell resolution at the very time when we're beginning to see substantial progress in Dayton would have, I think, a devastating impact on what has happened there. And I think the parties in Bosnia are watching very carefully what we do here.

Finally, with regard to the policy, before I get to the legal aspect of it, we've always understood that Bosnia's more than just Bosnia. It's also about the future of NATO and the stability of Europe, and our allies and the people of Europe have looked to us for leadership, and we've supplied it. The credibility of the United States is

at stake, and all of us on this Committee understand that broader point.

Now let me turn to some of the legal aspects of this. Tom Campbell, Congressman Campbell, has told us that his intent here with this resolution is to force the courts to examine the war powers authority. I understand that. He's right when he argues that we ought to have legal clarity here. But may I suggest that, even if his resolution passes, I think it is highly unlikely that it would resolve the broader question of Congress' war powers.

So far as I am aware, no President has accepted the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, while many, if not most, Members of Congress, including myself, have maintained the opposite. Congress has side-stepped this issue again and again. We're reluctant to take responsibility by voting for an authorization. We didn't do it in Haiti. We didn't do it in Somalia. We didn't do it in Bosnia. We did do it in the Gulf War, but, more often than not, we don't do it.

The question here is, would this resolution put forward by Mr. Campbell resolve the question of Congress' war powers authority? I think the answer to that question is, no, the resolution, if it were to go to the courts, would be judged, I believe, on fairly narrow grounds.

The first would be the Supreme Court Chadha decision. It has been widely accepted that a concurrent resolution that mandates the President to take action, but does not go to the President for his signature or win a two-thirds vote to override the President's veto, is going to violate the Constitution.

Second, the courts have been very reluctant to get into the question of what constitutes hostilities, which would trigger 5(c). I think the Administration's position is, in the letter they have sent to us, they do not believe that hostilities are present in this situation, because there haven't been casualties from hostile action. So if Congress were to pass a concurrent resolution to remove U.S. troops from Bosnia, pursuant to section 5(c), it seems to me that if a court were to rule, it would likely base its decision on the narrow grounds that I have indicated without resolving the larger question of war powers authority.

When Mr. Campbell says we need to find out if the war powers resolution is constitutional, I think he's quite right about that. I share his frustration on that point; I really do, and that's why I commend him for making this Committee confront it. But I don't think supporting this resolution is going to get the kind of judicial review of the war powers authority that he seeks. So while I have the highest regard for Mr. Campbell, I'm not able to support this resolution as the right vehicle for two reasons. The policy implications of this are just enormous at this point in time, and second, I don't think in the legal aspects it gets what Mr. Campbell wants, because the court would decide the question on narrow grounds. I thank the Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

I might note for our colleagues that at 5 o'clock there will be one 15-minute vote and two 5-minute votes. So about 5 o'clock, we'll recess until 5:30. Please bring back with you another Member, so

that we can have a quorum and resolve this measure—[Laughter] before we wind up, and we'll wind up at an early hour.

This resolution presents a number of interesting, pertinent issues to our Members, not the least of which is the question of our continued military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which this and the previous Congress have grappled with extensively. I must confess a certain degree of patrimony for the unusual procedure which utilizes provisions of the War Powers Resolution that require an expedited consideration for this measure, both within the Ĉommittee and on the House floor.

In 1993, I introduced the similar resolution concerning Somalia, drawing upon War Powers Resolution which called upon the President to withdraw forces from that country with certain exceptions similar to those in the measure now before us by a date certain. The gentleman from California, Mr. Campbell, is now emulating our effort, and we accept his invitation of our Somalian measure as the sincerest form of flattery. I regret, however, that the circumstances that now obtain, as the Committee considers this concurrent resolution, significantly differ from those at the time when the 103d Congress considered our Somalian measure. At that time we were facing a failed policy and a foreign_military venture that had in 1 day led to the death of 18 of our finest troops in a vain effort to search for and siege so-called warlords who were held to be responsible for obstructing the U.N. operation in Somalia. The Clinton Administration had, for political reasons, denied requests from our commanders in the field for heavier armor to better protect our troops and have subordinated our troops to the U.N. command at that time.

We're grateful that these are not the conditions that now face NATO forces in Bosnia. Our troops in Bosnia have been the heart of a NATO force under U.S. command that has successfully put a stop to a conflict in the center of Europe that killed hundreds of thousands and led to more than 2 million refugees. In the past few months we've seen the glimmerings of success in regenerating a stable civil society in all Bosnia and the replacement of extremists with moderate political forces.

Moreover, we've expended in excess of $7 billion to implement our peace plan in Bosnia. Withdrawal now would place considerable investment at risk, with no guarantee that we would not be called upon in the future to again introduce our forces if the conflict were to re-ignite. I remind the Committee that I opposed the initial deployment in 1995 of our troops in Bosnia because I rejected the Administration's assertions that their job would be completed swiftly within 1 year, because I saw little preparation for the costs that I felt doing the job completely would really entail.

I also was concerned then that our troops would face hostilities and that the American people had not been told what interests were at stake that justified those risks. I have voted for measures to terminate funding for our troops, most recently, last June, as we acted upon the defense appropriations bill, when I supported the Buyer amendment and I offered an amendment to last year's emergency supplemental that contained a similar provision.

I do believe, however, that the Congress essentially acquiesced in our Bosnian deployment when they agreed to the Conference Re

port on defense appropriations that adopted a Senate-authored, sense-of-Congress provision that funds should be terminated as of July 1, 1998, but allow the President to waive this provision with the full knowledge that he would utilize his waiver.

I commend the gentleman from California, Mr. Campbell, for including a provision that makes it clear that his measure is not reflective of either agreement or disagreement with our Bosnia policy, and I understand his intent in putting his measure before us, to reinforce and test the war-making prerogatives of the Congress. I do not believe, however, that an affirmative vote for this resolution would be understood in that context. Instead, I think it would be interpreted by friends and foes alike as a sign that the Congress does not support what our troops are doing in Bosnia, and that this country cannot muster its resolve even to continue a policy that seems to be succeeding.

I understand that Mr. Campbell has an amendment that substitutes for his June 30th deadline a definite period following a ruling by the courts to enforce this resolution. I'm willing to consider his arguments and see if they address the concerns that I just expressed.

Well, we still have time to hear a Member or two. Mr. Clement. Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must concur with both the Chairman and Ranking Democrat, Mr. Hamilton, and their comments concerning the Campbell resolution. I do not think it is in our best interest to approve this resolution, as Mr. Hamilton said, on policy issues, as well as legal issues. Just recently, I had the opportunity to visit Bosnia with the National Security Committee, and I didn't spend most of my time with the generals and the colonels. I spent most of my time with the troops concerning the morale of our troops, as well as where do we go from here knowing that we're going to vote somewhere between now and June the 30th concerning whether we keep our troops in Bosnia.

And I was real interested in the comments of our troops because many of them are homesick; many of them want to be back with their family, but then when I would ask them the question, without exception, every one of them said-and these are the rank-and-file troops that we have in Bosnia-they said, "Congressman Clement, we need to stay in Bosnia."

As the Chairman said a while ago, and Mr. Hamilton, we do have a major investment in that area. We also know that if it wasn't for the United States, and the Dayton Accord and the Dayton Agreement, they would still have fighting, and war would still be ongoing in that part of the world. And, yet, it was the U.S. leadership and the Clinton Administration's leadership that was responsible for bringing all parties to the table.

I think very strongly that the Europeans ought to have been more upfront much earlier. I still don't understand why the Europeans wouldn't show more leadership earlier, and could have saved many lives.

I am pleased that the United States has moved expeditiously from having 20,000 troops to 8,000, and now the announcement that they're going to even draw it down further. That's in our best interest.

I hope now, from being a veteran myself and a colonel in the Army National Guard, I'd like to see in the Bosnian area that we put a lot more emphasis on civil affairs-type people than combat arms personnel. And, also, to have not only more intelligence information, but better intelligence information, and I think it's going to come to a point in time that we're going to have to be more aggressive to bring these war criminals to justice. But it is in our best interest to keep a presence in Bosnia with this multi-national force, and I do agree with my colleagues that have spoken, even though I respect Mr. Campbell highly, and I know he surely is very knowledgeable on constitutional questions and all, but this resolution of Mr. Campbell's I cannot support. I do think it's in our best interest to continue our presence in Bosnia after June the 30th.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Clement.

Mr. Sanford.

Mr. SANFORD. I would respectfully disagree with my colleague from Tennessee, in that it seems to me that this debate, this discussion we're having today, is ultimately not at all about Bosnia. Bosnia is certainly tangential to this overall discussion, but it seems to me that the overall argument is one of process, and it's one of a question that has long been debated here in this Congress and here in Washington, and that is, who is ultimately responsible in the event that a young man or a young woman finds himself overseas? In that, ultimately, each of our respective congressional districts are the places where blood is shed. It is from our districts that a young soldier goes off to Bosnia or Yemen, or who knows where, to be engaged as part of a larger effort. At some point, based on the discussion that took place here in Washington, after the Vietnam-or through the middle of the Vietnam aftermath, it was determined that Congress ought to be a part of this. The Constitution I think makes it fairly clear.

And I would just like to yield my time, if I could, to Representative Campbell, in that there have been a number of points raised that-I'm not a constitutional scholar; I don't understand the maybes on it. I just see it from a common-sense standpoint on what I read the Constitution to mean, and who I think ought to ultimately bear this responsibility. It seems to me the Congress, but I'd be curious if you could refute a couple of these points that have come up.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I sure appreciate my colleague yielding.

Mr. Hamilton had two points. First, that an aye vote is against the Bosnia policy. It is not. An aye vote is that the Congress shall decide whether or not to support the Bosnia policy. Please don't make that mistake. And if this passes, the President may continue his Bosnia policy with no change, provided the Congress approves. Second, Mr. Hamilton said that it would not yield a definitive legal judgment because it would surely be decided on the narrow grounds of Chadha. I wish I could predict courts that well. But he doesn't anticipate the other two grounds of the lawsuit that we shall bring. It won't be under 5(c) exclusively; it will be under 5(b), and directly under the Constitution, as I said in my opening remarks. So even if the Court rules 5(c) unconstitutional, passing