this resolution gets me past the ripeness barrier to bringing a lawsuit. And then I simply straightforward argue, Mr. President should have come to Congress at the time you put the troops in Bosnia under 5(b); forget Chadha. And, third, as Ron Dellums argued, directly under the Constitution, the President should have, because it constitutes war. So, truly, Mr. Hamilton, for whom, in his absence, I will say, even to his face, I have equally high regard, but he can't be right that we shouldn't pass this, because he expects the Court will only rule on a narrow base. Mr. Gilman, our chairman, says this is different from Somalia because Somalia was a failed policy. Yes, you're right, I am imitating you, Mr. Chairman, jot and tittle. It was the idea of a member of your staff for whom I have great gratitude and regard—not to bring the idea, but I asked him, how could I, and he helped me. But, surely, we cannot be at difference on the basis of whether one is a successful policy and one is a failed policy. If it's a failed policy, vote no; if it's a successful policy, vote yes. But, for God's sake, vote. And, last, our chairman says that this was handled by an appropriation. No, it can't be, because the War Powers Resolution itself says an appropriation cannot satisfy the War Powers Resolution, and that part is not in constitutional doubt, and there is a severability clause. I thank my colleague for yielding. Mr. SANFORD. Certainly. I yield back. Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Davis. Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to ask Representative Campbell if he could further elaborate on exactly what alternatives would be available to Congress in the event your lawsuit were to succeed. In other words, what are the timeframes? Mr. CAMPBELL. Sure. Mr. DAVIS. And what would you reasonably expect by way of congressional action, given the compelling history of inaction? Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Davis. The President would be mandated by the Court to issue a 4(a)(1) report, and that means he would have to say, look, we have introduced American forces into hostilities or into a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances-4(a)(1). Then under 5, after that report is submitted, the Congress shall decide within 60 days whether to approve the use of force or not. If the President wants, he can get an additional 30, so totaling 90 days. At the end of that, according to and there is priority for that, Mr. Davis, so it goes right to the floor. If at the end of that the U.S. Congress has not approved, then under 5(b), the President has to withdraw the troops. So he issues the report because the Court orders him to. We have 60 to 90, probably 90, days in which to consider it. The President asks for our approval. If we give it, no change. If we don't, the troops come home. Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Since we have a series of votes, I will adjourn the hearing until 5:30. Please bring two other Members back with you. Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. Let me notify our Members that there will be no vote tonight on the resolution. We will put the amendment before the Committee, and then we will recess until tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to just say how much I respect my good friend from California, and reluctantly rise in opposition to his resolution, H. Con. Res. 227. I believe that the Congress should play a role in critical foreign policy decisionmaking, especially when there is the utilization of Chairman GILMAN. Will the gentleman withhold? Mr. SMITH. Sure. Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order; the gentleman is speaking. Please take your conversations out to the ante room. Mr. CAMPBELL. And, Mr. Chairman, point of order, if I may, just while we're stopping anyway. Did you want me to offer my amendment at some point? Chairman GILMAN. Yes, we do. Mr. CAMPBELL. I'll do so obviously, Mr. Smith has the floor. Mr. CAMPBELL. Fine, thanks. Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Smith, please proceed. Mr. SMITH. It's more important than ever that we be involved when U.S. Armed Forces are under consideration. I also have serious questions regarding those U.S. policies toward Bosnia which led to the Dayton Agreement and the subsequent deployment of U.S. troops there. I think, as you know, Mr. Chairman—and I think you were very much a part of this, as were people like my good friend Steny Hoyer, the co-chair of the Helsinki Commission-we felt that lifting the arms embargo, and going another route, was the means to the end, but now that that's water over the dam, how do we best make this policy work? As a matter of policy, I believe the continued presence of the troops remains a prerequisite for the objective of achieving a sustainable peace in the former Yugoslavia. With respect to the wellintentioned resolution before the Committee, I must oppose it for the following reasons: One, like it or not, the troops are there. The possibility of their withdrawal in June hung like a thick fog over Bosnia, compounding the international community's tenuous resolve and halting progress as a result. The question of a post-S-4 renewal of fighting and even a division of Bosnia loomed large. The President's March 3rd notification of the U.S. intention to stay this time without setting a date certain for their withdrawal has made a stable peace much more likely. U.S. policy has become much more assertive, as a creation of a more stable and lasting peace is a prerequisite for departure of the forces. Persons indicted for work crimes have been captured, and some are even surrendering themselves. More people have sought to return to their original homes. The Bosnian Serbs are seeing a brighter future with political moderates instead of being allied with the Nationalists. Unfortunately, the pace of the progress remains slow, too slow, but if the troops were withdrawn during this critical period or sometime thereafter, as I think the substitute may envision, I am convinced that progress would cease. Second, passing this resolution at this time would, without a doubt, send the wrong signal. Threatening withdrawal before the situation is stable is seen by those on the ground as a sign of weakness. Those that would prefer the troops out of Bosnia are more inclined to test our troops and our resolve, if they feel there is political weakness in Washington, DC. And, Mr. Chairman, the recent events in Kosovo are a stark reminder of Mr. Milosevic's inclination to violence and the volatility of that region. And, finally, ultimately, this resolution is more than a statement on the need for congressional authorization for troop deployments abroad. It also implies opposition to any authorization regarding Bosnia. The "Dear Colleague" circulated by the advocates of the resolution states that our troops, "face an endless period in a hostile region with an undefined mission of forging an unstable peace." If those who advocate the need for authorization are really seeking to withdraw the troops from Bosnia, we need to seriously consider the consequences of a premature withdrawal. No matter how much we have had reservations or even opposed the Administration's decision to deploy in the first place, the reality is that the Congress would be held responsible for the consequences, and should be held responsible, if there is a premature withdrawal. The United States, in my view, has a national interest at stake in Bosnia's future and the success of the Dayton Agreement. In Bosnia a few political leaders who desire political power seek to convince the world that division of the country is inevitable. If we let them succeed, there will be consequences in the region, and there will be a definitive impact on the viability of NATO, which is now successfully reshaping itself for the post-cold war era. Finally, just let me say, Mr. Chairman, that I have family there. As a matter of fact, one of the members of my family is there for the second deployment. I have spent hours talking to him about what's going on, and I think, as my good friend from Tennessee, I think it was, mentioned earlier, you talk to the troops; they do believe that they are providing a very useful service to humanity by being there. Yes, we all had misgivings at first, but I think now we all need to pull together and do what is in the best interest of the region, and in the best interest of our own troops who are there. So I would oppose, reluctantly, because Mr. Campbell is a good friend, the resolution that he has offered today. Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Do any other Members seek recognition? [No response.] If there are no other Members seeking recognition, I now recognize the gentleman from California to offer an amendment. Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment. It's not only at the desk, but it's already in your black folders on the lefthand pocket. Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will report the amendment. Ms. BLOOMER. "Amendment offered by Mr. Campbell. "Page 2, strike line 15, and all that follows through line 3, on page 3, and insert the following: "(b) Removal of Armed" Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the amendment will be considered as having been read. [The amendment to H. Con. Res. 227 appears in the appendix.] Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman from California will be recognized tomorrow on his amendment. There will be no votes tonight and no further discussion. We will be recessing until 10 a.m. tomorrow morning, and we'll recognize at that time Mr. Campbell on the amendment. [Whereupon, at 5:59 p.m., the Committee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a.m., on Wednesday, March 11, 1998.] MARKUP OF H. RES. 361, H. RES. 364, AND H.R. 2870 WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1998 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding. Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. The Committee is required by statute to provide its views and estimates on the President's budget each year at this time. So we will interrupt our proceeding on the Campbell resolution while we are awaiting Members to come in order to dispose of this business. At my direction, the Committee staff has prepared a draft letter. The letter sets out the view that we support 98.5 percent of the President's recommended spending, cutting his budget request for the next fiscal year by about $200 and $300 million. Neither the Budget Committee nor our Committee, through this document, makes recommendations at the program level. We are only supposed to make aggregate spending recommendations. These figures were built up from emotional spending on some programs. I am sure no one would agree with all of our ideas, but I would hope they represent a consensus view of where we ought to be in general terms. I would recommend that by unanimous consent we agree to send this letter and any other views to the Budget Committee. Mr. Hamilton. Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed the draft letter which you propose with regard to the 150 account, and let me say that I appreciate very much that your recommendation for this account for Fiscal Year 1999 is an increase of about a billion dollars over the amount appropriated thus far in Fiscal Year 1998. That is certainly a step in the right direction. So far as I am concerned, I support the President's recommendation, and I think we need to provide the President the resources that are commensurate with American leadership in the world. I also think we are just at the beginning of the budget process and each step of that process will almost certainly involve further cuts. Thus, I would like to start with a higher number. So may I request that, pursuant to the House rules, the chairman include, in his submission to Chairman Kasich, the Minority recommendation which I have prepared. I think it is straightforward and self-explanatory. |