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Of virtue, staggering on the brink of vice;
In waking whispers, and repeated dreams,

To hint pure thought, and warn the favored soul
For future trials fated to prepare."

It is not, however, to be supposed, that the power of these beings is so large as to alter or suspend the general laws of nature; for the world is not like a bungling piece of clock-work, which often requires to be set backwards and forwards. Neither is it to be supposed that they can change their condition, so as to ape us or inferior beings; and, consequently, we are not hastily to credit stories of portends, such as cannot be true, unless the nature of things, and their manner of existence, were occasionally revealed. Yet, as men may be so placed as to become, even by the free exercise of their own powers, instruments of God's particular providence to other men, so may we well suppose that these higher beings may be so distributed through the universe, and subject to such an economy, unknown to us, as may render them also instruments of the same providence; and that they may, in proportion to their greater abilities, be capable, consistently with the laws of nature, of influencing human affairs at proper times and places.

It is proper, however, to guard this doctrine against abuse. It is to be remembered that the present life is not a state of righteous retribution, but a state of trial; consequently, men are not dealt with according to their true characters. The goods of nature and Providence are distributed indiscriminately among mankind. The sun shines, the rain falls, upon the just and upon the unjust. It is a dangerous error, therefore, to judge of moral character from external condition in life. This was the error of Job's friends; this the foundation of the censures they cast against this excellent person, and for which they were reproved. The intention of the book of Job is, to show that this supposition is false and unfounded, by representing the incomprehensible majesty of God, and the unsearchable nature of his works. Many instances in the Scriptures confirm this observation. Who that saw David reduced to straits, wandering for a refuge in the rocks and dens of the wilderness, would have believed him to be the prince whom God had chosen? Who that beheld Nebuchadnezzar walking in his palace, surrounded with all the pomp and splendor of royalty, would have believed him to be the object of the divine displeasure? and that the decree was gone out, that he was to be driven among the beasts? Who that beheld Jesus in the form of a servant, would have believed that he was the Lord of life and glory? But these all proved to be facts. We are not, therefore, to judge of men's moral character by their external condition.

DISCOURSE IX.

Objections Answered to the Doctrine of Divine Providence.

"The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice."-Psalms xcvii., 1.

HAVING, in a former discourse, illustrated the mode of Divine Providence, we shall now proceed to state some of the principle objections which, in ancient or modern times, have been urged against it.

I. The first objection that has been urged against the doctrine of Divine Providence, which we shall notice, is this: That the system of nature contains many imperfections, which it ought not to do, if it be the work of a perfectly wise and good Being. To avoid the force of this objection, some modern writers have deserted the ground of supreme and absolute goodness, which the ancient theists always occupied, and have asserted that the divine perfection consists in unlimited power and uncontrolled supremacy of will; that, consequently, the Deity does not always do that which is for the best, but merely, what he himself pleases, and that for no other reason but because he wills to do so. But this is no better than Atheism itself. For it is of no importance to us whether the universe be governed by blind fate or chance-that is to say, by nothing at all; or whether it be governed by an arbitrary sovereign will, that is directed by chance, or, at least, by no principle of benevolence.

The true answer to this question is, that no created system can have every perfection, because it must, necessarily, be destitute of self-existence and independence; and, therefore, if being destitute of some perfections be better than nothing, it was worthy of infinite and perfect goodness to create such beings. In our present state, we mortals stand upon too low ground, and are too contracted and limited in our ideas, to take a commanding view of the whole frame of nature. We can only reason concerning what is unknown from the little that is within our reach. In that little, we see that wisdom and goodness reign; that nature always aims to produce perfection; that many salutary effects result even from the thunder and the storm: and we doubt not that a whole view of the structure of the universe would afford an additional argument to the goodness and skill of the great Architect.

We see a regular ascent in the scale of created beings, from mere lifeless matter up to man; and the probability is, that the scale continues to ascend as far above men in perfection, as such beings can possibly be raised. The sole purpose of God in creating the world, must have been to produce happiness; but this would be most effectually done by creating, in the first place, as many of

the most perfect class of beings as the system could contain; and afterwards, other classes less and less perfect, till the whole universe should be completely full. We do not, however, mean to assert that the Divine Architect, in the creation of the world, constituted a necessary chain of existence,

"Where all must fall, or not coherent be,
And all that rises, rise in due degree ;"

in such a manner, that the various races and orders of being are mutually dependent upon each other. For we have reason to believe that certain species of animals, having accomplished the purposes to which they were destined in the creation, have become extinct.

No man, who has examined the subject, will pretend to say that this earth could afford a comfortable subsistence to a greater number of the human race, were all the inferior animals annihilated, than it could at present, swarming as every element is with life. Suppose, then, that as many men had been placed, at first, upon the earth as it could possibly support, and that matters had been so constituted, as that the number should never have been increased or diminished; we beg leave to ask whether, since there would have been room for inferior animals, it would have been worthy of infinite goodness to leave the whole globe to men, or to introduce into it different orders of less perfect beings, which, while they could not incommode this principal inhabitant, would each find pleasure in its own existence? Different answers cannot surely be given to this question. Let us, then, extend our view, and consider the universe, which, however vast, cannot be positively infinite-as one system as much united as the several parts of this globe; let us suppose that there were, at first, created as many of the highest order of beings as it could have contained, had creation there stopped; let us remember that happiness, in many different degrees, is valuable; and we shall not, surely, think it any imputation on the goodness of God that there are, in the universe, many beings far from perfection. The most imperfect of these, in themselves, are better than nothing, and they all contribute to make up a system, which, considered as a whole, we have every reason to believe to be as perfect as anything not self-existent can possibly be. II. Another objection which has been urged, is this: If the world has been conducted by a benevolent providence, how came evil to be introduced into it? This question has perplexed mankind in all ages. The ancient Persians resolved it, by asserting the existence of two gods: Oromasdes, the author of good, and Arimanius, the author of evil. From them the Christians, called Manichees, borrowed the doctrine of two opposite co-eternal principles. Both the Platonists and the Stoicks ascribed the origin of evil to the perverseness or the imperfection of matter, which they thought the Deity could not alter; and Pythagoras imagined a state of pre

existence, in which the souls of men had committed offences, for which they are suffering the punishment. But these hypothesis are, some of them, impious, and all unsatisfactory.

Taking the expression in the most extensive sense, the evils to which the human race are exposed may be reduced to pain, uneasiness, disappointment of appetites, and death; of which not one could have been wholly prevented without occasioning greater evils, inconsistent with the perfect goodness of the Creator. As long as we have solid bodies capable of motion, supported by food, subject to the influence of the atmosphere, and divisible, they must, necessarily, be liable to dissolution by death. But if a man could suffer death, or have his limbs broken without feeling pain, the human race had long since been extinct. A fever is a state of the body in which the fluids are in great disorder. If we felt no uneasiness from that disorder, we should feel no inducement to pay proper attention to our state of health, and should die without ever expecting ourselves to be in imminent danger; whereas, under the present administration of Divine Providence, the pain and sickness of disease compel us to have recourse to remedies proper for restoring us to soundness and to health.

Of the uneasinesses to which we are liable, and which are not the effect of immediate pain, the greatest has been sometimes said to arise from the apprehension of death, which constantly stares us full in the face, and frequently embitters all our pleasures, even in the hour of perfect health. But this dread of death is implanted in the breast of man for the very best of purposes. Had we no horror at the apprehension of death, we should be apt, whenever any misfortune befel us, to quit this world rashly, and rush unprepared into the presence of our Judge; but the horror which attends on the reflection of our own dissolution, arising not from any apprehension of the pain of dying, but from our anxiety concerning our future state of existence, tends strongly to make us act, while we are here, in such a manner as to ensure our happiness hereafter. Add to this, that the fear of death is one of the greatest supports to human laws. We every day see persons breaking through all the regulations of society and good life, notwithstanding they know death to be the certain consequence, and feel all the horrors of it natural to man; and, therefore, were death divested of these horrors, how insignificant would capital punishments be as guardians of the law, and how insecure would individuals be in civil society. With regard to the unavoidable misfortunes and anxieties of our present state, so far from being truly hurtful in themselves, they are proofs of benign beneficence. When we see men displeased with their situation; when we hear them complaining of difficulties, the miseries, and the cares of life; of the hardships which they have undergone, and the labor which still lies before them; instead of accounting them unfortunate, we ought to regard them as active agents, placed only in the situation that is fit for the improvement

of their natures. That discontent, these restless wishes to improve their condition, are so many sure indications that their faculties will not languish. They who are, in the least degree, accustomed to observe the human character, know well the influence which pleasure and repose have in enfeebling every manly principle, and how capable they are of attaching us to a sordid and dishonorable

existence.

Happy, indeed, is it for the human race, that the number of those men is small, whom providence has placed in situations in which personal activity is unnecessary. By far the greater number are compelled to exert themselves, to mix and to contend with their equals, in the race of fortune and honor. It is thus that our powers are called forth, and that our nature reaches the highest perfection. It is even, perhaps, a general truth, that they who have struggled with the greatest variety of hardships, as they always acquire the highest energy of character, so, if they have retained their integrity, and have not sunk entirely in the contest, seldom fail to spend their remaining days respectable and happy, superior to passion, and secured from folly by the possession of a wisdom dearly earned.

There is another view of this subject, which sets it in a still brighter light. The benefits of physical evils are realized in the production of moral good. That man is a moral agent, sent into this world to acquire the habits of piety and virtue, to fit him for a better state, is a truth to which no consistent Christian will, for a moment, refuse his assent. But almost all the moral good that is left among us, is the apparent effect of physical evil.

Goodness may be divided into sobriety, righteousness, and godli

ness.

Let us examine, and see how each of these duties would be practised if there were no physical evil to enforce it.

Sobriety is nothing but the forbearance of pleasure; and if pleasure was not followed with pain, who would forbear it? The world furnishes us with numberless instances of those in whom the desire of pleasure overpowers all sense of past, and all foresight of future misery. In a remission of the gout, the drunkard returns to his wine, and the glutton to his feast; and if neither disease nor poverty were felt or dreaded, every one would sink down into idle sensuality, without any care of others or of himself. To eat and to drink, and to lie down to sleep, would be the chief business of mankind.

Righteousness, or the system of social duty, may be subdivided into justice and charity. Of justice, one of the heathen sages has shown, with great acuteness, that it was impressed upon mankind only by the inconveniences which injustice had produced. "In the first ages," says he, "men acted without any rule, but the impulse of desire; they practised injustice upon others, and suffered it from them in their turn; but in time, it was discovered that the pain of suffering wrong was greater than the pleasure of inflicting

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