of contention between North and South, but it is, perhaps, that point in dispute between them which most immediately affects us. If every individual Northerner were an energetic abolitionist, and voted for the war simply to overthrow slavery, and if, at the same time, they were also protectionists, our hatred of slavery would scarcely induce us to pardon their meditated injury to our commercial interests. As we doubt their being disinterested opponents of slavery, we find it all the harder to pardon their love of protection.

A curious illustration of the patriotic Northerner's creed is to be found in a work lately published, entitled "The Tariff Question," by Erastus B. Bigelow. A work bearing on its titlepage the name of Erastus B. Bigelow can, perhaps, hardly be said to want no other recommendation. When we add that in size it is a kind of young folio, and that it is deliberately written to prove the doctrine of Free-trade to be a fallacy, we shall hardly make it more attractive. We have, however, had the courage to open it, and, to some extent, to read it. The enterprise is not quite so difficult as might be expected. A hundred pages contain what we may, by courtesy, call the argument. Two hundred and thirty more are filled with endless columns of figures. Opening these pages at random, we find such facts as the number of tons employed in the cod fishery of the United States from 1815-60, the duties payable on perfumed soap, periodicals, pestles and mortars, and an indefinite number of other articles, in various tariffs, and an endless variety of other refreshing statistical facts. We are not prepared to say that some human beings might not be found capable of swallowing and digesting these columns, and even of bringing out some useful results. We can, however, confidently state that, if Mr. Erastus B. Bigelow has swallowed them, they have decidedly disagreed with him. They have resulted in about a hundred pages, in which, fortunately, the type is large and the margin broad; moreover, the argument includes a very small

allowance of that Yankee bluster which is so offensive to most educated Englishmen; and the whole is also an instructive illustration of the commercial policy which commends itself to the American mind. We must also acknowledge the industry which has brought together a large and, in some respects, valuable collection of statistics. But this is all we can say in praise of him.

The political economy may be judged of from a couple of specimens. Mr. Erastus B. Bigelow still seriously quotes Chalmers to prove the exploded fallacy of a general glut of commodities. We are constantly, it appears, on the very borders of the awful danger that such an immense amount of production will take place that everybody will have more of everything than he can possibly want; and, consequently, the production. of commodities will be discouraged. Protection is recommended us as a specific for this distressing malady. It is certainly likely to prove an effective

one.

At another place Mr. Bigelow expresses his indignation that England should profess to be a free-trading country. We actually impose a greater duty upon imports from America than the United States impose upon imports from England. On looking at the figures, we find that much more than nineteen-twentieths of this duty upon American imports is imposed upon tobacco. An Englishman would, as Mr. Bigelow foresees, humbly submit that this could scarcely be called a protective duty. So far from taxing foreign tobacco in order that we may grow it ourselves, we actually forbid ourselves to grow it. But this objection is received with indignant contempt, and we are treated to a prospective sneer at the inconsistency between our practice and our profession "of spreading the blessings of civiliza"tion and Christianity by means of "commercial freedom."

After this, it would clearly be rash to argue with Mr. Bigelow. There is a quality against which the gods themselves contend in vain. Moreover we must confess to a certain feeling of

sympathy with Mr. Bigelow's last argument. We do, indeed, most firmly believe that civilization and Christianity are spread by free-trade. We believe that this is, perhaps, the truest recommendation of free-trade. But we are rather inclined to doubt the propriety of putting forward this argument, as is sometimes done, to the exclusion of certain much more humble ones, which are not, however, necessarily less effective. When a beggar asks for sixpence, he is apt to put it to you, that by giving it him you are exercising a Christian virtue. You know, however, perfectly well, that he wants the sixpence with a view to a loaf of bread or a glass of gin; and that your exhibition of Christian virtue is comparatively a matter of indifference to him. When English writers recommend the adoption of free-trade by foreign nations, they sometimes, perhaps, pitch their note a little too high. They are rather fond of treating the poor benighted foreigner as a professor of political economy would treat a labourer about to strike. They tell him that he is contravening the great laws of supply and demand, that he is, in fact, running his head against a stone wall, and is very much in want of a guide with a pair of eyes in his head. They imply that the English people, being generally perfectly well acquainted with certain abstruse scientific laws, only dimly visible to the rest of the earth, acted with a grand reliance upon them, when they repealed the cornlaws, and were not simply taking the shortest way they could to get cheap bread. All this is, perhaps, more or less true, but it is not the less "aggravating." It has evidently considerably annoyed Mr. Erastus B. Bigelow. Mr. Cobden and others, he says, have recommended free-trade to him, because it would tend to spread Christianity and civilization. When he came to look into the matter, he discovered that free-trade would also keep up the profits of English manufacturers. He found out that whilst England might, perhaps, be spreading civilization, she was undoubtedly putting money into her own pocket. He fancied No. 38.-VOL. VII.

that this last process was equivalent to taking it out of other men's pockets; and he therefore very erroneously concluded that the English apostles of free-trade were little better than false prophets, who were trying to make money under the guise of a disinterested zeal for truth. We need hardly point out the complete confusion of ideas involved in all this; but we may, perhaps, not be the worse for seeing ourselves a little as Mr. Bigelow sees us. When we lecture other countries on their gross ignorance of political economy, we may as well remember that the immediate cause of our repeal of the corn-laws was not the thorough saturation of the popular mind with scientific doctrines. The farmers and the agricultural interest were not persuaded by a study of Adam Smith or Mr. Mill. The arguments which in fact did the work were absolute famine and the direct interest of other classes. In fact, a larger and more influential part of the population had a very clear gain in cheap bread than the part which was temporarily benefited by dear bread. Fortunately it was impossible for us to do good to ourselves without doing good to others. A policy, which, like most policy of a sensible character, was adopted at first on selfish grounds, ultimately was as useful as if it had been purely disinterested. It is well to remember these things in order that we may not speak too harshly or with too much apparent arrogance of countries, which have not yet followed our course. Especially we must expect that in a country like America, where the mass of the people are much less dependent upon the advantages of freetrade, and where the mass has much more weight in comparison with the enlightened classes, they will be slow to see the course which true wisdom would dictate. By following out Mr. Bigelow's argument a little further, we shall, however, be able to form a more accurate notion of the way in which free-trade presents itself to a patriotic, if not very intelligent, Northerner.

What, in particular, is the disadvantage which Mr. Bigelow really sees in free

K

trade? What are the special evils which he expects it to produce in the North? He is not, we should say, a confirmed protectionist. He has, of course, a certain leaning to the prevailing fallacy that it is an advantage to a country to make its own manufactures, when it can get them much more cheaply by making things to exchange for them. But he has also a sort of vague impression that commercial restrictions cannot be defended on principle. His real defence of them is on two grounds; both of which are intelligible, though singularly unsuitable, it seems to us, to an American mouth. The first is his impression that a country ought to protect its own manufactures until they are sufficiently organised to be able to support foreign competition. It would be hard to say that this was in itself necessarily an absurdity. Perhaps cases might be produced in which an industry has actually been originated by a protective system, which would not have sprung up otherwise, and which has nevertheless been able to maintain itself afterwards. Such, for example, was the case of beetroot sugar, which began in France during the late war; and which, it appears, has increased fourfold during the last twenty years, during which it has been subject to unrestricted competition. But such an argument, as applied to America, is absurd in the extreme. In a country where every one is accustomed to rely upon Government to take the initiative in everything, where competition is so torpid, and labour so unintelligent, that it is necessary to employ official power to induce people to put money into their own pockets, and to show them how to do it, such a policy might be defensible. The United States are the exact opposite to all this. There is nowhere keener competition, greater skill in applying labour and machinery, or less want of any kind of Government assistance. The only respects, as Mr. Bigelow himself observes, in which we have the advantage of them, are cheap labour and abundant capital. Even in these they will every year be treading more closely on our heels. It is, therefore,

us.

absurd to suppose that they will delay developing their manufactures one instant longer than that period at which they can make them themselves more cheaply than import them. They are the last of all people who ought to wish the Government to take them by the hand, in order to show them their own interests. Supposing that, in some cases, we can undersell their manufacturers even in their home-markets, they may be quite sure that we shall not be permitted to do this one instant longer than it is an advantage to them, as well as to So soon as they can make their own goods more cheaply than they can import them by any application of skill and energy, so soon they will be certain to do it. We may dismiss this argument as being not only absurd in itself, but one that can hardly have any effect even upon the minds of Americans themselves. The real objection goes deeper. Mr. Bigelow objects to buying our manufactured goods, even though it is clearly more profitable, commercially, to buy our goods than to raise them at home. His reason for this is curious and instructive. It is a simple inversion of the ordinary argument for freetrade. Mr. Cobden, as we have already seen, has rather excited Mr. Bigelow's wrath by stating that Free-trade tends to promote civilization. It tends to make nations more dependent upon each other, and, therefore, to make war more expensive and disagreeable. Mr. Bigelow prac tically admits this: but to him the argument tells exactly in the opposite direction. Free-trade makes war more hurtful, is his argument, but war is a necessity; therefore, let us avoid freetrade. We must always be expecting a fight; the expectation of universal peace is simply Utopian; therefore let us keep as clear as we can from any engagements with our neighbours. Certainly Mr. Bigelow's argument is a remarkable one. It is frequently said, as an argument against facility of divorce, that, the more firmly man and wife are tied together, the more disagreeable they will find it to quarrel; and the common conclusion is that they should be tied

We

as firmly as possible. Mr. Bigelow's argument would be exactly the contrary. He would say, Men and wives always will quarrel; it is Utopian to expect that they should not; consequently let us make it as easy for them to separate as possible. The fact which he states is undeniable. have only too good reasons for knowing how sensitive we are, not only to our neighbours quarrelling with us, but even to their quarrelling amongst themselves. The mere fact that we imported in the year 1860 between fourteen and fifteen millions of quarters of corn would itself be sufficient to show to what an extent we now depend upon foreign countries for the necessaries of life. Indeed, it becomes rather hard to see how our policy can be so profoundly Machiavelian in his eyes as he represents it. We at any rate must appear to him to be trusting pretty implicitly to the spread of civilization and to the decline of war, when we place ourselves so unreservedly at the mercy of foreign countries for our supplies of food. Probably he conceives that the cunning man has over-reached himself: whilst we were laboriously contriving and scheming in order that we might have the pleasure of producing manufactures for foreigners, we unwittingly came under the misfortune of depending upon them for great part of our food. This is undeniably true; and, if Mr. Bigelow considers that the first was a great advantage, he will not improbably look upon the other as a heavy retribution. Meanwhile we will try to throw out for him this piece of consolation. He seems to be haunted by the fear that the Americans will be reduced to the condition of the Israelites, when there was no smith throughout the land, because the Philistines feared they might make swords or spears. Even under these circumstances the Israelites would have had a considerable advantage if the Philistines had been dependent on them for bread; and, in the same way, every increase of international trade makes war in the long run as disagreeable for one party as it does for the other. However much, therefore, the Americans

may suffer in case of war by allowing themselves to become partially dependent upon England for implements of war (and it seems that for the present they are pretty well able to hold their own in this respect), they may be comforted by reflecting that they would injure us equally by cutting off our supplies. The whole theory, however, is obviously too preposterous to bear argument. It is strange that any one should seriously recommend a great nation to deprive themselves of much of the advantage of a foreign trade in order that, some time or other, they may be able to go to war with less inconvenience. It is, we must suppose, the result of the present state of feeling of the North. They have, as we have already said, shown an amount of energy for which no one could have been prepared. They have shown themselves ready to sacrifice anything and everything in order to carry on the war. National credit becomes a trifle, and a debt is almost a

thing to be proud of. It is not strange that they should be willing to sacrifice foreign trade too, if it seems at first sight to injure the war-making power of the country. They have been enjoying a profound peace so long that, when waked up to a tremendous war, which occupies every faculty they possess, the rebound makes them attribute an exaggerated importance to war. Everything whatever that can interfere with the one object of carrying on war successfully must go to the wall. Mr. Bigelow has an impression, to a certain extent true, that the more a country depends upon foreign trade, the more liable it is to be injured by war. Let every country, therefore, learn to form an independent community as far as possible, making its own clothes, growing its own food, and especially manufacturing its own powder and shot. As Mr. Bigelow objects to our saying that free-trade has a civilizing tendency, we will not ask too curiously what effect upon civilization his own pet schemes would probably produce.

The theory, indeed, that every nation ought to live in a separate compartment shut out from the rest of the world, in

order that it may be more ready to fight, is one too much opposed to common sense, and too much opposed to the interest of individuals, to be tenable except in times of extreme excitement. We have referred to it chiefly because it is an interesting example of the extreme lengths to which even a wellinformed and laborious observer may be driven. It shows how powerfully the idea of war has seized upon the imagination of Americans, and how it has ousted all common sense. It would be more interesting to inquire what were the chances, that, when peace returns, a more intelligent view may become popular. On the one hand, all the statistics which Mr. Bigelow has collected show how strong is the interest which many classes in America have in free-trade. We need not speak of the cotton trade. The enormous regions of the West have a direct interest in obtaining freedom of trade in agricultural products, and an interest which must every year become stronger. The farmers, who exported the endless quantities of corn which Mr. Trollope saw pouring through Chicago, will, doubtless, be slow to see the advantage of paying heavily for manufacturing products, in order to foster the development of the Eastern States. It is to be observed, however, that these evils, generated by protection, are not likely to press heavily on the population. We cannot expect much from the necessarily slow progress of enlightenment in the science of political economy. The planters, who are sometimes commended to our sympathy because of their wish for free-trade, are quite quick enough to ask for protection whenever they fancy that they want it. They naturally do not ask for protection to cotton. It is, probably, only one class who would wish for protection to the negro-trade. But, as Mr. Bigelow tells us, the amount of protective duties levied on products of the planting States in 1860, namely, on sugar and tobacco, was ten millions of dollars, those levied on manufactured commodities being about eighteen millions. We do not expect any rapid progress of perfectly

disinterested views sufficient to convert producers of protected articles. It will, probably, be some time before the consumers of them will feel a sufficient pressure to induce them to stir themselves. Mr. Bigelow argues against free-trade in general, because the progress of English commerce has been less rapid for the last ten years than that of the United States under a

protective system. The argument is sufficiently weak, and is an example of the complete impossibility of treating such a subject by a mere appeal to statistics. It is just as sensible an argument as if we were to say that it was healthier to live in London than the country, because a boy of seventeen had grown an inch in a year in London, and, when removed to the country, had ceased to grow at all. There are many other circumstances upon which the growth of a country depends than its commercial system. Providentially, there is scarcely any amount of Government interference which can possibly prevent a country from progressing. If a nation, with the enormous resources of which Mr. Bigelow justifiably boasts, had not made rapid progress, the fact would indeed be a startling one. If the British coalfields, he says, are represented in area by the number 54, those of the United States will be represented by 2,691; and their supplies of iron are simply inexhaustible. Without quoting more statistics to illustrate what nobody doubts, the unrivalled productive powers-of the United States, and the skill and enterprise of their possessors-we need merely remark that, even if confined to their own manufactures entirely, they could no doubt afford to get on without very sensibly feeling the increased cost of production. This being the case, the interests immediately affected will probably be able to retain protection for some time longer, in a country especially where private interests know how to make themselves respected, whether by fair means or foul. There are, no doubt, a good many people in America who would at first lose considerably by freetrade; and the benefits resulting from it