The production in 1923, indicated by the heavy black line of Figure 31, has been exceeded but twice in the history of the industrynamely, in 1918 and in 1920. Nevertheless, the output for 1923 fell short of what might have been expected from the rate of growth in the years before the war. The average value of the coal produced in 1923 was less than in any of the three years preceding, though greater than in 1918. The average for 1923 was $2.68 a net ton at the mine, as against $1.18 in 1913; in other words, it was more than twice the pre-war value.

Though the production in 1923 was less, the number of men employed was much greater than in either 1918 or 1920. Between 1920 and 1923 there were added to the pay rolls of the industry 63,000 men. At the same time a remarkable increase occurred in the output per man employed per day. This figure has been steadily rising: In 1890 it was 2.56 tons; in 1920 it stood at 4 tons. This was an increase of 56 per cent in 30 years. From 1920 to 1923 the production per man increased even more rapidly, and in 1923 it stood at 4.47 tons. Probably the chief factor in the increasing output per man is the adoption of machine mining. In 1891, the year of earliest record, 5.3 per cent of the bituminous coal was cut by machine; in 1923 the proportion had risen to 66.9 per cent.

With an increase both in the number of men worked and in the average output per man per day, there was a large increase in the productive capacity of the industry. The best measure of capacity that is available, plotted with the dot and dash line in Figure 31, shows a more rapid increase for the period since the war than before. This increase in productive facilities at a time when the demand for coal was stationary, if not declining, has brought idleness both to the capital and the labor in the mines. The industry has become accustomed to part-time employment, for in the year of first record the number of days worked averaged but 226, leaving 82 possible working days in idleness. But the time lost has been greater since the war than before on account of the increase in productive capacity above noted. The black columns at the base of Figure 31 indicate the amount of lost time in each year. The low point-59 dayswas reached in 1918. The high point of 166 days came during the great strike of 1922, when many mines were idle for 5 months or more. Even in 1923, with an output exceeded but twice before, the labor and capital in the industry were idle on the average 129 days and worked on the average 179 days. The time lost on account of strikes in 1923 was 2 days on the average for all men employed, as against 78 days in 1922.

The salient features of 1923 and the years immediately preceding may be summarized in a word. The number of employees and the output per man have been increasing and with them the potential capacity. The demand has been stationary or even declining. The average time worked has therefore been decreasing, and with it prices have tended to fall. The working of these broad tendencies in the several departments of the industry forms the subject of the figures that follow.

TABLE 4.-Growth of the bituminous coal mining industry, 1890-1923

• Computed by dividing production in tons by the average number of days worked and multiplying the quotient by the theoretical full time, 308 days. No data.

ANTHRACITE INDUSTRY

A different picture is presented by the historical summary of anthracite mining in Table 5. From 1890 to 1923 the production of anthracite has barely doubled, whereas that of bituminous coal has increased fivefold. The value of the anthracite output, on the other hand, has increased nearly ninefold.

In the number of employees, the figures for which include boys, particularly in the earlier years, the increase has been but 25 per cent from 1890 to 1923. At the same time the output per employee per day has shown no great change. The presence of culm-bank coal in the statistics makes it difficult to interpret the average output per man per day, but the figures as they stand show an increase from 1890 to about 1899, followed by a slight decrease. There has, however, been a notable improvement in the average number of days worked. It stood at 200 in 1890 and at 268 in 1923. This increase in the amount of productive time has come about since 1902, for in the years preceding the great strike of that year the working time, if anything, declined. It is the increase in number of days worked that has made possible a relatively large increase in production with a small increase in number employed.

In the 30 years covered by the table has come a change in the character of the demand for anthracite. In 1890 the then domestic sizes (sizes above pea) constituted 76.9 of the shipments; by 1923 this proportion had dropped to 63.7 per cent. This significant change permitted the recovery by washing of much of the small coal that in earlier years had been thrown upon the culm banks. Shipments from washeries and dredges in 1890 were only 42,000 tons. In 1923 they amounted to 4,000,000 tons.

The most significant fact of the anthracite industry is that production has shown no consistent increase since 1913. In that year 82,000,000 gross tons was produced, practically the same as the output of 1923. The record production of 1917 and 1918 included a large proportion of culm-bank coal.

TABLE 5.-Growth of the anthracite mining industry, 1890-1923

Although the productive capacity and labor force of the bituminous coal mines has continued to increase since the war, the consumption has failed to increase, if indeed it has not declined. Because of the serious consequences to the labor and capital engaged in the industry, it is important to measure the rates of growth and to inquire what

causes have curtailed the expected demand. The following paragraphs are adapted, with the permission of Coal Age, from a paper by members of the United States Geological Survey.3

Since the war the demand for coal has not been growing as fast as before that time, if indeed it is now growing at all.

Anthracite production, as practically everyone knows, has shown no material increase in fresh-mined coal since 1913. Production of bituminous coal, on the contrary, showed a steady growth up to 1918. For the 20 years from the founding of the central competitive field to the end of the war the normal rate of increase of soft-coal output averaged 16,800,000 tons a year. Actual production in a given year might rise above the normal line, or fall below it (fig. 32) (Table 6), depending on the state of general business. In years of depression it dropped below; in boom years it rose above normal; but there is no mistaking the steadiness of the normal increase. It was one of the most characteristic measures of American business activity. The coal industry counted upon this steadily growing demand, and the opening of new mines and steady recruiting of new miners was the industry's means of preparing for a constantly enlarging market. Since the war, however, the market has ceased to expand, or at best it is expanding at a much slower rate. The largest annual output attained since the armistice was declared was 565,000,000 tons in 1923. That included 26,000,000. tons put into storage, so that the amount actually consumed or exported was only 539,000,000 tons. Had the pre-war rate of expansion continued, the market would have absorbed 614,000,000 tons. Bituminous-coal consumption in 1923, therefore, was 75,000,000 tons less than might have been expected on the basis of pre-war experience.

TABLE 6.-Normal production of bituminous coal as calculated by E. E. Day and percentage of normal produced, 1899 to 1923

Anyone, of course, might say that this figure of 539,000,000 tons for 1923 is larger than that of any other year except 1917, 1918, and 1920, and that consequently the industry is no worse off than it was, say, in 1916. Such a statement might be true if the industry were one of stationary capacity, as, for example, anthracite mining is. As a matter of fact, however, the capacity of bituminous mines is far from stationary. It has been growing faster since the war than before. In the five years from 1913 to 1918 the full-time productive capacity of the industry increased by 82,000,000 tons. But in the five years after the war, from 1918 to 1923, capacity increased 254,000,000 tons, or just three times

as much.

The cause of this great increase of productive facilities lay largely in the high prices of the war period and 1920, but whatever the cause, the combination of arrested demand and rapidly increasing capacity has brought about great distress. A stationary demand may be just as serious to an industry with increasing capacity as a falling demand would be to an industry with stationary capacity. It is therefore most important for the bituminous operator to understand why the expected increase in output has not materialized. There are a number of reasons.

Tryon, F. G., McKenney, W. F., and Finn, E. E., Relative rate of growth show, further inroads of oil on coal consumption: Coal Age, vol. 27, Jan. 15, 1925.

One reason is that business in general in the United States probably has not increased at quite the same pace as before 1918. Business certainly has grown faster than the demand for coal would indicate, but probably not quite as fast as before. Even America could not escape entirely from the after effects of the war. Another reason is that the high prices of fuel from 1917 to 1920 stimulated an interest in fuel economy such as was never felt before. The results have been remarkable. Progress in the design of fuel-burning equipment has been matched by more care in firing. It is not possible to say just how many tons of coal have been saved in the aggregate, but there are straws which show the direction of the wind. Beehive coking, which wastes 33 per cent of the heat in the coal, has been largely replaced by the by-product process, which recovers all but 10 per cent. Consumption of railroad fuel per thousand ton-miles has fallen notably. In 1913 it took 2,433 pounds of coke to make a ton of pig iron, whereas in 1922 the work was done with 2,176 pounds. The coal consumption per kilowatt-hour produced by electric utilities dropped from 3.2 pounds in 1919 to 2.4 pounds in 1923, or 25 per cent in five years.

FIGURE 32.-Annual production of bituminous coal and line of normal trend, 1899-1923, as computed by E. E. Day. The normal growth of production from 1899 to 1919 was computed by Professor Day at 16,800,000 tons a year. Since 1919 this rate of increase has not been maintained, chiefly because of the great depression of 1921 and the strike of 1922, but also apparently because the slope of the line of normal growth is changing

Great as have been economies in fuel utilization, however, they are not sufficient to account for all of the slowing up in coal demand. Another cause, and one whose importance the industry has not fully sensed, is competition of other fuels and power sources. It is to this cause that this article is addressed. There has been much talk recently of the "fuel-oil menace," and various attempts have been made to measure the displacement of coal by fuel oil. We made such an attempt a few years ago and concluded that from April, 1919, to June, 1920, the quantity of coal actually displaced at plants that changed over from coal to fuel oil has been less than 2 per cent of the total consumption of coal. Other observers, considering the years 1922 and 1923, have estimated the actual replacement at about 5 per cent. But this actual replacement at plants that changed over from one fuel to another, even if it could be measured accurately, tells only a part of the story. It does not show the large amount of potential new business which would fall to coal were there not other means of accomplishing the same work which at the moment appeared cheaper.

Gasoline is meeting a demand that otherwise would have fallen to coal, if not directly then indirectly, through the medium of electricity. The world's potential appetite for power and heat would not be less if there were no gasoline. It would merely seek satisfaction in some other way. Coal, though somewhat more costly and less convenient, could largely have satisfied that demand. Con