because the sentiments it awakens are not only disagreeable, but are of such a sort as no imitation can convert into pleasing sensations, it remains to be ascertained whether it may not be employed in painting as well as in poetry, as an ingredient for strengthening other sensations.

Let us then consider whether the painter may be permitted to employ deformity in order to produce images of ridicule or of terror.—This is a question which I would not venture to answer at once in the negative. It is undeniable that an inoffensive kind of deformity may produce an effect of ridicule even in painting; particularly when combined with an affectation of grace and dignity. It is equally certain that deformity of an offensive character may excite terror in painting as well as in nature; and that both these feelings, of ridicule and terror, which are in themselves mixed sentiments, acquire through the imitation an additional degree of intensity.

It must be observed, however, that painting does not, in this respect, stand in precisely the same situation with poetry. In poetry, as I

have already remarked, deformity almost entirely loses its offensive effect by the conversion of its co-existent parts into successive details; it ceases, as it were, to be deformity, and may therefore be the more intimately combined with other appearances, in order to produce a certain new effect. In painting, on the contrary, deformity stands forth in all the collective strength of its features, and its effect is but little weaker than in nature. It is for this reason that deformity, even when of an inoffensive character, cannot long remain merely ridiculous; the feeling of aversion obtains the ascendency, and what at first seemed ludicrous, becomes in the end an object of disgust. It is the same with deformity of an offensive character; the first feeling of aversion gradually dies away, and gives place to that of disgust at the deformity itself.

This being the case, it must be acknowledged that the Comte de Caylus has acted with perfect propriety in omitting from the series of his Homeric pictures the episode of Thersites. But it does not therefore follow that we should

desire to see it expunged from Homer himself. I regret, however, to find that a learned writer, of otherwise very correct and delicate taste, is of this opinion; but I shall reserve what I have further to say on this point for another opportunity.

*

* Klotzii Epistolæ Homericæ, p. 33.

TWENTY-FIFTH SECTION.

Further Reflections on the Power which Poetry possesses of employing Images of Disgust and Deformity as Ingredients in the Production of mixed Sensations.

The second point of difference observed by the critic before-mentioned, between the feeling of disgust and the other disagreeable affections of the soul, is founded on the aversion which deformity excites in our minds.

"Other disagreeable emotions," he says, may frequently, even in nature, independently of any imitation, convey something soothing to the soul; for they never excite unmodified disgust, but always mingle their bitterness with pleasure. Our fear is seldom deprived of every ray of hope; terror gives animation to all our energies to enable us to escape the threatened * Klotzii Epist., p. 103.

danger; rage is combined with the desire of vengeance, and melancholy with the agreeable image of former happiness, while compassion is inseparable from the tender emotions of benevolence and love. The soul is free to dwell, now on the pleasing, now on the adverse parts of an emotion, and to create for herself a combination of pleasure and pain, which has a greater charm than the most unmixed delight. Those who have paid the smallest attention to their own feelings, must frequently have observed this; how indeed could it otherwise happen that the wrathful man prefers the indulgence of his rage, and the sorrowful man that of his dejection, to all the joyful ideas with which one might attempt to assuage their emotions? It is quite otherwise with the feeling of disgust, and the sentiments allied thereto. In these the soul discerns no perceptible admixture of pleasure. feeling of dissatisfaction obtains the ascendency, and therefore it is impossible to conceive any case, whether in reality or in imitation, in which the soul would not recoil with abhorrence from such ideas."

The