TWENTY-FOURTH SECTION,

The disagreeable Effect of Deformity, though modified in Poetry by the successive Detail of its Parts, in Painting stands forth in all its Hideousness, and the Feeling of Disgust must predominate in the Mind of the Spectator.

Such is the use which the poet makes of deformity; let us now consider in what way the artist may be permitted to employ it.-There is no doubt that Painting, considered as a means of mere mechanical imitation, has the power to express deformity; but this power cannot with propriety be exercised in her character as one of the Fine Arts. Under the first of these heads, all visible objects are comprehended within her range; under the last, she confines her operations to those objects alone which awaken agreeable sensations.

But, it may be asked, do not even those which excite disagreeable sensations please in the imita

tion ?— Not all of them, as has already been shown by a sagacious critic, with regard to those which excite disgust. "The representations," he says, "of apprehension, of grief, of terror, of compassion, &c., can only excite unpleasant feelings in so far as we regard the suffering as real. Such feelings may therefore be resolved into agreeable sensations by the mere reflection that what we are contemplating is nothing more than an ingenious deception. The disagreeable sensation which accompanies the sight of anything disgusting arises, on the contrary, through the power of the imagination, from the mere mental representation; whether the object which excites it be regarded as real or not. What boots it to the outraged feelings though the artifice of the imitation be ever so much betrayed? The pain they feel arose, not from the supposition that the object of disgust was real, but simply from its representation, which is actually present."

The same observations are applicable to de

Briefe die neueste Litteratur betreffend, part v., p. 107.

formity, which offends our sight, shocks our love of order and harmony, and excites our aversion, without reference to the real existence of the object wherein we perceive it. We would avoid the sight of Thersites whether in nature or in art; and if the picture be less disgusting than the reality, it is not because his deformity has ceased to exist in the imitation, but because we possess the power of abstracting our ideas from that deformity, and of occupying ourselves exclusively with the art of the painter. Yet even this enjoyment is constantly interrupted by the reflection which we cannot avoid making on the unworthy manner in which his art has been employed, and which will seldom fail to excite a feeling of contempt for the artist.

*

Aristotle assigns another reason in explanation of the supposition that things which we regard with aversion in nature, yield gratification in even the most faithful copy; namely, the curiosity common to mankind. "We delight," he says, "in learning, through the

* De Poetica, chap. iv.

medium of the copy, the likeness of some unknown object, or in being able to recognise that with which we were previously acquainted." But this cannot be admitted as an argument in favor of deformity in art. The enjoyment arising from the gratification of our curiosity is momentary, and incidental to the object from which it proceeds, while, on the contrary, the dissatisfaction which accompanies the sight of deformity is permanent, and essential to the object which occasions it. How then can the former operate as a counterpoise to the latter? Impossible; and still less will the mental occupation which the contemplation of the resemblance creates, agreeable though it be, suffice to overcome the opposite effect produced by the aspect of deformity. The more closely I compare the deformed imitation with the deformed original, the more strongly will this disagreeable effect exhibit itself to me; so that the satisfaction arising out of the comparison soon disappears, and nothing remains but the sensation of aversion, produced by the twofold deformity. If we may judge from the examples given by Aristotle,

he even seems himself not to have included deformity among those displeasing effects which may, in the imitation, produce agreeable impressions. These examples are wild beasts, and dead bodies. The sight of wild beasts excites terror, even though they be not deformed; and it is this feeling of terror, not the deformity of the animals, which is resolved into an agreeable sensation by means of the imitation. Again, it is the acute sense of sympathy, or the fearful recollection of our own mortality, which renders the sight of a dead body painful in nature. But, in the imitation, that sympathy loses all its bitterness through our consciousness of the illusion; and the fearful thoughts may either be entirely diverted by the introduction of circumstances of a soothing nature, or may inseparably combined with such circumstances, that we may be led to view in the image of death something even of an attractive, rather than of a terrific nature.

be so

Since, then, it appears that deformity cannot of itself with propriety afford a subject for painting, considered as one of the Fine Arts,