payment of first mortgage bonds, and would not, therefore, be brought within the range of the suggested estoppel, we prefer to pass by that question, and consider whether all the holders of bonds under the income and equipment mortgage did not, by their inaction and acquiescence under the decree and sale, lose any right to redeem which they might otherwise have had as against the purchasers.

As we have seen, the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, in its answer and cross bill as they stood before and at the time of the decree of October 30, 1875, did not assert any right or any intention to redeem, although in the bill an opportunity was afforded it so to do. It restricted its* allegations and claims for relief entirely to the engines and box cars. When the cases, as well the case of Frost, trustee, in respect to the foreclosure of the main line, and the other consolidated bills of foreclosure, came on to be heard, there was no assertion of any right or wish to redeem. There was record notice to the said trustee that a plan of sale and reorganization was intended which contemplated the issue of new stock and bonds. Not only was there a tacit acquiescence in the proceedings, but no sign of any intention to disturb the title of the purchasers was given until more than seven years had elapsed, during which period large expenditures were made, and, beyond a doubt, third persons had become interested on the faith of that title.

The principle upon which this ground of defense rests has been so often vindicated and applied by this court that we do not feel it necessary to further enforce it by argument, nor to cite cases so numerous. It is sufficient to refer to Abraham v. Ordway, 158 U. S. 416, 15 Sup. Ct. 894.

The rule is aptly expressed by 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 816, as follows: "Acquiescence is an important factor in determining equitable rights and remedies in obedience to the maxims, 'He who seeks equity must do equity,' and 'He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.' Even when it does not work a true estoppel upon rights of property or of contract, it may operate in analogy to estoppel-may produce a quasi estoppel-upon the rights of remedy." And in section 965: "When a party, with full knowledge, or at least with sufficient notice or means of knowledge, of his rights, and of all the material facts, freely does what amounts to a recognition of the transaction as existing, or acts in a manner inconsistent with its repudiation, or lies by for a considerable time, and knowingly permits the other party to Ideal with the subject-matter under the belief that the transaction has been recognized, or freely abstains for a considerable length of time from impeaching it, so that the other party is thereby reasonably induced to suppose that it is recognized, there is acquiescence; and the transaction, although origi

nally impeachable, becomes unimpeachable In equity. Even where there has been no act nor language* properly amounting to an acquiescence, a mere delay, a suffering time to elapse unreasonably, may of itself be a reason why courts of equity refuse to exercise their jurisdiction in cases of actual and constructive fraud, as well as in other instances. It has always been a principle of equity to discourage stale demands. Laches are often a defense wholly independent of the statute of limitations."

As these views lead to the conclusion that the so-called “amended and supplemental cross bill," filed by Simmons, trustee, in April, 1883, cannot be maintained against the Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Railway Company, nor against the trustee named in the new mortgage, it is unnecessary for us to enter into questions that arose affecting the title of alleged bondholders under the income and equipment mortgage, and with respect to which a cross appeal was taken from the decree of the court below.

It may be that whatever questions existed between the Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Minnesota Railway Company and the trustee of the income and equipment mortgage were left open as between them, if, indeed, any property remained to which a decree of foreclosure could apply. As to this we express no opinion. But, so far as the Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Railway Company and the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, trustee, under the new mortgage, are concerned, the so-called "amended and supplemental cross bill" should be dismissed.

The decree of the court below under the said amended and supplemental cross bill is therefore reversed, and the record remitted, with directions to enter a decree in accordance with this opinion; the costs in the court below and in this court to be paid by the appellants in No. 11.

Mr. Justice BREWER took no part in the hearing or decision of the case.

(159 U. S. 303) GILFILLAN et al. v. McKEE et al.

MCPHERSON v. SAME.
(October 21, 1895.)
Nos. 26 and 46.

APPEAL-WAIVER OF RIGHT-JOINT AND SEVERAL
DECREES-SEVERAL APPEALS-CONSTRUCTION OF
CONTRACT-INDIAN CLAIM AGAINST THE UNITED

STATES.

1. A decree which determines the rights of the parties in two funds, one a general, and the other a special, fund, which have been kept separate, may be regarded as, in effect, two decrees; and the acceptance by a party of an amount decreed to him out of the special fund will not operate as a waiver of his right to appeal from that part of the decree which disposes of the general fund.

2. Where a decree is several, both in form and substance, and the interest of each defend.

ant thereunder is separate and distinct from that of the others, one defendant may appeal alone, without a summons and severance, or other equivalent proceeding.

3. The Choctaw Indians, who had a claim against the United States for a large sum of money, contracted with one C. for services to be rendered by him in procuring payment thereof, agreeing to pay him 30 per cent. of the sums actually received. After rendering services during several years, C. died, and his executor, under a power in his will, assigned the contract to another. Neither the efforts of C. nor of his assignee resulted in the payment of any money to the tribe, and thereafter the tribe entered into a new contract with B. and M., to whom was to be paid 30 per cent. of any moneys obtained, with a stipulation, however, that they should pay to the widow of C. 5 per cent. of any amount realized by them. Held that, as C.'s contract was contingent upon success, no legal right to any money accrued under it, either to himself or to the assignee; that the provision in the new contract, for the payment of 5 per cent. to C.'s widow, was to be regarded as a recognition of a merely moral obligation to make some compensation for the services he had rendered; and that, consequently, neither the executor of his estate nor any other persons claiming compensation under his contract, were entitled to share in the funds coming to the widow under this provision.

Appeals from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

The litigation involved in this and the following cases was originally instituted by a bill filed July 7, 1888, by Ward H.*Lamon and Chauncy F. Black, survivors of themselves and Jeremiah S. Black (Black, Lamon & Co.), against Henry E. McKee, the object of which was to protect and enforce their equitable rights and interest in an appropriation of $2,858,798.62, made by an act of congress approved June 29, 1888 (25 Stat. 239), to carry into effect the decision of this court in the case of the Choctaw Nation against the United States, relating to what is known as the "Choctaw Net Proceeds Claim." 119 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 75. Six days after the filing of this bill by Lamon and Black another bill was filed, July 13th, by John H. B. Latrobe against Henry E. McKee and others for the same general purpose of sharing in the sum recovered by McKee.

On July 19, McKee filed a bill of interpleader, which is the subject of the opinion in this case, against a large number of defendants, claiming, under eight or nine different titles, to share in the fund held by him, of which he admitted that they or some of them were entitled to the sum of $161,197.63, which he paid into court. This amount was made up of a general fund of $147,057.63, being 5 per cent. of a commission of 30 per cent., which had been dedicated by the Choctaw Indians to the payment of attorneys and agents in the prosecution of their claims, and which had been received by McKee, and also of a special fund of $14,140, due to the estate of John T. Cochrane, for which a special appropriation had been made by an act of the general council of the Choctaw Nation of February 25, 1888, and which McKee had agreed to pay. The bill prayed that the de

fendants interplead, and that the court determine to whom the money should be paid.

On October 1, 1889, a decree of interpleader was entered, the defendants were enjoined from instituting or prosecuting any suit or action for the recovery of the money paid into the registry of the court by the complainant, and complainant was dismissed as a party to the suit with his costs to be taxed. The decree, however, was made without prejudice to the rights of any of the defendants to, institute any action at law or in equity, to recover from the complainant any demands which they might have for amounts due from him over and above the money paid into court.

Answers and cross bills were filed by the several defendants making claims to both funds, and upon a hearing upon pleadings and proofs one-half of the special fund of $14,140 was ordered to be paid to McPherson, executor of the will of John T. Cochrane, and the remaining half to the solicitors of James Gilfillan, John A. Rollings, and the estate of C. D. Maxwell. The general fund was ordered paid to Ellen Cochrane, widow of John T. Cochrane, John H. B. Latrobe, and Ward H. Lamon, in certain specified proportions. The claims asserted by certain other defendants, including a claim of McPherson, executor of Cochrane, to be paid out of the general fund for professional services rendered by Cochrane, was denied, and an appeal allowed in the decree. An appeal was also allowed to Gilfillan, Rollings, and Eastman, administratrix of the estate of C. D. Maxwell, from so much of the decree as awarded the general fund to Ellen Cochrane, John H. B. Latrobe, and Ward H. Lamon, and also from a decree previously rendered sustaining a demurrer to the cross bill of Rollings, Gilfillan, and Maxwell, and dismissing the same. As to the last decree the appeal was dismissed.

Subsequently, as it appears from the certificate of the clerk of March 1, 1895, the money deposited in court was paid out to the several persons to whom it had been awarded by the above decree.

The facts underlying all these cases were substantially as follows:

(1) That the Choctaw Nation, having various unsettled claims against the United States, arising out of treaty stipulations, the principal of which was a claim for the net proceeds of certain lands, by resolutions of its legislative council, adopted November 9, 1853, and November 1, 1854, appointed certain citizens of that Nation, the principal one of whom was one Pitchlynn, to prosecute such claims, and, in the name of the Choctaw people, "to enter into any and all contracts which in their judgment are or may become necessary and proper, to bring to a final and satisfactory adjustment and settlement all claims and demands whatsoever, which the Choctaw Nation or any member thereof has against the government of the United States by treaty or otherwise."

(2) Pursuant to this authority, on February 13, 1855, these delegates entered into a contract with John T. Cochrane, in which, after reciting the abandonment of a similar contract that had been made with Albert Pike, and the fact that Cochrane had already been for three years before acting as the agent of the Choctaw Nation in the prosecution of a claim for arrearages of annuities and school moneys, in which he had rendered valuable and most important services, Cochrane bound himself to continue to prosecute all unsettled claims and demands of the Choctaw Nation, and especially a claim arising under the treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek of September 27, 1830, to the net proceeds of the lands ceded to the United States by that treaty, and to do his utmost to se cure payment of said claims and demands, the Choctaws upon their part agreeing to pay him 30 per cent. of every and all such sums of money, payable to them, as soon as the same was paid over by the United States.

(3) Shortly thereafter Cochrane succeeded in inducing the authorities of the United States to enter into a treaty with the Choctaws, which was concluded June 22, 1855 (11 Stat. 611), by which it was agreed that the claim of the Choctaws for the net proceeds of the lands in question should be submitted for adjudication to the senate, which body was thus charged with and assumed the functions of an umpire, and on the 9th of March, 1859, made an award in favor of the Choctaws, according to certain principles, and referred the matter to the secretary of the interior to state an account showing the amount due to them according to such principles. That official made his report to the senate on May 8, 1860, certifying that there was due to the Choctaw Nation, under the award of the senate, the sum of $2,981,247.30, and in 1861 there was paid to the Choctaws on account thereof the sum of $250,000.

(4) No progress was made in the further prosecution of their claim from 1861 to 1866, by reason of the alliance of the Choctaws with the Southern Confederacy during the war. After the close of the war, however, Cochrane procured a treaty to be entered into between the United States and the Choctaw Nation relieving them of their disa bilities. 14 Stat. 769.

(5) In 1866, Cochrane was stricken with a mortal illness, and with a view of securing to himself and family some remuneration for the services he had performed in behalf of the Choctaws, proposed to assign to Ward H. Lamon, or to some one in his behalf, all his interest in the contract of February 13, 1855; and verbal arrangements for the accomplishment of that result by the assignment of said contract to Jeremiah S. Black were made before the death of Cochrane. Before his death Cochrane made a will dividing his property equally between his wife Ellen and his sister Mary Magruder, and au

thorizing John D. McPherson, his executor, to sell, assign, or compromise his claims under his contract with the Choctaws as he should deem most for the interest of his estate. There was also an acknowledgment in this will that an equal interest in the Choctaw contract belonged to Luke Lea. After Cochrane's death, McPherson having qualified as his executor, a contract was enter ed into between him and Jeremiah S. Black, November 8, 1866, for the further prosecution of the Choctaw claims by Black, as the successor of Cochrane, and upon the terms of the contract made with Cochrane February 13, 1855, to which assignment the Choctaw delegates gave their assent.

(6) The firm of Black, Lamon & Co., in whose behalf the assignment to Black was in fact made, at once entered upon and continued the work of prosecuting this claim until Judge Black withdrew from active practice, from which time the duty of prosecuting the claim devolved solely upon Lamon.

(7) Nothing, however, was definitely accomplished before July 16, 1870, when, for reasons unnecessary to be here stated, the delegates of the Choctaw Nation entered into a new contract with James G. Blunt and Henry E. McKee to prosecute their claim, stipulating to pay them for their services and expenses 30 per cent. of the sum already awarded and due to the Choctaw Nation, or of any sum that might be paid, whenever the money or bonds arising from said claim should come into the possession of the party or parties authorized by the Choctaw people to receive the same. This contract contained a further stipulation of Blunt and McKee "to pay to Mrs. John T. Cochrane of Washington, D. C., 5 per centum from the 30 per centum before referred to whenever they shall receive the same; and the said Blunt and McKee further agree to adjust the claims of all parties who have rendered service heretofore in the prosecution of said claim upon the principle of equity and justice, according to the value of the services so rendered." Blunt soon afterwards died, leaving McKee to carry out the contract alone.

(8) In 1881, an act was passed by congress (21 Stat. 504) referring the question of the liability of the United States in respect to the Choctaw claims to the court of claims, and in March, 1886, a judgment was rendered in the court of claims in favor of the Choctaw Nation. 21 Ct. Cl. 59. From the judgment so rendered both parties appealed to this court, which also decided in favor of the Choctaws, and held that the award made by the senate in 1859 determined the amount due in respect of the claim (119 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 75), and on June 29, 1888, an appropriation was made for the payment of the judgment of $2,858,798.62. 25 Stat. 217, 239. (9) On February 25, 1888, an act of the legislative council of the Choctaw Nation, after reciting the recovery of the judgment, and that McKee and his associates were making

313

which is 5 per cent. upon the 30 per cent. which the Choctaws agreed to pay to McKee for his services. This fund was awarded by the final decree to Ellen Cochrane, individually, and to Latrobe and Lamon, the fund being divided into 25757/100 parts, of which Latrobe took 75, Lamon 35, and Ellen Cochrane the residue. The parts assigned to Latrobe and Lamon represent the decree obtained by them upon their separate bills against McKee in the two following cases. Both McPherson, as executor of Cochrane, and Rollings and Gilfillan, assignees of Lea, appealed from the decree in the present case. The interests of these appellants are in reality identical. Cochrane, in his will, made in 1866, acknowledged an equal interest in the Choctaw*contract to belong to Colonel Luke Lea, and on September 24, 1869, Lea assigned all his interest to Rollings and Gilfillan. No controversy exists between these parties; but if McPherson be awarded the fund, both are interested to defeat the claims of Latrobe and Lamon, which diminish by the amount of their decrees the sums which would otherwise go to the Cochrane estate. Both are also interested adversely to Ellen Cochrane, who claims the entire fund individually, while the appellants claim it as assets of Cochrane's estate, to pass, under his will, one-half to Rollings and Gilfillan, assignees, and the other half to be divided equally between Ellen Cochrane, his wife, and Mary Magruder, his sister.

The controversy between them turns upon the construction of the contract of July 16, 1870, between McKee and the Choctaws, in which Blunt and McKee agreed "to pay to Mrs. John T. Cochrane of Washington city, D. C., 5 per centum from the 30 per centum before referred to whenever they shall receive the same." The view of the court be low was that, if there were a trust in favor of parties who had rendered valuable services before the execution of the McKee contract of July 16, 1870, that trust attached to every dollar received by McKee, and that it was not in his power to disengage any particular dollar or any particular sum of money from the charge, and hence that the amount paid into court by McKee in this case was subject to the trust found by the court to exist in the other cases in favor of Latrobe and Lamon. As the court also awarded the residue to Ellen Cochrane, it follows that it must have treated this as a donation to Mrs. Cochrane, and not as a payment for services rendered by Cochrane, as, under the latter theory, it would have been ordered paid to McPherson, as executor, to become a part of the assets of his estate.

Two questions, then, arise upon this appeal. First, was the payment in the McKee contract, to be made to Mrs. Cochrane, intended as a personal gift to her, or as a payment for Cochrane's services? Second, was such sum subject to a trust in favor of Latrobe and Lamon?

In disposing of the first question it is only necessary to consider the contract between the Choctaws and McKee, in which the former agreed that for services rendered and money expended and to be expended in the prosecution of the claim, Blunt and McKee should receive 30 per cent. of the amount awarded, or of any sum that may be paid by the United States, Blunt and McKee on their part agreeing to pay 5 per cent. of this 30 per cent. to Mrs. Cochrane, and also to adjust the claims of all parties who have rendered service heretofore in the prosecution of said claim, upon the principle of equity and justice, according to the value of the services so rendered. By section 4 of the act of the Choctaw council of February 25, 1888, the sum of $14,140 was the amount fixed as due the late John T. Cochrane, deceased, by an act of the general council of November 1, 1861, and that sum was appropriated out of any money to be received from the United States in payment of said judgment. Exactly for what this was intended as a payment does not clearly appear, but the fact that it was found to be due by an act passed in 1861 indicates very clearly that it could not have been for services subsequently rendered, although section 5 provides that the payments therein directed to be made should be accepted as full discharge and satisfaction of all the contracts and obligations of the Choctaw Nation to any and all attorneys for services rendered to the Nation in the prosecution of said claim. This appropriation was evidently intended to discharge that obligation to him personally.

The argument for Mrs. Cochrane is based upon this plain agreement on McKee's part to pay her the 5 per cent., although, as no consideration moved from her either to McKee or to the Choctaws, it is in reality a donation. Upon the contrary, the appellants insist that the payment was intended as compensation for the services of Cochrane, which had been undoubtedly of great value to the Choctaws, and that the Nation had no right to divert what must naturally have been intended as a payment for those services away from his estate, to which it properly belonged, and turn it into a donation to his widow. The oral testimony as to the intention of the parties, if competent at all, is conflicting and wholly unsatisfactory.

As already observed, the Cochrane contract provided for payment to him of 30 per cent. of the amount collected, but it was a contract wholly contingent upon his success, and was never performed either by Cochrane personally, or by Black and Lamon, his assignees. Nothing was ever earned by them under this contract, and neither Cochrane's executor nor his assignee ever stood in position to sue upon it or to claim anything by virtue of it. At the same time, both the Choctaws and McKee were ready to concede that Cochrane had rendered valuable services, which had doubtless contributed much to the ultimate