themselves to evaluate when they decide whether or not to apply for visas. If I may again say, it is our strong feeling that not simply because of expectation of any therepeutic effect as a result of maintaining our open policy, but because of the value of the policy itself and what it represents for the United States we should maintain that policy.

One particular consideration we have in mind when examining this type of problem is what the consequences would be. It is my belief that the consequences of rejection of a visa for Mr. Player would not cause the South African Government to change its policies, would not cause the South African Government to adopt a more lenient stance with regard to the issuance of visas to Mr. Ashe or other black Americans of any category.

And at the same time it would simply move us out of the part of the forest we find more comfortable and put us in the same category as the South African Government. This would not be to our advantage. At the same time, I think it would be to their advantage because it would remove, I would expect, much of the opprobrium that attaches to their arbitrary action in a case such as this one.

Mr. DIGGS. Well, that is a very interesting comment because it is this kind of concept that I think that too often in our policy vis-a-vis South Africa and that is whether or not it is going to have an effect upon South African policy. Given the intransigence of that administration and the official policy of that Government on this subject, you may be correct; however, we have here in this sports subject something that has a little extra dimension to it because the South African people are great sports enthusiasts, and there is, from what I can gather, a developing resentment against this sort of situation.

There are some people who have spoken out, athletes and whatnot, who have spoken out against their government in this instance because of the Ashe incident, so that it has had some effect inside. But in addition to that, what about the effect? We talk about the effect on South African policy. What about the effect on the degradation that this represents for the 30 million black Americans here in the United States. What about the effect of this kind of incident and the kind of implications of this matter with respect to the other African countries and their supporters. In each instance that the United States identifies itself either through some kind of policy pronouncement, that is not implemented or in some other fashion on the wrong side of this question, our rating in the rest of black Africa goes down another notch.

So you are confining the issue to the question of whether or not what we do is going to have some effect on South African policy, as a very disturbing statement if it reflects the opinions of our administration in that matter.

Mr. CROSBY. Mr. Chairman, that was part of the comment I made, that it could not be expected necessarily to change their policy over the short run. There is another major reason why I believe our present policy is correct in relation to our own values, and this has to do with the view other countries take of the United States itself. You mentioned the reaction of other African countries. I don't have a reading on how they have felt about this, but I expect they would respect the efforts that have been made, the very high level and special efforts in this particular case to get a visa for Mr. Ashe.

At the same time, I think they would particularly respect our strength of character in maintaining the policy, in maintaining a position of openness. It is this contrast that sets us off so positively in comparison with the policies of the South Africans. I honestly believe it is not in our interest to take on the characteristics that we criticize in them. I believe this is the way a change of position would be regarded in Africa, because the African countries themselves so strongly dislike what is at the root of the problem in South Africa. Mr. DIGGS. Well, it has not been my experience, Mr. Crosby, that they do have this reaction. We are continually criticized in all parts of Africa despite the pronouncements that have been correct. We have made all kinds. We are the greatest country in the world for making pronouncements that are correct, not only as it relates to this matter but all aspects of Africa. Yet we know these people are not naive, they are much more sophisticated than they are given credit for. We make a correct statement that we are abhorring apartheid and we are against racism and yet on the other hand one of our leading citizens is denied entrance into a country like South Africa and yet one of their people can come over here. I am positive this lack of implementing these pronouncements is seen for what it is, and we are not fooling anybody because I have had this kind of criticism directed at our Government on missions that I have made to all parts of Africa, not only on the part of private individual citizens but on the part of leading members of the Government.

My colleague here, Mr. Burke, who accompanied me on a tour in Nigeria earlier this year, who is not a member of the subcommittee but a member of the full committee, and is present here, can recall many instances where these kinds of criticisms were directed at our policy. So it is not having the kind of effect that we think it is because it is not being implemented in those instances when it can be.

I think that our policymakers within the executive department ought to be realistic enough to face up to this kind of realism and this understanding of the dynamics of racism that the African nations and their peoples are expressing in this whole incident.

We have several other witnesses that are coming in who are being delayed because of bad weather. Mr. Ashe is coming in from Philadelphia. We have already heard from him, he is on the way. We have three or four witnesses coming from New York. As you know, the New York airports were closed down until I think 10:30, the first flight left there at 10:30.

So the committee is going to declare a recess to the call of the Chair until these other witnesses arrive. I fully expect them to arrive within the next few minutes.

(Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m. the subcommittee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

Mr. DIGGS. The subcommittee will come to order again.

Our next witness will be Mr. Arthur Ashe, who is accompanied by Mr. Donald Dell, the former U.S. Davis Cup captain.

I am delighted also to welcome at this juncture Congressman David Satterfield who represents the home community of Mr. Ashe and who is here out of respect for his constituent.

Did you have any preliminary comment to make?

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID E. SATTERFIELD III, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, if I might take just a moment. Nobody can introduce Arthur Ashe, he is too well known, but I consider it a privilege at least to have this opportunity to present him to you because we are very proud of Arthur. I think that all citizens of this Nation can take pride in the manner in which he has comported himself on the tennis courts in many nations throughout the world, for certainly his sportsmanship has redounded to great benefit not only to himself but credit to his country.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, he is a man with a mind of his own, and he does not hesitate to express his views. As is often the case in that circumstance, there are some who disagree with some things that he might say. I would only want to say this, that it has been my personal observation that in the exercise of his right to observe, without exception I have observed that he has never been abusive of that right but in absolute harmony with the intent of the constitutional provision that guarantees this right to all of us.

I wish I could hear his statement, but the drug abuse hearings prohibit it. I am confident, you, Mr. Chairman, will find him to be a completely articulate and candid witness as he expresses to you his own honest views. I as one welcome him and commend him to your judgment.

Mr. DIGGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Ashe, you may proceed. Do you have a prepared statement, sir?

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR ASHE, U.S. TENNIS CHAMPION, ACCOMPANIED BY DONALD DELL, FORMER U.S. DAVIS CUP CAPTAIN

Mr. ASHE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, also I would like to thank Mr. Satterfield for being here this morning.

It may be somewhat_redundant apropos the statement of Mr. Crosby from the State Department, but I would like to give my personal chronological series of events leading up to the denial of the visa application.

An informal attempt was made in 1968 by my lawyer here, Mr. Dell, who then was U.S. Davis Cup captain, with Mr. Owen Williams of the South African Open in Johannesburg. This took the form of letters to and from Mr. Dell and Mr. Williams. Mr. Williams informed us from Johannesburg that if we did in fact file for a visa in 1968 the visa would be turned down.

I brought up the subject again at the International Tennis Players. Association meeting in England last summer and this is where it broke into the public eye for the first time.

The head of the South African Lawn Tennis Union, Mr. Alf Chalmers, said that I never applied to play in the South African Open for 1969, and that I was quite wrong in my accusation that South Africa barred me, but I have letters to and from Mr. Williams and Mr. Dell to substantiate my claim that I did in fact try. The only technicality in 1969 for the 1969 championships was that I did not apply for a visa. This year in preparation for the 1970 South African Open to be held in March, I decided to exhaust every possible

legal, diplomatic, athletic, and moral channel to secure a "yes" on the visa application.

Owen Williams, the tournament chairman, was appointed tournament chairman at the U.S. Open at Forest Hills, and he volunteered to help me with my visa application. During the time of Forest Hills pickets were being formed by two factions, one from Chicago and one from New York City's Harlem. I personally knew that if I wanted to maximize my chances of getting a "yes" on a visa, I would have to get them to cool it. I pleaded with them and told them to give me 9 months, that is all I asked, and that timing was all important. The pickets, by the way, were being formed to protest the presence of Owen Williams because he is South African and he was tournament chairman of the biggest tennis event held in the United States.

So we planned to plan the entire visa procedure. Owen Williams would use his best efforts to secure a "yes" on my visa application in South Africa. Our president, Alastair Martin, president of the U.S. Lawn Tennis Association here, sent their South African Tennis Union president, Mr. Alf Chalmers, a letter which constituted my application, and further explained the possible consequences of a "no."

This letter held a November 30 deadline for an answer. The answer came back quickly and the South African team accepted my offer to play in the south. The question of the visa still remained, however. During the interim, I was scheduled for a series of exhibitions in France with two of my Davis Cup teammates, against members of the French Davis Cup team. This was arranged by my lawyer, Mr. Dell, and our Ambassador to France, Sargent Shriver, who is a personal friend of ours. Ambassador Shriver plays tennis every day, and it just so happens that while we were in France, so was Secretary of State Rogers. Ambassador Shriver brought Secretary Rogers to see the tennis and on December 6, Ambassador Shriver introduced all of us to Secretary Rogers, and then I politely asked if he would be of assistance. His exact words were, "I will see what I can do," concerning the visa application.

I later read in the paper, and heard through my office here in Washington, that he did in fact pursue the matter and instructed our Ambassador to South Africa, Mr. Rountree, to personally inform Prime Minister Balthazer Vorster, that Secretary of State Rogers was lending his personal weight and the weight of the State Department behind the application.

I think the letter and my chat with Secretary Rogers took care of the athletic and the diplomatic channels.

On December 15, I filed a visa application in New York City and held a press conference in New York City expressly to explain the rationale behind the visa application.

One, and most important, if I go, I go as an individual American citizen, a qualified tennis player, specifically not as a team member. Two, I recognize full well all anti-South African statements I have made in the past, but I stated that freedom to criticize is a privilege enjoyed by all Americans, so why should I make South Africa an exception?

For the purpose of maximizing my chances for securing a "Yes," I agreed not to make any political statements about South Africa from the time my visa application went in, December 15, until a

reasonable time after the tournament in March, and this was obviously because of the April elections. I was strongly urged, and I did sign notarized statements to this effect, that I would not make any political statements. These notarized statements are held in my office and they can be seen if anyone wants to see them.

This I thought was a major concession on my part to bend over backward to get a "Yes." The visa application and the notarized statement I thought took care of all the legal channels. All the legalities were out of the way. The press conference made my position quite clear, and in so doing I knew South Africa would hear about it the next day over the wire service.

My only moral obligation now is to keep my mouth shut as I promised, which was quite difficult until I got a "Yes" or a "No" on the visa application. I did just that; I kept my mouth shut until I got the answer.

I left for a tour of Southeast Asia and Australia on Christmas Day, and on January 22 UPI in Sydney, Australia, tells me that I will probably get a "No" because of an answer to a question at a political rally by a close confidant of the Prime Minister of Australia. On January 27 I learned that the answer was "No." I conclude that the only reason they gave me a "No" in light of all I did beforehand was because I happened to be nonwhite. The only other considerations left now as far as procedures are concerned are that in March there is a meeting of the Davis Cup nations to decide the fate of the South African Davis Cup, and in July there is a formal meeting of the International Lawn Tennis Federation which will decide whether South Africa remains in the International Lawn Tennis Federation.

That is the series of events chronologically leading up to the "No" on January 27.

Mr. DIGGS. Is that the end of your opening statement?

Mr. ASHE. Yes. I am free to answer questions. That is the situation as it stands.

Mr. DIGGS. Thank you very much for that sequence of events.

Mr. Dell, would you like to make your comments now, and then we will submit some questions?

Mr. DELL. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to make any comments. I am here to assist Mr. Ashe.

Mr. DIGGS. Mr. Ashe, you of course have referred to your previous statements which, according to the South African Government, were supposed to be the basis for their denial of your visa. I have a copy of that press release and I am going to make it part of the record. This was issued on the 28th of January 1970. It said:

Mr. Arthur Ashe has been refused a visa to go to South Africa.
Why?

Mr. Ashe claims that he wished to participate in the South African Open Tennis Tournament not for political reasons but solely for the purpose of playing tennis. Yet what has Mr. Ashe done from the political point of view so far?

Mr. Ashe associated himself with a movement to prevent South Africa's participation in the Olympic Games in 1968. This is recorded in United Nations Document A/AC.115/L.215 of 21 February, 1968.

Had South Africa been allowed to participate in the Games that would have been the first time that non-whites would have been included in the South African team.

Mr. Ashe must therefore bear a share of the responsibility for depriving South African non-whites of the opportunity of taking part in the Olympics.