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Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

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aThis is date of notification of succession. The declaration of waiver was deposited 4/26/77, which is date of entry into force for The Bahamas.

"Not in force. No declaration of waiver under Art. 28, para. 2.

The declaration of waiver was deposited 6/27/75, which is date of entry into force for Trinidad and Tobago.

Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

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Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

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Weapons

The need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was evident from the first days of the nuclear era. On November 15, 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada proposed the establishment of a U.N. Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of "entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes." The Baruch plan of 1946, offered by the United States, sought to forestall nuclear arms proliferation by placing all nuclear resources under international ownership and control.

But the early postwar efforts to achieve agreement on nuclear disarmament failed. The Soviet Union in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and the People's Republic of China in 1964, became nuclear-weapons states. And increasingly it was becoming apparent that earlier assumptions about the scarcity of nuclear materials and the difficulty of mastering nuclear technology were inaccurate.

Other developments and prospects further underscored the threat of nuclear proliferation. In the early 1960s the search for peaceful applications of nuclear energy had brought advances in the technology of nuclear reactors for the generation of electric power. By 1966 such nuclear reactors were operating or under construction in five countries. It was estimated that by 1985 more than 300 nuclear power reactors would be operating, under construction, or on order. Nuclear reactors produce not only power, but plutonium-a fissionable material which can be chemically separated and used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. By 1985 the quantity of plutonium being produced would make possible the construction of 15 to 20 nuclear bombs daily, depending upon the level of the technology employed.

If the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes were not prevented by an international system of safeguards, and if a growing number of nations came to possess nuclear arsenals, the risks of nuclear war as a result of accident, unauthorized use, or escalation of regional conflicts would greatly increase. The possession of nuclear weapons by many countries would add a grave new dimension of threat to world security.

A succession of initiatives by both nuclear and nonnuclear powers sought to check proliferation. Indeed the effort to achieve a test banculminating in the treaty of 1963-had as one of its main purposes inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. But much before that, in

August 1957, the Western powers (Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) submitted a "package" of measures, in the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which included a commitment "not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons," except for self-defense.

Although the Soviet Union opposed proliferation, it claimed that this Western formula would allow an aggressor to judge his own actions, and to use nuclear weapons "under cover of the alleged right of self-defense." It sought to couple a ban on transfer of nuclear weapons to other states with a prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons in foreign countries.

In 1961 the General Assembly unanimously approved an Irish resolution calling on all states, particularly the nuclear powers, to conclude an international agreement to refrain from transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the general disarmament plans which had been submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union during the period 1960-62 included provisions banning the transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The United States, on January 21, 1964, outlined a program to halt the nuclear arms race in a message from President Johnson to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). This program, unlike the 1957 proposal, was not a "package." It included a nondissemination and nonacquisition proposal-based on the Irish resolution-and safeguards on international transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, combined with acceptance by the major nuclear powers that their peaceful nuclear activities undergo increasingly "the same inspection they recommend for other states." An issue that was to be the principal stumbling block for the next 3 years was the proposed multilateral nuclear force (MLF) then under discussion by the United States and its NATO allies. The Soviet Union strongly objected to this plan and maintained that no agreement could be reached on non-proliferation so long as the United States held open the possibility of such nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO. These would constitute proliferation, the Soviet Union contended, and were devices for giving the Federal Republic of Germany access to or control of nuclear weapons.

On August 17, 1965, the United States submitted a draft nonproliferation treaty to the ENDC. This draft would oblige the nuclearweapons powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national control of any country not having them. Nonnuclear nations would undertake to facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities. A Soviet draft treaty was submitted to the General Assembly on

September 24. In an accompanying memorandum, the Soviet Union declared that the greatest danger of proliferation was posed by the MLF and the alternative British proposal for an Atlantic nuclear force (ANF). The Soviet draft prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons "directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons." It would also bar nuclear powers from transferring "nuclear weapons, or control over them or their emplacement or use" to military units of nonnuclear allies, even if these were placed under joint command. The draft included no safeguards provisions.

In March 1966 the United States tabled amendments to its draft treaty in the ENDC, seeking to clarify and emphasize the Western view that collective defense arrangements would not violate the principle of non-proliferation. The U.S. representative stressed that the United States would not relinquish its veto over the use of U.S. weapons. The Soviet Union objected that the amendments did not prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons through such alliance arrangements as the MLF, the ANF, or units placed under joint command. The U.S. retention of a veto, the Soviet representative argued, did not provide security against dissemination.

Despite strong disagreement on the issue of collective defense arrangements, it was apparent that both sides recognized the desirability of an agreement on non-proliferation. Moreover, the interest of nonnuclear powers was increasingly manifest. It was shown in 1964 at the African summit conference and at the Cairo conference of nonaligned states and expressed in a series of resolutions in the General Assembly urging that non-proliferation receive priority attention. In May 1966 the U.S. Senate unanimously passed a resolution, sponsored by Senator Pastore of Rhode Island and 55 other Senators, commending efforts to reach a nonproliferation agreement and supporting continued efforts.

In the fall of 1966 the U.S. and Soviet co-chairmen of the ENDC began private talks, and by the end of the year they had reached tentative agreement on the basic nontransfer and nonacquisition provisions of a treaty, as well as on a number of other aspects.

There followed a long and arduous series of consultations between the United States and its allies. The allies raised a number of questions regarding the effect of the treaty on NATO nuclear defense arrangements, and the United States gave its interpretations. The United States considered that the treaty covered nuclear weapons or explosive devices but not delivery systems. It would not prohibit NATO consultation and planning on nuclear defense, nor ban deployment of U.S.-owned and -controlled nuclear weapons on the territory of nonnuclear NATO members. It would not "bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its members." The allies' questions and the United States

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