Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Having concluded the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Reaffirming that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security, Convinced that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, Have agreed as follows: First, The Parties will continue to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation. In furtherance of existing agreements between the Parties on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, the Parties will continue, for the purposes of reducing and averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, to seek measures to strengthen strategic stability by, among other things, limitations on strategic offensive arms most destabilizing to the strategic balance and by measures to reduce and to avert the risk of surprise attack. Second. Further limitations and reductions of strategic arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means, using additionally, as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means. The Parties will seek to strengthen verification and to perfect the operation of the Standing Consultative Commission in order to promote assurance of compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties. Third. The Parties shall pursue in the course of these negotiations, taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation, the following objectives: 1) significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms; 2) qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms; 3) resolution of the issues included in the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in the context of the negotiations relating to the implementation of the principles and objectives set out herein. Fourth. The Parties will consider other steps to ensure and enhance strategic stability, to ensure the equality and equal security of the Parties, and to implement the above principles and objectives. Each Party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms. The Parties will also consider further joint measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Vienna, June 18, 1979 For the United States of America JIMMY CARTER President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics L. BREZHNEV General Secretary of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Backfire Statement On June 16, 1979, President Brezhnev handed President Carter the following written statement [original Russian text was attached]: "The Soviet side informs the US side that the Soviet 'Tu-22M' airplane, called 'Backfire' in the USA, is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA. Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate." President Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per year. President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II Agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty. CYRUS VANCE Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material provides for certain levels of physical protection during international shipment of nuclear material. It also establishes a general framework for cooperation among states in the recovery and return of stolen nuclear material. Further, the Convention defines certain serious offenses involving nuclear material which state parties are to make punishable and for which offenders will be subject to a system of extradition or submission for prosecution. This Convention resulted from a U.S. initiative in 1974, which was subsequently endorsed at the 1975 Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference. Two provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 call for negotiation of such a convention. Negotiation of the Convention was begun in 1977. The Convention was adopted at a meeting of government representatives in Vienna on October 26, 1979, and signed by the United States on March 3, 1980. The U.S. Senate provided its advice and consent for the ratification of the Convention on July 30, 1981, by a vote of 98-0. Legislation to implement the Convention is currently pending in the Congress. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Signed at New York March 3, 1980 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate July 30, 1981 Ratified by U.S. President September 4, 1981 The States Parties to This Convention, Recognizing the right of all States to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear energy, Convinced of the need for facilitating international co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy, Desiring to avert the potential dangers posed by the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material, Convinced that offenses relating to nuclear material are a matter of grave concern and that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate and effective measures to ensure the prevention, detection and punishment of such offenses, Aware of the Need for international co-operation to establish, in conformity with the national law of each State Party and with this Convention, effective measures for the physical protection of nuclear material, Convinced that this Convention should facilitate the safe transfer of nuclear material, Stressing also the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, Recognizing the importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material used for military purposes, and understanding that such material is and will continue to be accorded stringent physical protection, Have Agreed as follows: Article 1 For the purposes of this Convention: (a) "nuclear material" means plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore or ore-residue; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; (b) "uranium enriched in the 235 or 233" means uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 Occurring in nature; (c) "international nuclear transport" means the carriage of a consignment of nuclear material by any means of transportation intended to go beyond the territory of the State where the shipment originates beginning with the departure from a facility of the shipper in that State and ending with the arrival at a facility of the receiver within the State of ultimate destination. Article 2 1. The Convention shall apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport. |