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Of these methods, the plan of informing voters more thoroughly strikes somewhere near the root of the matter, and may accomplish something. But the difficulty lies still deeper. Any system is wrong which expects to obtain a popular judgment upon questions which are too trivial or too local for the voters to have any real opinion upon the matters submitted to them. The amending procedure in its operation has in many cases become a mere farce because of the triviality and multiplicity of questions submitted. Upon unimportant matters a popular verdict is obtained which is worth little or nothing, and the amending procedure is so cumbered with unimportant questions that matters of importance-matters upon which the people may have a real judgment are obscured. The present

system is defective. It cannot be expected that even important measures, when submitted in such a manner as to be understood by the people, should as a rule receive a vote equal to that of candidates in a hotly-contested election, because the personal interests of voters cannot be aroused to such an extent upon proposed measures. All that can be hoped for is that the people be not overburdened, that the purpose of measures be well understood, and that the result of the popular voting be fairly representative of a real public opinion. These results are not obtained through the present operation of the amending procedure.

What should be done to better the present situation? Speaking of the Alabama constitution of 1901, Dr. Robert H. Whitten said several years ago: "In a constitution so detailed in many parts there will be frequent need for amendments. In most of these the voters will have no interest and cannot be expected to vote on them intelligently, yet each amendment will have to receive a three-fifths vote of the Legislature, and a majority vote of all electors voting at the election. This will cumber the election machinery

with votes on questions that might better be left to the legislature and will often prevent much needed changes. If it seems desirable to include matters of detail in the constitution, special provision should be made for their amendment by a two-thirds vote of the legislature or of two succeeding legislatures without submission to the people." It has not been unusual for constitutions to contain provisions which were specifically made subject to alteration by state legislatures, at certain times or under certain conditions, and what Dr. Whitten proposes is an extension of this practice.

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But if a provision is considered of sufficient importance to be inserted into the constitution, it may be thought undesirable to have such a provision alterable merely at the discretion of the legislature, even though that body be acting by an increased majority. Some popular control should be maintained even over unimportant changes in the constitution. What may well be done, however, is to provide that unimportant constitutional changes may be made by a two-thirds vote of the legislature, but to permit a popular referendum upon such legislative action if a petition is presented signed by a sufficient number of voters. A popular check upon legislative action would thus be retained, but the alteration of constitutional details would be made simpler and easier; the electorate would be freed from the burden of passing upon such changes, except in cases where there was assurance of rather wide popular interest in the matter.37

35 New York State Library, Review of Legislation, 1901, p. 29.

36 As, for example, the Virginia constitution of 1902, secs. 155, 1561; the Oklahoma constitution of 1907, Art. ix, sec. 35, Art. xii, sec. 3, Art. xx, sec. 2; Maryland constitution of 1867, Art. xi.

37 If this were done there would be introduced a class of legislation somewhat intermediate between the constitution and ordinary statutes,

Putting in concrete form the suggestions for obtaining more effective popular action through the amending process, we may say:

(1) Measures of fundamental importance-measures of a real constitutional character-should, as at present, in every case be subject to a popular vote. Upon such measures the people should pass, and upon them they may be presumed to have a real opinion. The compulsory referendum should be retained for all such constitutional proposals.

(2) Upon matters of detail the legislature should be permitted to act by an increased majority, subject however to a popular vote should a sufficient number of the electors petition for such action.38 Upon matters of small importance the optional referendum is a sufficient check on legislative action, and the less frequent votes upon trivial matters will enable the electors to express a more intelligent judgment upon measures of real importance. Matters of purely local importance, which bear little or no relation to the policy of the state as a whole, should, of course, not be decided either by the legislature or by a state referendum. A number of questions submitted to the people of California, Louisiana, Missouri, and South Carolina during the past ten years might much better have been left to the particular cities or local districts directly concerned.

and an interesting question would be raised as to the attitude of the courts toward such legislation, but as has already been suggested, the courts have already largely broken down the distinction between state constitutions and state statutes.

38 The distinction between important and relatively unimportant constitutional questions could in most cases be made without great difficulty. The compulsory popular vote might well be made the usual method of altering constitutions, and there could then be an enumeration of specific constitutional provisions which might be changed without a popular vote unless such vote was petitioned for.

(3) Popular control over the proposal of amendments should be extended. Legislatures are not always responsive to the desires of the people in this respect, and it should be possible to initiate proposed amendments by popular petition. The popular initiative has already been introduced in several states, and its extension with respect to constitutional questions is desirable. The popular initiative is open to many objections, both theoretical and practical, but the people should have power independently of the legislature, to force changes in their constitutions when such changes are desired. Perhaps the greatest value which the initiative will have is not in the direct results which may come from its use, but in its influence in causing legislatures to act upon matters upon which action is desired by the people.

(4) The plan of distributing the text of measures to each voter should be employed in preference to that of publication in newspapers. The separate ballot for constitutional questions also has advantages in that it separates the voting upon measures rather distinctly from that upon candidates. These things however are but machinery, and are of little value unless the questions submitted to the people are of sufficient importance to attract the attention of the voters.

The suggestions made above do not involve a decrease in popular influence upon constitutional changes. They do involve an attempt to concentrate attention upon fewer and more important measures, so that the popular vote may represent a real judgment and not merely an unintelligent and haphazard action.

APPENDIX

POPULAR VOTES UPON CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS, 1899-1908

The votes upon amendments given in the following list have been obtained by correspondence with state officials or taken from official state publications. The list of amendments proposed has been checked with the annual lists given in the bulletins of the New York State Library, and with the statutes of the several states, and is probably complete for the period covered. Acknowledgment is made to the secretaries of state who have been kind enough to send information. Of the four hundred and seventy-two questions listed below, the popular vote has been obtained upon all but twenty-two. It has been impossible to obtain the popular votes upon three amendments submitted in Colorado in 1904 and 1906, and upon two proposals voted on in Kentucky in 1905 and 1907. The secretary of state of Georgia declined to furnish information regarding ten amendments submitted in that state, and the votes are not available in print; in Tennessee only the affirmative vote is returned, as no proposal is adopted unless the affirmative vote is more than one-half of the whole vote cast, so that upon the seven Tennessee proposals complete information is not available.

The total state vote used for comparison with the vote upon amendments is, where possible, the vote cast for the highest state officer chosen at the election when the proposed amendment is submitted; where no state officer is chosen at such an election the vote for President of the United States or for members of the national house of representatives is sometimes used; where the amendments were submitted at special elections the vote used for comparison has been that at the nearest general election (in most cases that at the nearest preced

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