5. Last fall analysts were predicting severe food shortages in Lebanon this winter due to the rapid deterioration of the economic situation there. What is the present food situation in Lebanon? How are people able to meet their daily food needs? Does there continue to be a problem with militia - What is the Lebanese government doing to try to address this problem and how effective has it been? How much U.S. food assistance was provided to Lebanon in FY-1987 and what is planned for FY-1988? - Are there plans to allow the Lebanese Government to distribute any U.S.-supplied food or will you continue to rely on international PVOS? Our reports are that adequate food supplies are generally available in the market and, specifically, that sufficient flour stocks are currently available to provide bread through June 1988. Tenders have recently been made to purchase 200,000 MT of wheat. This purchase, in addition to the 125,000 MT of wheat already procured, leaves the Government 65,000 MT short of its target of 390,000 MT in calendar year 1988. Due to declining real income, more and more people are having trouble affording the type and quantity of food contained in their normal diet. Substantial amounts of humanitarian relief food assistance have been received from various countries and international organizations. Efforts are currently underway to amass data on how much food is arriving, how much more has been committed, and how distribution is being handled - including what beneficiary criteria (if any) are to be applied. We estimate that over 1.25 million needy Lebanese, which was the basis for -2 the Government of Lebanon's emergency appeal in May 1987, are now receiving food assistance. This excludes the one-time food distribution from Saudi Arabia, given to about 80% of the population. We have seen reports of food shortages among low income families and indications of growth deficiency patterns indicative that malnutrition may become a problem. During the years of the "camp wars," there have been reports of malnutrition or starvation in Palestinian refugee camps, but there are no verified reports that malnutrition has become a reality among the general population of Lebanon. Bread consumption is said to be up to compensate for shortages of other food in the diet. Bread is highly subsidized and thus more readily available to those on limited budgets. Increased bread consumption has traditionally been a way to stretch a family's budget. We have no data on either the foodstuffs available nor on the cost of basic dietary staples. The transportation of all goods throughout Lebanon is channeled through various militia checkpoints where access may be controlled or taxed. To date there have been no significant impediments to distribution of the relief food supplies provided by the United States through private voluntary organizations. -3 The Lebanese Government is unable to prevent militias from setting up the checkpoints and thus controlling food supplies and distribution. Under PL-480 Title II, the United States contributed $13.7 million in food commodities (and ocean freight costs) late in FY-1987, and added another $7.9 million in FY-1988. On an annualized basis, this is a program of about $20 million which provides assistance to 135,000 families (800,000 people or about one quarter of the Lebanese population). The U.S. humanitarian relief food support is being handled by Save the Children Federation, a U.S.-based private voluntary Implementation of the program is handled by a organization. Lebanese staff. Various indigenous organizations, including committees organized by the Government of Lebanon, have assisted Save the Children in registering beneficiaries and assisting with distribution of rations. Save the Children has been generally effective in reaching beneficiaries throughout all parts of Lebanon and of differing confessional affiliations. Assuming a continuing need to provide humanitarian relief, we expect to continue to work with Save the Children. There are at present no plans to distribute U.S. food relief through other channels. Q: What has been the reaction of Saudi Arabia and North Yemen to these reports? A: --SOUTH YEMEN'S NEIGHBORS VIEW WITH CONCERN ANY ARMS BUILDUP OR EXTENSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION 1: A: Are you concerned about this buildup? --SOUTH YEMEN, THE ONLY AVOWEDLY MARXIST STATE IN THE ARAB WORLD AND HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON MOSCOW, HAS IN THE PAST INTERVENED MILITARILY IN EVENTS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. TENSIONS CONTINUE AMONG THE NEIGHBORS, FROM TIME TO TIME, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE OF THE STILL UNDEFINED BORDERS THEY SHARE. THUS WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION CLOSELY. Q: A: What do you see as the purpose of this arms buildup? - -WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT LOST IN THE COUP AND THE FIGHTING THAT ACCOMPANIED IT. Q: The Christian Science Monitor reports that the Soviet Union is engaged in a major buildup of military equipment in South Yemen, including tanks, air defense weapons and fighter aircraft. Are these reports accurate? A: --THE SOVIET UNION HAS UNDERTAKEN TO RESUPPLY SOUTH YEMEN'S MILITARY CAPABILITY, A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF WHICH WAS DESTROYED DURING THE BLOODY FIGHTING THAT ACCOMPANIED THE 1986 COUP. LIBYA In February the Washington Post ran a series of articles based on an exclusive interview with Col. Qadhafi. In this article Qadhafi stated that he was ready for a new live-and-let-live relationship with the U.S. while at the same time refusing to discuss his continued support for terrorism. --Could you comment on these articles? --In your view did the interview reveal any significant changes in Qadhafi's positions? --What is the administration's analysis of Qadhafi now, nearly two years after the U.S. bombing of Tripoli? --Are you open to this initiative? The administration's current analysis is that, although Qadhafi has been weakened by the U.S. bombing, defeats in Chad, and domestic problems, he has not abandoned his radical and aggressive policies or his support of terrorism and aggression. Recent evidence of Libyan support for terrorism includes the arrest in Senegal of Libyan operatives carrying arms and explosives, the French seizure of the Eksund II, with its cargo of sophisticated arms destined for the Irish Republican Army (four earlier shipments reached their destination), and the presence in Tripoli of key elements of the Abu Nidal Organization. Qadhafi's comments to the Washington Post were consistent with our analysis that he has not changed, although it was interesting that he so unabashedly admitted that Libya supports terrorism. Qadhafi's denial of Libyan involvement in the shipment of weapons to the IRA is not consistent with the facts. Further, there is no basis for Qadhafi's claim that |