2. At the UN last week, a piece of paper was circulating claiming that Iran had agreed to accept UN Security Council Resolution 598. - Where did this piece of paper come from? The paper was handed to the Security Council President (Yugoslavia during March) by Iranian UN Permanent Representative Mahallati. Did it come from the Iranians, and was it an official document of the Government of Iran? While the document came from the Iranian UN Mission, it was a "non-paper", without official status. Did this document have any signature and did it have the letterhead of the Government of Iran? The document was on plain bond paper, without letterhead or signature. What was the purpose of the document? We view it as an attempt to create the impression that 3. According to Gary Sick, former National Security Council staffer on Iran during the Carter Administration, Iran has indicated that it would be prepared to observe informally the terms of a cease-fire resolution while an impartial commission (mentioned in paragraph 6 of UN Resolution 598) met to determine the war. - Is it fair to characterize this Iranian idea as a revision of the timetables within UN Resolution 598, but an approach consistent with the intent of 598 that is, a cease-fire and an end of the war? No. Iran is attempting to rewrite Resolution 598 to advance its own interests. may have some superficial appeal, it is in fact inconsistent with the fundamental elements of 598: immediate cease-fire, cessation of all hostilities and withdrawal without delay to international borders. In the past, Iran has said it would accept only a de 2 Recently, even this position appears to have hardened, with Iran demanding a condemnation of Iraq as a condition for a cease-fire of any kind, de facto or formal. Iran continues to reject the Security Council's demand for a withdrawal to international borders. What is wrong with having the Commission to investigate the origins of the war go first, if it means Iran will accept a cease-fire? First, the de facto cease-fire envisaged by Iran would be fragile and, in the absence of withdrawal of forces to international borders, would be unlikely to last. Second, making implementation of the other provisions of 598 contingent on the acceptability to Iran of results of a commission of inquiry is inconsistent with the letter and intent of 598. This would in effect give Iran veto power over implementation of the other provisions. Resolution 598 was designed as a comprehensive, integrated package to be implemented in full. It is a mandatory resolution, binding on both parties, and cannot be made the subject of bargaining over selective implementation if the Security Council's credibility is to be maintained. Why shouldn't we have the UN Secretary General go out and give it another try, following up on this Iranian idea, rather than put all our efforts into a second resolution to punish Iran? Our objective is not to punish Iran. Rather, we seek to help bring the Gulf war to an early end through implementation of Resolution 598, which provides a fair and balanced framework for resolving the conflict. Because UN efforts to implement 598 have been blocked by Iranian intransigence, we support adoption of enforcement measures against Iran as the non-complying party. We recognize that implementation of 598 will require negotiations in which both sides will have to be flexible, but at the moment there is no sign that Iran is prepared to negotiate in good faith to implement 598. In December the Secretary General asked the Security Council for a "fresh and resolute impulse" to assist his mediation efforts. We believe an enforcement resolution would give the Secretary General the leverage he needs to pursue his efforts. 4 - The Secretary General recently invited senior Iranian Q. The Observer of London reported recently that the U.S. had sent a secret envoy to Iran for the first time since the Iran-Contra affair. Are these reports accurate? A. No. The reports were false. |