The Council urges the Administering Authority to continue to implement, in the light of the Charter of the United Nations, the Trusteeship Agreement [and the Colonialism Declaration and another General Assembly resolution setting forth the possible forms of terminal political status as sovereign independence or free association or integration with an independent state] and in consultation with the Congress of Micronesia, realistic plans and programmes reflecting a proper sense of urgency for the rapid and planned advance of the Territory in all aspects of its political life.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF 24 CONSIDERATION: OCTOBER 9-23, 1964

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Subcommittee II of the Special Committee (see page 235) 8 discussed the Trust Territory from October 9 through October 23, 1964. In his statement before the Subcommittee on October 9, the U.S. Representative, Dwight Dickinson, explained the special status of the Territory as a "strategic area" so designated under the provisions of article 82 of the Charter in an agreement between the Government of the United States and the Security Council. Noting that article 83(1) provided that "All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council," he added that the Security Council had requested the Trusteeship Council to perform on its behalf the functions specified in articles 87 and 88 of the Charter relating to the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of strategic areas. Annual reports by the Trusteeship Council in response to this request had accordingly been submitted to the Security Council and not, as in the case of nonstrategic areas, to the General Assembly. These reports were available to members of the Special Committee. After a draft report on the Territory had been tabled in the Subcommittee, the U.S. Representative again reminded the group of the provisions of article 83 (1) of the Charter and suggested that any proposals for action by the Subcommittee or the Special Committee with regard to the Trust Territory be cast in the form of proposals to the General Assembly for recommendations it might make to the Security Council.

The Special Committee considered the report of its Subcommittee II on November 12, adopting a series of conclusions and recommendations. In its recommendations the Special Committee reaffirmed the "inalienable right of the people of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to self-determination and independence" in conformity with the Colonialism Declaration. It recommended that the Congress of Micronesia be provided with "all powers necessary to pave the way for the speedy implementation" of that Declaration and that the people of the Territory be enabled to express their wishes with respect to their future status "through well-established democratic processes and under United Nations supervision." The Special Committee also made recommendations concerning the administrative, economic, and educational life of the Territory, suggesting, among other things,

Of the source text. Concerning the establishment of the Special Committee, see footnote 1 to doc. II-44, ante. "See U.N. doc. A/5800/Rev. 1, chapter XVIII.

the establishment of an overall economic development plan. Finally, the Special Committee recommended a visiting mission to the Trust Territory. A U.S. proposal to delete the recommendation for a visiting mission was rejected by a vote of 5 (U.S.) to 8, with 10 abstentions.

Following adoption of the report the U.S. Representative formally reserved the U.S. position. Discussing various elements of the report with which the United States could not agree, he pointed out that the Special Committee's recommendations included a paragraph (the recommendation for a visiting mission) which was in direct contravention of the Charter.

E. Developments Affecting the Situation in the Republic of Viet-Nam

[See also ante docs. IX-9 et seq. and docs. IX-89 et seq.]

Document IX-104

"There Continues To Be Infiltration From the North [in VietNam]": STATEMENT AND REPLY MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) TO A QUESTION ASKED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, JANUARY 2, 1964 (EXCERPTS)1

Just before Christmas . . . a Vietnamese Army group seized in the delta area of Viet-Nam some 300,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, weapons like mortars, recoilless ammunition, made in China. It is quite clear that there continues to be infiltration from the north across national frontiers and, despite existing accords, support and encouragement for those who are trying to take over a peaceful and friendly country.

Who actually forwarded them [-arms and ammunition-] into South Viet-Nam is a matter of some speculation, but almost certainly the authorities in Hanoi were primarily responsible for that.

1 1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 20, 1964, pp. 81, 85.

Document IX-105

"I Can Conceive of No Alternative Other Than To Take All Necessary Measures Within Our Capability To Prevent a Communist Victory [in Viet-Nam]": STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MCNAMARA) BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, JANUARY 27, 1964 (EXCERPT)2

No region is more vulnerable and exposed to Communist subversion than southeast Asia. Living in the shadow of the Communist giant to the north, the far smaller nations in this region are torn between the desire to be free and independent and their fear of being overrun by the Chinese hordes. It is quite understandable therefore that a policy of neutralism should look very attractive to some of them. Yet most of the governments in that area realize the danger of placing themselves at the mercy of Communist China and have sought to retain some ties with the Western Powers, particularly the United States.

The principal objective of U.S. policy in southeast Asia is simply to maintain the integrity and independence of the non-Communist nations in that area. We do not require that they be allied with us, but we do attempt to convince them that any tendency to be neutral on the side of Communist China will inevitably lead to Communist control. Accordingly, we have tried in every possible way to support the independence of the non-Communist nations in southeast Asia wherever our help is wanted, and we have respected the positions of those nations which prefer to seek their security in neutrality.

In the case of South Vietnam, our help is clearly wanted, and we are deeply engaged in supporting the Vietnamese Government and people in their war against the Communist Vietcong. In addition to large-scale economic and military assistance, we are also maintaining a very substantial training and logistics mission in that country. Including the Military Assistance Advisory Group, there are now about 15,500 U.S. military personnel in Vietnam providing training, airlift, communications, and advice to the Vietnamese forces and administering the military assistance program.

But the situation there continues grave. Last September we had hoped we could bring sufficient pressure to bear on the Diem government to persuade it to abandon its oppressive measures against the Vietnamese people and get on with the task of winning the war against the Vietcong. 3 Although the military situation in the delta region was still very bad, good progress had been made in the northern areas and especially noteworthy work had been done in the key coastal provinces where Vietcong strength had once threatened to cut the country in half. In the central area and the highlands, progress had been steady, though slower. The situation was still difficult in the pro

'Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9637, Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 6891-7906 (extract taken from pp. 6903-6906).

3 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 870 ff.

vinces to the west and north of Saigon itself. Throughout the northern two-thirds of the country, the strategic hamlet program had developed very well and freedom of movement in the rural areas had grown steadily. We concluded then that top priority should be given to the delta region which contains approximately 40 percent of the population. This region has traditionally resisted central authority. It is the center of Vietcong strength, and the swampy nature of the terrain makes it the most difficult area to pacify.

The first step in that direction had already been taken by September when a third division was moved to the delta. But we felt that additional measures were needed, particularly the consolidation, rather than the further spread, of strategic hamlets; the elimination of many fixed outposts; better hamlet defenses; and more trained hamlet militia. We also felt that the regular Republic of Vietnam Army units should be reserved for use in mobile actions and for "clear and hold" operations in support of the strategic hamlet program.

With these further measures in view, we felt that a start could be made in reducing the number of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam as their training missions were completed. Accordingly, we announced that about 1,000 men were to be withdrawn by the end of 1963 and expressed the hope that the major part of the U.S. military task could be completed by the end of 1965, although we recognized that there might be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. advisory personnel.*

In this connection, we must recognize that the U.S. advisory effort cannot assure ultimate success. This is a Vietnamese war, and in the final analysis it must be fought and won by the Vietnamese. To leave our advisers there beyond the time they are truly needed would delay the development of Vietnam's initiative. Therefore, it has been our policy to transfer U.S. responsibilities to the Vietnamese wherever this can be done without impairing the total war effort.

Unfortunately, the Diem government did not choose to follow the advice we offered. In November that government was overthrown and replaced by a new government made up of military officers and civilians. The Vietcong was quick to take advantage of the growing opposition to the Diem government and the period of uncertainty following its overthrow. Vietcong activities were already increasing in September and continued to increase at an accelerated rate in October and November, particularly in the delta area. And I must report that they have made considerable progress since the coup.

The new government, however, has considerably more popular support than its predecessor and the Military Revolutionary Committee is beginning to take action to intensify military operations and to improve civil administration. The strategic hamlet program which had been overextended in the delta area is now being built more solidly." And

4 See ibid., pp. 877, 884, footnote 36.

5 See ibid., p. 878.

A joint U.S.-Vietnamese team had made a critical report on Jan. 14 following an investigation into the operation of the strategic hamlet program in the Mekong River delta area; see The New York Times, Jan. 15, 1964.

the new government is now applying "clear and hold" tactics in that

area.

We hope that, with our full support, the new government can take hold and eventually suppress the Vietcong insurrection. The dry season will give us a firmer basis for this judgment. However, the survival of an independent government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of all of southeast Asia and to the free world that I can conceive of no alternative other than to take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a Communist victory. We must prove that Communist aggression cannot succeed through subversion, but will fail as surely as it has failed in direct confrontation.

Document IX-106

"The Army [of Viet-Nam] Is Determined To Rise Up and Continue To Carry Out the National Revolution": STATEMENT MADE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (KHANH), JANUARY 30, 1964 1

8

On 1 November the main cause prompting the Republican Army to rise up and overthrow the dictatorial, rotten, and incompetent regime of Ngo Dinh Diem was to strive to carry out a comprehensive revolution in order to build a truly democratic regime, to increase effective measures against communism, and to insure a free and happy life for every citizen.

But for three months following the coup the political, economic, and social situation, especially in the rural areas, has not brought any promise for the future of the country and has not compensated for the daily sacrifices of soldiers. Therefore, the aspirations of the compatriots and soldiers are not satisfied. The governmental organization has proved incompetent and counterrevolutionary. A number of persons desiring to protect their individual interests do not hesitate to ally themselves with the colonialists and have a tendency to advocate neutrality, thereby paving the way for the Communists to enslave our people.

The army is determined to rise up and continue to carry out the national revolution to satisfy the aspirations of all the people. The army is determined to wipe out the Communists and the Vietnamese traitors advocating neutrality. The army is determined to join the compatriots in restoring security and order so as to bring the people a plentiful and happy life. The army is determined to join the compatriots in building the future of the Fatherland on the basis of freedom and democracy.

The army insistently calls on the compatriots to unite in order to achieve the final victory quickly.

'Department of State files. This statement was made in a radio broadcast from Saigon. Also broadcast was the text of a proclamation designating Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council. Lt. Gen. Duong Van Minh was allowed to remain as Chief of State. Subsequently, on Feb. 8, Gen. Khanh assumed the office of Premier also.

On Jan. 31, the Department of State issued a statement that it was continuing relations with the new leaders of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and that no question of recognition was involved (Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 17, 1964, p. 239).

8

* See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 878.