a "People's Revolutionary Party" to overthrow the Government. The Director of the CIA stated that this Party had engineered the student riots that led to the imposition of martial law in June 1964. The CIA also announced clashes with agents whom it sought to apprehend in the southern part of the Republic of Korea. It is relevant here to recall that, on 3 August 1964, President Park Chung Hee stated, in an address to graduates of the National Defence College, that a great number of enemy agents and subversive elements had been arrested in connexion with the student riots of 3 June 1964.

The development of the economy of the Republic of Korea continued in recent years but the rate of development fluctuated. A financial stabilization programme and the export-import link system had restraining effects during 1963 but, despite these, there was considerable expansion.

The country continued to face a number of difficulties hindering economic growth. These included acute price inflation, decreased foreign exchange reserves, declining United States aid, low level of domestic savings, a high rate of growth of population and labour force, agricultural under-employment and industrial under-utilization of installed capacity, limited natural resources and the continued division of the country. Despite these difficulties, the rate of economic growth in 1963 was 5.9 per cent-the largest since 1957, when the growth rate was 8.7 per cent.

Document IX-88

Korean-United States Pledge of "Continued Cooperation in the Common Interest": JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT SEOUL BY THE KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER (LEE) AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS (BUNDY), OCTOBER 3, 1964 96

Foreign Minister Lee Tong Won of the Republic of Korea and Mr. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, met today and exchanged views on matters of mutual concern to the Governments of both countries. They reaffirmed the friendship between their two countries and pledged their Governments to continued cooperation in the common interest.

1. They reviewed the results of the meeting held on August 17 between Foreign Minister Lee and Ambassador Brown, and reaffirmed the contents of the statement released following that meeting.97

2. Mr. Bundy expressed his Government's support for the efforts of the Korean people and Government to maintain constitutional institutions and democratic processes. He also paid tribute to the people and the Government of Korea for their contribution to the collective security of the free world and the solidarity of free nations in the Far East.

3. The Foreign Minister recounted recent developments with regard to relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan." The Foreign Minister and Mr. Bundy agreed that normalization of relations between Korea and Japan would be an important contribution to the cause of peace in Asia and expressed the hope that public opinion in

Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 19, 1964, p. 542. Mr. Bundy visited Seoul, Oct. 2-3. Not printed here. See supra.

97

Korea on this matter would recognize the national interest on a suprapartisan basis. They expressed the hope that negotiations for normalization of those relations could be resumed at an early date.99 Mr. Bundy repeated earlier U.S. expressions of willingness to assist in appropriate ways to bring about a successful conclusion of this longstanding problem.

4. Mr. Bundy reiterated assurances given previously that the basic policy of the United States Government of extending military and economic aid to Korea would be continued after the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan. It was agreed that cooperation between Korea and the United States will continue to be directed toward maintaining Korea's security and independence, promoting a self-supporting economy, balanced economic growth, and financial stability.

5. The Foreign Minister and Mr. Bundy exchanged views with respect to the military assistance program. It was agreed that the requirements for military assistance would be periodically reviewed and that the United States will continue to give careful consideration to the Korean Government's needs and views in this regard.

LAOS

[See also post, docs. IX-104 et seq.]

Document IX-89

Violation of the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos by the Pathet Lao With the Support of the North Vietnamese: STATEMENT and RePLIES MADE BY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NEWS (McCLOSKEY), DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 4, 1964 (EXCERPTS)1

For the past several weeks, Pathet Lao forces have been attacking neutralist and conservative forces in this area [-Central Laos]. According to the Prime Minister 2 and other Lao officials, North Vietnamese troops are supporting the Pathet Lao in these operations. This area has been under neutralist control since 1960.

In June of 1963, the neutralists were forced to abandon Lak Sao and their headquarters at Nommarath, as a result of Pathet Lao pressures.

"Japanese-Korean discussions were resumed on Dec. 3 (see The New York Times, Dec. 4, 1964).

'Department of State files. The text of the Geneva Accords is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075–1083. "Prince Souvanna Phouma.

The neutralists then consolidated their forces around NaKay, but remained under Pathet Lao pressure.

Since early in January, Pathet Lao attacks have been intensified. In addition, the Pathet Lao have moved closer to Thakhek. This is on the Mekong River.

They [-the Pathet Lao-] are supported by the Viet-Minh. We have always known that. There has from time to time been information that some Viet-Minh were among the officer corps, but, by and large, they remain Pathet Lao forces.

As you remember, in keeping with the Accords, we withdrew our forces. But we were never able to verify that, in fact, the outside Communist forces have been withdrawn.

Suffice to say that continued action by the Pathet Lao in this case is a violation of the Geneva Accords, and it continues that way. Now, unless and until the Accords are adhered to, you won't be able to establish a truly neutral government.

I am not prepared to say that [, the Accords having been violated, the United States is free to go back into Laos].

Document IX-90

United States Desire for a Truly Neutral Laos: REPLY MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) TO A QUESTION ASKED AT A News CONFERENCE, MARCH 6, 1964 3

3

The principal objective, as far as we are concerned, is to get everybody else to leave Laos alone. We don't need Laos as an ally; the other side doesn't need Laos as an ally. Those 2 million people could be left alone to pursue their own course. It would be better, certainly, for the Laotian people and, I think, better for the rest of the world.

Now, we had some solemn agreements in 1962 that would have produced this result. The Pathet Lao and Hanoi, with the support of Peiping, have not honored these agreements. And so we must try to work toward the full implementation of the accords of '62. If not, then we will have some serious questions ahead of us, and I don't want to speculate on those.

Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 23, 1964, p. 446.

'Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075-1083.

Document IX-91

United States Continued Support for the Royal Government of National Union in Laos: STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, APRIL 19, 1964 5

We are maintaining a close watch on developments in Laos and are in touch with our Embassy there. The U.S. Government has fully supported, and we continue fully to support, the Geneva agreements of 1962 and the Royal Government of National Union."

We are therefore categorically opposed to any seizure of power and are urging immediate release of the neutralists as a first step toward restoring the situation."

Document IX-92

United States Reconnaissance Flights Over Laos in Response to a Request for Aid From the Royal Lao Government: STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MAY 21, 1964

We are working with the Royal Lao Government in response to its request to assist in every way possible in supplementing its information on intentions and dispositions of attacking forces. For this purpose certain U.S. reconnaissance flights have been authorized in view of the current inability of the International Control Commission to obtain adequate information.10 Information obtained will be turned over as rapidly as possible to the International Control Commission.

Document IX-93

Continuation of United States Reconnaissance Flights Over Laos: STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, JUNE 11, 1964 11

11

There has been no change in the matter of photo reconnaissance flights.12 They will be undertaken as necessary and in close consultation with the Royal Government of Laos.

3

Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1964, p. 703. The statement was read to correspondents by the Director of the Office of News (Phillips).

6 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1072-1083. 'The neutralist government of Prince Souvanna Phouma had just been overthrown by a right wing coup. The Prime Minister, however, was returned to power within a few days, following representations by the Western Powers, the Soviet Union, and India, all of whom opposed the coup. On May 2 Prince Souvanna Phouma announced the merger of the neutralist and right wing factions. Subsequently, the Pathet Lao launched a heavy offensive against neutralist forces on the Plaine des Jarres in central Laos (see infra). Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1964, p. 994, footnote 1.

9 See footnote 7 to doc. IX-91, supra.

10

The ICC had been denied access to areas controlled by the Pathet Lao. 11 Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1964, p. 995.

12 See supra.

As I have said before, we have been in full consultation with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on this problem. Yesterday's meeting between Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Ambassador [Leonard] Unger was part of the continuing consultation process. We share the conviction of the Lao Government that the refusal of the Communists to allow any effective functioning by the ICC combined with Pathet Lao-Viet Minh recent actions of aggression has created an urgent and continuing need for reliable information on eastern Laos. It is for that reason that we agreed to undertake reconnaissance flights.

These flights have taken place and will take place at the intervals necessary for the purpose of obtaining information. We have a clear understanding on this matter with the Laos Government, and we are in agreement with that Government also that it is not in the interest of the Government of Laos or of those who undertake these hazardous missions that any operational part of their work should be discussed.13

Document IX-94

Chinese Communist Complaint Against "Deliberate Provocation" by the United States in Laos: LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE "PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA" (CHEN YI) TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAOTIAN QUESTION (BUTLER AND GROMYKO), JUNE 13, 1964 14

Six U.S. fighter-bombers intruded into the air space of Khang Khay, the seat of the former Royal Laotian Government, at 10:00 a.m. on June 11, and carried out wanton bombing and strafing, destroying the quarters of the Chinese Economic and Cultural Mission in Laos, killing one and wounding five of the staff members of the Chinese Mission. This is another incident of deliberate provocation by the U.S. Government and a grave step taken by it to extend its direct armed intervention and aggression in Laos.15

The Chinese Government and people are greatly indignant at this incident. Now that the situation has grown so serious, the Co-Chairmen must not remain silent any more but must discharge their duties by taking immediate measures to stop such acts of naked aggression and provocation by the United States. The increasing deterioration of the Laotian situation shows that the 14-nation conference must be speedily convened and must not be put off any longer.

16

The State Department had announced on June 6 and 7 that American planes on reconnaissance flights were shot down over Laos on each of those days (see Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1964, p. 994). On June 8, the Department stated that permission had been granted for armed escort planes to accompany these reconnaissance flights, with the approval of the Laotian Government (see The New York Times, June 9, 1964).

14 Peking Review, June 19, 1964, p. 8.

15

The text of a statement issued by the Government of the "People's Republic of China" protesting the alleged bombing of its mission is printed ibid., pp. 7-8. On June 15, Jenmin Jih Pao, official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, printed an editorial strongly criticizing American policy in Laos and rejecting a denial of responsibility for the bombing at Khang Khay which had been issued by the American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos. The editorial said: "Peace in Indo-China and Southeast Asia is hanging by a thread." (Text ibid., pp. 8-10.)

Of nations party to the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos (text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075-1083).