No one can visit Japan for long without being aware of its special interest in mainland China, as deep as our own, but different in perspective. Ambassador Takeuchi gives us insight into this perspective when he said before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on February 25:

Continental China was, you might say, the fount of Japanese culture. Before the second World War, the Chinese continent was an important source of raw materials for the Japanese economy and at the same time an important market for Japanese products. The Japanese recall with regret the time when they sent their troops to the Chinese mainland, over a sustained period, to occupy the land and to inflict damages and impose upon its people. As Prime Minister Ikeda said recently in his speech to the Diet, the Japanese people are conscious, day and night, of the presence of 700 million Chinese on the China mainland separated from us only by a narrow strip of water. The Japanese people have always known from history that these Chinese were by nature peace-loving, highly intelligent, and that for many centuries they succeeded, time and again, in freeing themselves from the oppression of foreigners and foreign culture.

The Japanese press and public do not view quite as we do the links we are persuaded exist between Peiping and Hanoi, Hanoi and the Viet Cong, nor share our fears and anxieties about Peiping's conduct.75

74

Reflective Americans date their knowledge of China mainly from the early 19th-century voyages of New England's clipper ships and the evangelistic drive which took our first missionaries across the Pacific. Today they are raw from the disillusionments and Communist betrayals of 1945-49, the wounds of Korea, and deep conviction that except for China the Communist siege of Saigon could more swiftly be turned back.

The Government of Japan is as aware as we of a common security problem. But for the people of Japan-presented with today's headlines-it is not only the mass, the proximity, and the melancholy recollection of military adventure that obsesses imagination; China's past glory echoes deep in Japan's racial memory, and has for a thousand years.

So long as Japan's perspectives and ours, Japan's knowledge and ours, Japan's experience and ours, can be exchanged and combined in ever deepening understanding of the formidable problems of our era-not least of all, those in and with China-the free world possesses assets far greater than an arithmetical sum of our separate strength.

To sum up: Japan has emerged from its wartime devastation and dislocation to become a proud equal in every way of the societies of the advanced industrialized countries of the world today. Japan can compete and stand competition.

Tokyo and Washington look out upon the international trading community with similar, if not identical, views on what is needed to create a worldwide nondiscriminatory, competitive environment.

"See post, docs. IX-104 et seq.

"See ante, docs. IX-28 et seq.

Both countries are troubled by the widening gap between the affluent and less developed countries of the world and are exploring methods by trade and by aid to close it.

Both Tokyo and Washington are alert to the financial and fiscal policies of major countries around the world and have devoted their best talent to evolving international mechanisms for forestalling potentially calamitous fluctuations in production, trade, and payments trends worldwide in the less developed countries no less than in those more developed.

Both countries have deep and somber experience with the peoples and institutions of the Communist world, both in Europe and in Asia. Both realize that, in a nuclear age, the patient search for safety must move along varied and precarious paths.

Within the frame of its dynamic and still rapidly developing economic system, the people of Japan are experiencing an improvement of welfare and a flowering of scientific, artistic, intellectual creativity which is the envy of Asia.

In the context of these vast areas of common interest and purpose, our occasional disputes should remain but pinpricks, provided we accord to each other the respect and tolerance due to true partners.

And so I conclude: Japan does have a new destiny in the world at this point in midcentury-not to control or to follow but to dedicate itself to fulfillment of the promise in its present system of social, political, and economic freedom so that neighbors will emulate, participate, and share in its rewards.

Document IX-84

United States-Japanese Agreement on the King Crab Fishery in the Eastern Bering Sea, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON AND ENTERED INTO FORCE, NOVEMBER 25, 1964 76

KOREA

Document IX-85

Korean-United States "Cordial Discussions on Matters of Mutual Interest": JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT SEOUL BY THE PRESIDENT OF KOREA (PARK) AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK), JANUARY 29, 1964 7

77

At the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Korea, Secretary of State Dean Rusk of the United States of America made a visit to the Republic of Korea on January 29, 1964. President Park

76

TIAS 5688; 15 UST 2076. Text of the agreement is also printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 21, 1964, pp. 892-893, along with the text of remarks by Secretary of State Rusk and Japanese Ambassador Takeuchi; see also ante, doc. IX-81.

77 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 17, 1964, pp. 238-239.

Chung Hee and Secretary Rusk held cordial discussions on matters of mutual interest including recent international developments and the situation in Korea.

Secretary Rusk expressed appreciation for President Park's act of friendship and sympathy for the American people in their sorrow when he came to Washington to attend the funeral of the late President John Fitzgerald Kennedy. He brought to President Park the personal greetings of President Lyndon Johnson.

President Park and Secretary Rusk discussed the implications of the recognition of Communist China by France for the security of freeworld countries in the Pacific area.78

President Park explained the current status of the negotiations with the Government of Japan. The two agreed that early completion of these negotiations would be of significant benefit to Korea, to Japan and to general free-world interests. The Secretary assured the President that the basic policy of United States military and economic assistance to the Republic of Korea would not be affected by normalization of relations between Korea and Japan.

Arrangements to ensure the continued defense of the Republic of Korea against Communist aggression were also discussed. It was agreed that powerful Korean and U.S. forces adequate to the defense of the Republic of Korea would be maintained in order to meet the continuing Communist menace in the Far East.

It was agreed that the Republic of Korea was making good progress toward economic independence but would continue to require economic aid for the further development of the Korean economy. It was also agreed that it is important to stabilize the national economy and to make the best possible uses of all the resources available.80 They also noted that the status-of-forces negotiations have made good progress, and were confident that progress would continue to achieve earliest possible agreement.

President Park and Secretary Rusk reaffirmed the friendship between the two countries and pledged themselves to continued cooperation in the economic, monetary, and political fields.

At the same time other high United States and Korean officials met together in several separate meetings to discuss activities of common interest: Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges with Minister of Commerce and Industry Lee Pyong-ho and Minister of Transportation Kim Yun-ki; Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz with Minister of Health and Social Affairs Park Chu-pyong; Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Walter W. Heller with Deputy Prime Minister Kim Yu-taek, Finance Minister Park Dong-kyu and the Governor of the Bank of Korea Kim Se-yon; and Under Secretary of the Interior James K. Carr and Under Secretary of Agriculture Charles S. Murphy with Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Won Yong-sok. These meetings were of great benefit in developing a closer understanding between the two Governments.

See ante, docs. IX-29–34.

79 See post, docs. IX-87-88. 29 See infra.

219-262-67- -63

Document IX-86

United States Approval of Korean Reform of Its Monetary Exchange Rate System: STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK), MAY 3, 1964 81

I have been informed that on May 3, 1964, the Government of the Republic of Korea undertook a major reform of its exchange rate system, initiating a unitary, flexible exchange rate.82 I understand this action was taken in agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

I am pleased to note this important step toward the strengthening of Korea's foreign exchange earning capability and the establishment of equilibrium in her external accounts. The new flexible rate will be an effective means to achieve these purposes.

The United States will continue to cooperate with the Government of the Republic of Korea toward the success of the 1964 stabilization program and toward the solution of the country's balance-of-payments problems.

A new basis now is being laid for investment in industry, expan sion of exports, rising employment, and the broad economic and social progress which Korea's energetic and capable people can achieve, with government and private financial assistance from the United States and from other countries. The United States looks forward to expanding its development lending program in support of sustained Korean efforts.

Document IX-87

"Continued... Efforts To Promote United Nations Objectives in Korea": FOURTEENTH REPORT OF THE U.N. COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA, SUBMITTED AUGUST 26, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 83

Since the signing of the last annual report on 23 August 1963, the Commission, and the Committee acting on its behalf, has continued its efforts to promote United Nations objectives in Korea and to seek a proper and early settlement of

"Department of State Bulletin, May 25, 1964, p. 830. The statement was read to news correspondents by the Deputy Director of the Office of News (McCloskey), Department of State.

82 The Korean Government devalued the won by establishing a unitary flexible exchange rate system with a floor of 255 won to $1 (U.S.), replacing the unitary fixed rate system of 130 won to $1 (U.S.).

U.N. doc. A/5812, pp. 1-7, 10-14. The Report covered the period Aug. 23, 1963-Aug. 26, 1964. The UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) was composed of representatives from Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey. Its Committee, composed of representatives of Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey, was established in 1956 with authority to act on behalf of UNCURK (see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, p. 830).

64 Text ibid., 1963, pp. 790-796.

the Korean question. Such endeavours, however, have again been subject to limitations caused by the continued non-acceptance of the United Nations principles and resolutions on the unification of Korea by the North Korean authorities.

The Commission, pursuant to its mandate, has continued to be available for observation and consultation in the development of representative government in Korea. It has followed closely the general political and economic developments in the Republic of Korea, and has travelled and consulted freely.

As in the observation of the national referendum on the new Constitution, the Government again took the initiative of extending invitations to UNCURK to conduct observations of the presidential and National Assembly elections held on 15 October and 26 November 1963, respectively.

86

UNCURK observed the peaceful transition of the Government from the military to civilian control, and the functioning of the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of the Government as well as that of the political parties.

The transition to civilian control was completed by the inauguration of President Park Chung Hee and the convocation of the National Assembly on 17 December 1963, thereby bringing into being, as pledged, a duly constituted representative government under the Third Republic.

The members of the Commission had occasion, collectively and individually, to confer with leaders of the Government and political parties who have both maintained close and cordial co-operation with UNCURK and reaffirmed their determination to continue such co-operation in the future.

97

The current position of the United Nations on the Korean question is that which has been hitherto reaffirmed by the General Assembly. The most recent reaffirmation was effected in resolution 1964 (XVIII) of 13 December 1963 (see paragraph 21 above).s The reaffirmation is also applicable to the First Committee's decision on the question of invitations (see paragraphs 16-18 above).

Following the submission of its annual report, dated 23 August 1963, to the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, the Commission continued to observe closely developments in respect to the question of unification. It remained receptive to public and private opinions expressed by Koreans of all walks of life, including government leaders and politicians of both government and opposition parties. The Commission, in this connexion, has continued to be available to all concerned in order to fulfil its mandate from the United Nations regarding the attainment of the latter's objectives.

UNCURK takes this opportunity to report that during the period under review the Government of the Republic of Korea, both under the latter part of the military administration and since the resumption of civilian control as from 17 December 1963 with the advent of the Third Republic, continued its adherence to the United Nations stand on Korean unification. Regrettably, however, the Communist authorities to the North were as negative as ever before in their rejection of the competence and authority of the world Organization to deal with the Korean question and in their refusal to enable UNCURK to fulfil its obligations. Such a negative attitude towards the United Nations stand has further delayed a proper, equitable, and definitive settlement in Korea.

Nevertheless, the Commission maintains that a realistic and peaceful settlement in accordance with established and reaffirmed principles of the Organization is still the only proper solution to the division of Korea and its people. It also believes firmly that such a settlement arrived at in a speedy and equitable manner would not only fulfil the national aspiration of the Korean people, but also

See ibid., pp. 804-805.

See ibid., p. 796.

Text ibid., pp. 804-805.

Not printed here.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 798-801.

*Not printed here.