formulation and presentation of U.S. positions at international disarmament meetings.

Expenditures of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission are estimated to be unusually high in fiscal years 1964 and 1965 because of special payments of war claims to the Philippines.29 These payments are scheduled for completion in December 1964.

Document I-3

"The First Purpose of Our Foreign Policy... Is To Defend Freedom": ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) AT THE BARNARD COLLEGE 75TH ANNIVERSARY DINNER, NEW YORK, JANUARY 22, 1964 (EXCERPT) 30

The cause of freedom has been the central commitment of our nation since its birth. It is the central issue in the world struggle in which we are engaged. The first purpose of our foreign policy, and of the military power which supports it, is to defend freedom-without war, if possible. Our foreign policy is designed also to strengthen freedom wherever it exists and to promote it by peaceful means where it is still suppressed. Tonight I should like to summarize the state of the cause of freedom in the world, as I see it.

A realistic appraisal must take full account of dangers, some active, others latent. There are active dangers in Southeast Asia and in the Caribbean. Those who now rule Hanoi and Habana are infiltrating arms and agents across international borders to foment Communist insurrection within other nations.

In Laos there is an uneasy truce.31 The Communists continue to refuse to cooperate with the Government of National Union.82 Hanoi still has troops in Laos in violation of the Geneva accords of 1962.33 And it is using the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" through Laos to reinforce the Communist guerrillas in South Viet-Nam.34

With the help of new cadres trained in North Viet-Nam and new supplies of weapons and ammunition from the north, the Viet Cong have stepped up their activities in South Viet-Nam. This course of action is dangerous for those who refuse to leave their neighbors alone. The Government of South Viet-Nam has set in motion new measures, political and economic as well as military, which will, I believe, bear good fruit.

The 15,000 military men we have there to support and assist the South Vietnamese are proof of our own commitment to the independence of that brave people.

29

Now and then somebody suggests that a conference be called to

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 829–831; post, doc. IX-101.

"Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 10, 1964, pp. 190–195.

34

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 806–818.

See ibid., 1962, p. 1072, footnote 97.

Text ibid., pp. 1075-1083.

See post, docs. IX-104 et seq.

"neutralize" South Viet-Nam; nothing is said about "neutralizing" North Viet-Nam. With Hanoi ruled by aggressive Communists, this is a prescription for a Communist takeover in South Viet-Nam. No new conference or agreement is needed. All that is needed is for the North Vietnamese to abandon their aggression. When they renewed it in 1959, no foreign nation had bases or fighting forces in South Viet-Nam. South Viet-Nam was not a member of any alliance. If it was a threat to North Viet-Nam, it was because its economy far outshone the vaunted "Communist paradise" to the north.

We want no bases in South Viet-Nam. We want nothing for ourselves there. But we are determined that this aggression shall not succeed.

Habana continues to encourage and engage in subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere.35 A few weeks ago the Government of Venezuela uncovered a cache of arms from Cuba intended for terrorists whose objective is the destruction of the democratic government of Venezuela.36 The recent unfortunate disturbances in Panama were immediately exploited by terrorists trained in Cuba.37 In seyeral other Latin American countries Castro-trained agents are actively promoting violence and terrorism. This is a situation which requires further measures by the Organization of American States, and in fact the Venezuelan arms cache is being investigated by a special OAS committee with a view to such further action.

The continuing dedication of the Cuban regime to active terrorism and aggression in Latin America is a basic reason for our attitude toward free-world economic ties with Cuba. We cannot accept the contention that trade with Cuba is comparable to ordinary trade with any Communist country. The Castro regime represents an unacceptable intrusion of Marxist-Leninism into the Western Hemisphere. Two years ago the Organization of American States declared it to be incompatible with the inter-American system.38 The OAS has taken various steps to isolate Castro's Cuba and to curb its capacity to do harm. It is considering further steps in order that the Cuban people may regain their freedom and rejoin the inter-American system.

Those countries which for commercial reasons supply Cuba, especially with goods critical to the Cuban economy, are prejudicing the efforts of the countries of this hemisphere to reduce the threat from Cuba. President Betancourt of Venezuela, a prime target of Castro's attacks, recently put the case in these words:

It is not comprehensible that countries that are within the free world . . . trade with a government that is actively promoting communist subversion in the Hemisphere. . . . This [subversion] is a risk and a danger for . . . all the free world.

We agree. During the missile crisis of October 1962,39 it was plain that what happens in Cuba can affect the security of the whole free

Ibid.; also see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 285-286.

33

See post, docs. III-41, et seq.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 326–327. "See ibid., pp. 399-473.

world. We think that free nations outside the Western Hemisphereand especially our allies, whose freedom is so actively bound up with ours should pursue with respect to Cuba policies which harmonize with those of the Organization of American States.

There is danger in Berlin and in Germany so long as the basic right of self-determination is not accorded to the German people."

40

There is danger in other places where Communists continue to tempt the hungry, the frustrated, and the bitter, where they find leverage amid political and social conflict and confusion.

There are dangers arising from disputes within the free world, which communism seeks to exploit. Many are deeply imbedded in history and encrusted with emotion.

In a world in rapid transition we have to learn to live with turbulence. But many acrimonious disputes could be settled, we believe, if the parties concerned and their neighbors put their minds to the task. Peacemaking is not a job for the great powers alone but a duty which all must share.

And finally, among the dangers we cannot forget are those inherent in weapons of almost inconceivable destructive power.

The main task before us is to build the strength and cohesion of the free world.

41

In the North Atlantic our goal remains the further development of a closer partnership between the United States and a uniting Europe.11 There is talk of disarray in the Atlantic alliance. There is no disarray concerning the fundamental purpose for which this alliance was constructed.

There are differences of view about next steps: about how Europe shall be organized, about trade relations both within Europe and with the rest of the world. We should understand two things about these debates. First, they are natural among friends and partners, especially in the absence of acute crises. Secondly, many of them are about essentially European problems, although the United States has a vital interest in their outcome. The present need within the Atlantic alliance is for the European nations to agree about the future of Europe.

The first task of the Atlantic partnership is defense. The heart of NATO remains strong. The combined military power of its members is immense. But, like any living organism, NATO must adapt to a changing environment.

When NATO was set up,12 we had a virtual atomic monopoly and the Soviets had massive conventional superiority. Since then the Soviets have achieved an atomic arsenal and NATO has gained in both conventional and nuclear strength. This makes it even more important that NATO have a force structure capable of deterring, or coping with, a wide range of possibilities-that it should be able to respond with the force appropriate to each threat.

"See post, docs. IV-63-89.

41 See post, docs. IV-1 et seq.

"The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on Apr. 4, 1949; text in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 812-815.

We also recognize the need to share nuclear responsibilities more effectively in NATO. To this end, we have been discussing with interested allies the formation of a multilaterally owned, manned, and operated missile fleet.43 Such a fleet would enable our allies to play a self-respecting role in nuclear deterrence without proliferating national nuclear forces. It could provide a framework within which Europe, as it moves toward unity, could have an increasingly authoritative voice in the use of weapons.

This will be a year of important trade negotiations. We strongly favor lowering the artificial barriers to the flow of goods throughout the free world.44

In Latin America some nations are making steady and hopeful progress; others have been disappointing. The material resources for economic progress are present. We think the will of the people is that progress take place. In both the public and private sectors of Latin American life there are dedicated men, able and willing to bring their skills to bear. This effort is the central task of this hemisphere for the coming decade. The Alliance for Progress is not the cause of present tensions; those tensions arise from the necessity for change. It is aimed at permitting those changes to occur within a climate of political freedom. We shall continue to meet our commitments to the Alliance for Progress.

In the Pacific our task is not merely to turn back the outward thrust of communism. It is to work constructively with the forces of strength and stability gathering in the Philippines, Korea, Thailand, and elsewhere.

Japan has become a major constructive force on the world scene. We welcome the membership of Japan in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as a full partner of the Atlantic nations.45

In South Asia we shall continue to help build the security and prosperity of India and Pakistan, those two great countries whose struggle for the well-being of their citizens has lifted the hearts of free men everywhere. Sensitive to their anxieties, we regret the tragic fact of continuing friction between them.

In Africa, too, nations are moving forward to build the longrun foundations for growth and development: in education, in public health, in agriculture, in early industrialization. We shall help them, as we seek together to complete by peaceful means the historic transition to self-determination.

In Africa, as in the United States and elsewhere, men will be tested to the limit of their wisdom and self-discipline in seeking constructive solutions to serious racial problems. They must find ways to build societies where the rights of citizens to equal social and political status are respected, regardless of the color of their skins.

"See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 381 ff. "See post, docs. II-30, 32-34, 36; also post, docs. XI-10-18.

"The OECD Convention entered into force as regards Japan upon the deposit of its instrument of accession, Apr. 28, 1964; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 392–393.

I shall speak frankly about our foreign aid programs.46 The need for them, which has been explained by every postwar President, has never been more compelling than it is right now. Communism's last chance is to exploit the frustration and the turmoil which is inevitable as nations many of them new nations struggle to modernize themselves. This decade-the 1960's-is the critical decade.

We have approximately 2,700,000 men under arms-nearly 1 million outside the continental United States, ashore or afloat. All of us hope that it won't be necessary to commit them to combat. To undermine our foreign aid program, now costing three to four cents of your Federal tax dollar, would increase the danger of crises whose costs in blood and treasure would dwarf our foreign aid outlays.

Day by day we are working at the job of strengthening the institutions of the free world-above all the United Nations. We hope that the Soviet Union, as well as the other members, will join in steps to improve the procedures of the General Assembly and to strengthen the U.N.'s peacekeeping machinery."

The principles of the charter remain the goal and the inspiration of all who want a world without war, a world of law, a world of peaceful change, a world in which the sovereignty of the human person is secured in peace and social justice.

Now let us look at some developments inside the Communist world. First, the Sino-Soviet dispute: It is not a complete break, and the leaders of totalitarian systems can change course quickly. But, subject to those reservations, the dispute seems to be fundamental and far-reaching, embracing ideology, struggle for influence in other parts of the world, economic interests, state relationships, and personal rivalries.48

To the extent that the dispute is about militancy versus genuine peaceful coexistence, we prefer recognition of the dangers of war in this nuclear age. The Soviets have not abandoned their basic goal of world revolution, nor have they renounced all force for the settlement of international disputes. Nevertheless, we think they show a better understanding than the Chinese Communists of the dangers and meaning of nuclear war. We do not intend to give any Communists anywhere cause to suppose that they can reap dividends by resort to force.

In Eastern Europe there is a visible resurgence of nationalism. Out of this have come two parallel trends: one toward greater autonomy, the other toward increased trade and other contacts with Western Europe and, to some extent, with the United States. Despite the gulf in ideology and political organization, the peoples of Eastern Europe seem to feel a nostalgia for their historic links with the main centers of Western civilization.

All the Communist nations are experiencing internal economic difficulties, and in most of them these difficulties are serious. The Soviet Union is using substantial portions of its limited gold and foreign exchange reserves for foodstuffs in a single year. Meanwhile its rate

* See post, docs. XII-1 et seq.

67 See post, docs. II-11-27.

48 See post, docs. IX-35, 37, 40-41, 43-44, and 50.