discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and that as a first step, the summit conference should reach an agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which will soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, neither to use them against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, nor against each other."

If those countries in possession of huge quantities of nuclear weapons are not even willing to undertake not to use them, how can those countries not yet in possession of them be expected to believe in their sincerity for peace and not adopt possible and necessary defensive measures?

The Chinese Government will, as always, exert every effort to promote the realization of the noble aim of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons through international consultations. Before the advent of such a day, the Chinese Government and people will firmly and unswervingly march along their own road of strengthening their national defenses, defending their motherland, and safeguarding world peace.

We are convinced that nuclear weapons, which are after all created by man, certainly will be eliminated by man.

Document IX-47

"The Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation Is a Reflection of Policies Which Do Not Serve the Cause of Peace": STATEMENT READ TO NEWS CORRESPONDENTS BY THE PRESIDENT (JOHNSON), OCTOBER 16, 1964 48

Document IX-48

United States Observations on the Chinese Communist Detonation of a Nuclear Device: RADIO AND TELEVISION REPORT TO THE NATION BY THE PRESIDENT (JOHNSON), OCTOBER 18, 1964 (EXCERPT) “

49

.. The Chinese nuclear device was exploded at a test site near a lake called Lop Nor, in the Takla Makan desert of the remote central Asian province of Sinkiang.50 The building of this test site had been known to our American intelligence for several years. In recent weeks the rapid pace of work there gave us a quite clear signal that the long and bitter efforts of this regime were leading at last to a nuclear test. At first, in the 1950's, Russia helped the Chinese. This assistance in the spread of nuclear weapons may now be regarded with some dismay in Moscow. We believe that this help was ended in 1960 as the quarrel among the Communists grew sharper. Soviet technicians left suddenly, with their blueprints under their arms, and the unfinished facilities were just left there standing and the expected supplies were cut off. But the Red Chinese kept to their chosen purpose, even as

"See post, doc. X-36.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, vol. II, p. 1357.

49

Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 2, 1964, pp. 610-614. For an excerpt from this report concerning the recent change in leadership in the Soviet Union, see ante, doc. VI-13.

50 See ante, doc. IX-46.

their economic plans collapsed and the suffering of their people increased.

Our own distinguished Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, gave timely warning as the preparations at Lop Nor advanced,51 and when the test occurred I at once told the world that this explosion will not turn Americans and other free peoples from their steady purpose.52

No American should treat this matter lightly. Until this week, only four powers had entered the dangerous world of nuclear exploWhatever their differences, all four are sober and serious states, with long experience as major powers in the modern world. Communist China has no such experience. Its nuclear pretensions are both expensive and cruel to its people. It fools no one when it offers to trade away its first small accumulation of nuclear power against the mighty arsenals of those who limit Communist Chinese ambitions. It shocks us by its readiness to pollute the atmosphere with fallout. But this explosion remains a fact, sad and serious. We must not, we have not, and we will not ignore it.

53

I discussed the limited meaning of this event in a statement on last Friday. The world already knows that we were not surprised; that our defense plans take full account of this development; that we reaffirm our defense commitments in Asia; that it is a long, hard road from a first nuclear device to an effective weapons system; and that our strength is overwhelming now and will be kept that way.

But what I have in my mind tonight is a different part of the meaning of this explosion at Lop Nor. Communist China's expensive and demanding effort tempts other states to equal folly. Nuclear spread is dangerous to all mankind. What if there should come to be 10 nuclear powers, or maybe 20 nuclear powers? What if we must learn to look everywhere for the restraint which our own example now sets for a few? Will the human race be safe in such a day?

The lesson of Lop Nor is that we are right to recognize the danger of nuclear spread, that we must continue to work against it—and we will.

First: We will continue to support the limited test ban treaty," which has made the air cleaner. We call on the world-especially Red China-to join the nations which have signed that treaty.

Second: We will continue to work for an ending of all nuclear tests of every kind, by solid and verified agreement.

Third: We continue to believe that the struggle against nuclear spread is as much in the Soviet interest as in our own. We will be ready to join with them and all the world in working to avoid it.

Fourth: The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.

51 See ante, doc. IX-45.

See supra.

Oct. 16.

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1032-1034.

Document IX-49

Reiteration of United States Opposition to the Militant Policy of Communist China: REPLIES MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) TO QUESTIONS ASKED ON A CBS TELEVISION PROGRAM, NOVEMBER 11, 1964 55

I am very doubtful about that[-the possibility that, if Communist China were admitted to the U.N., she would be easier to deal with and more apt to mollify her hard line]. In the first place, the United Nations is not a reform school. It is an organization of those states that are prepared to commit themselves to the principles of the charter. Peiping has consistently announced to the world a militant doctrine of another sort. They pursued it in practice. Their harsh policy has caused great problems within the Communist world itself, quite apart from concerns, of course, created in the free world. Let me point out that since August 1955 we have had talks with Peiping.50 President Eisenhower started them back then. We had 122 talks through our ambassadors in Geneva, or Prague, or Warsaw, and we are not in a position of not knowing what Peiping thinks; we are in the position that, with contacts, we don't like what we find out. You see in these in these discussions they always start with the proposition that, if there is to be any improvement in relations, we must turn over 11 million free people on Formosa to Peiping. And this we're not going to do. And when that becomes clear, these talks produce no forward motion. So I would think that this is a question of Peiping policywhether they are prepared to live at peace with their neighbors and with the rest of the world. And if they're not prepared to do so, I think we should not encourage them by rewarding them for a policy which is so contrary to the prospects of peace.

I must say that I haven't seen much blue sky ahead in the attitudes of Peiping. They have not been prepared to leave their neighbors alone. They did attack India,57 they are putting pressures on their neighbors in Southeast Asia,58 they do continue to refuse to renounce force in the Formosa Strait. They are engaged in trying to subvert other nations through the usual techniques of Communist penetration. This [matter of whether the United States and Communist China are on a collision course regarding Viet-Nam] turns entirely on Peiping's decision on that crucial question, about whether they are prepared to leave their neighbors alone. We've made it very clear that we are not going to pull away and leave Southeast Asia to be overrun by these people from the north. Therefore, the answer to your question lies to Peiping. We feel that they must come to the decision to

55

Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 30, 1964, p. 772. Secretary Rusk was interviewed by CBS news correspondent Marvin Kalb as part of a program entitled "CBS Reports: The United States and the Two Chinas."

See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, p. 2516.

57 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1015-1027; ibid.,. 1963, pp. 761-762.

58 See post, docs. IX-104 et seq.

50 See footnote 2 to doc. IX-1, ante.

leave these people alone in Southeast Asia. Now, if they don't, then there is trouble ahead. If they will, then there are not any problems there that can't be solved by the ordinary processes of discussion with the nations of Southeast Asia.

We have invested 150 years of affection and interest and effort with the Chinese people. And the fact that they are living in this kind of regime is a matter of deep disappointment to us. These relationships with the Peiping government have nothing to do with our basic attitude toward the Chinese people. And of course, we all look forward to the day when those underlying relationships can be restored and we can express once again that century-long feeling that we have about the Chinese people.

Document IX-50

Discussions Between Soviet and Chinese Communist Government and Party Leaders in a "Frank, Comradely Atmosphere": CoмMUNIQUÉ PRINTED IN Pravda, OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER OF THE CPSU, NOVEMBER 14, 1964 co

INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE KASHMIR QUESTION

Document IX-51

Pakistani Request for a Meeting of the United Nations Security Council To Consider the Kashmir Question: LETTER FROM THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER (BHUTTO) TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL (JUSTINIANO), JANUARY 16, 1964 61

60 The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XVI, No. 46, Dec. 9, 1964, p. 18. The talks took place on the occasion of the visit of Chou En-lai, Premier of the "People's Republic of China" and vice chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC, to Moscow as head of a Communist Chinese delegation attending the 47th anniversary of the Octobrist Revolution. The Soviet delegation for the talks was headed by Leonid I. Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and Alexei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. Subsequent to the talks, announcement was made by the Soviet Union of a decision to postpone the international conference of Communist parties scheduled to open Dec. 15 (see ante, doc. IX-40). A commission was to meet, however, in Mar. 1965 to plan for such a conference.

U.N. doc. S/5517. The Pakistani request called attention to the disturbed situation that had arisen because of "unlawful steps that the Government of India is continuing to take in order to destroy the special status of the State" of Jammu and Kashmir, in contravention of U.N. resolutions (see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, pp. 1171-1172). The letter also pointed out that since the theft on Dec. 26, 1963, of a Muslim relic from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, Muslim demonstrations in Jammu and Kashmir had paralyzed in many parts the life of the state and had caused communal strife and unrest in both India and Pakistan.

On Jan. 24 (U.N. doc. S/5522) the Government of India replied, denying Pakistani allegations of a constitutional change perpetrated by India in violation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, and claiming that no disturbed sit

Document IX-52

"It Must Be Recognized... That the Problem of Kashmir Cannot Be Settled Unilaterally by Either [Pakistan or India]": STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (STEVENSON) IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, FEBRUARY 14, 1964 62

So much has been said on the Kashmir case in this Council over the past 16 years that I shall not impose on your patience by reviewing the case again.

It is a matter of greatest regret to my Government, as it is to so many governments here represented, that India and Pakistan have been unable to reach a settlement either through mechanism set up by the Security Council or in bilateral talks, and that this dispute continues to occupy so much time of the international community. We are also profoundly concerned with the recurring communal disturbances in India and Pakistan which have caused such appalling loss of life, destruction of property, and displacement of peoples and human misery. It is hard for us to understand why these two countries have not found it possible during all of these years of bloodshed and of violence to take joint action to calm this situation and to allay the suffering, to stem the panic and migration of thousands of frightened human beings. Until there is a far greater effort to resolve these problems, they will continue to threaten the integrity and the prosperity of both countries.

I should like today to review just the essentials of the approach which my Government has taken and continues to take toward this everlasting question of Kashmir.

The origin of the dispute is complicated and deeply buried in the history of the great subcontinent. But in 1948 India and Pakistan agreed to the UNCIP [United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan] resolutions 63 as a political compromise of the difficulties which followed from the partition of the subcontinent into two countries and the ensuing dispute over the status of Kashmir. The essence of this compromise was that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should have the right to determine their future without coercion or intimidation from the military forces of either country. Our support of the United Nations resolutions is based on this principle of self-determination. The political compromise has not been fulfilled,

uation existed there. It also pointed out that the holy relic had been recovered (Jan. 4) and restored.

On Feb. 3 the Security Council agreed without objection to include the item in its agenda. It considered the Kashmir question Feb. 3-17, Mar. 17-20, and May 5-18 (see post, docs. IX-52, 55).

02 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 16, 1964, pp. 425–426.

63 Reference is to UNCIP resolutions dated Aug. 13, 1948, and Jan. 5, 1949; texts in United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948 (Department of State publication 3437), pp. 250-252, and U.N. doc. S/1196, pp. 4-6, respectively.