Part IX

THE FAR EAST, SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Document IX-1

United States Policies and Problems in Asia: ADDRESS BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS (BUNDY) BEFORE THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JAPAN, TOKYO, SEPTEMBER 29, 1964 (EXCERPT)1

Secretary of State Dean Rusk recently set forth the five basic elements of our foreign policy. They apply fully in East Asia and are, I think, shared by Japan and by other free nations of the area. I should like to use them as the outline of my remarks today:

1. Security through strength-the efforts of individual free-world nations, supported where necessary by external military assistance, and backed by the strategic nuclear power of the United States-which we earnestly hope we shall never need to use and by our greatly improved and far more mobile conventional and counterguerrilla forces. 2. Progress through partnership the closer association of the more industrialized nations of Western Europe, North America, and Asia— specifically Japan--both in strengthening their own economic ties and in working together to assist the less industrialized nations of the free world.

3. Revolution in freedom-harnessing the great and potentially constructive forces of nationalism and carrying out the revolution of modernization without sacrifice of independence and freedom.

4. Community under law-the gradual emergence of a genuine world community based on cooperation and law, through the establishment and development of such organs as the United Nations, the World Court, the World Bank and Monetary Fund, and other global and regional institutions.

5. Through perseverance, peace-no goal is more important than peace to the American people.

All of these objectives stand squarely in the way of communism's goal of recasting the world in its own image. A central task of our foreign policy is, thus, to cope with the Communist threat-particularly that of Communist China-while at the same time working in

1

Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 19, 1964, pp. 534–539.

(824)

positive terms to promote the economic, social, and political progress of the free nations.

Communist China's foreign policy is fashioned by men whose whole life has been one of struggle, who are thoroughly wedded to a fundamentalist concept of communism, who have grown rigid and intransigent even in the face of overwhelming proof that the 19th-century doctrines of Karl Marx are hopelessly inadequate to meet the 20thcentury problems of China. Monumentally convinced of the correctness of their position, they view all who disagree with them, including even the Russians, as old and bad and decadent. Neutralists are tolerated only to the extent that they are moving in the direction desired by Peiping.

I do not claim to know what their precise goals are. Are these goals to be defined in territorial terms, and, if so, what territories? Or could their goals be better described in terms of their quest for power and status and of gaining control and influence over other nations? Or are their goals directed more at exploiting the divisions and the difficulties of the countries of the free world, especially those in bordering areas? I suspect that all these and other elements are involved. But in any event the record of Communist China's behavior in recent yearsagainst the offshore islands,2 Tibet,3 and India -should leave us in no doubt of her militant and expansionist outlook.

More recently we have evidence in the continuing statements of Chinese Communist leaders, expressed most forcefully in the course of their ideological dispute with the Soviet Union. They say (as in their June 14, 1964, [1963] letter to the Soviet Communist Party) that "two-thirds of the world's population need to make revolution."5 They add that the revolution must be violent: "Violent revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolution. To realize the transition to socialism the proletariat must wage armed struggle, smash the old state machine, and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat." Now it may be argued that the leaders of Communist China do not really mean all that they say, but I think it is a good rule of thumb to believe most of what dictators say about their intentions.

Finally, we should note that the severest indictments of Chinese Communist bellicosity come from the Soviet Union itself, and, because of the close relationship that until recently marked Moscow-Peiping affairs, the Soviet Union may be in a good position to judge what Communist China is up to.

To say that Communist China is fundamentally militant is not inconsistent with the view that she may be tactically cautious when confronted with major force. Unquestionably our United States strategic and conventional capabilities, supplementing the efforts of

* See American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 945–949, 955-956, 963-964; ibid., vol. II, pp. 2323-2326, 2448-2510; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 790–800; ibid., 1957, pp. 1117-1118, 1120; ibid., 1958, pp. 1144-1168, 1169-1180, 1183-1204; ibid., 1959, p. 1167; ibid., 1960, pp. 659–661; ibid., 1961, p. 946; ibid., 1962, pp. 1007-1009; ibid., 1963, pp. 748-749. See ibid., 1959, pp. 1162-1165, 1167–1178, 1180-1187; ibid., 1961, pp. 1037-1042. See ibid., 1962, pp. 1015–1027 ; ibid., 1963, pp. 761-762. "See ibid., pp. 749–751.

3

free Asian nations, have made Communist China reluctant to embark on the older forms of naked aggression. Instead they prefer what Premier Khrushchev has called "wars of national liberation"-support to guerrillas, training of saboteurs, and the creation of Communist-dominated "national fronts." Fortunately Japan and other countries with internal stability and strength are not susceptible to this type of aggression.

I do not say that this will always be the picture of the policy of the Asian Communist nations. They confront tremendous internal problems. Like Communist countries everywhere they have not yet found the answer to the basic problem of agricultural production, much less of carrying out a true industrial or scientific revolution along the lines on which you in Japan have led the way. If their leaders were reasonable, or even pragmatic, the Communist nations of Asia should recognize that they cannot afford to embark on outside adventures and draw upon resources so urgently needed at home.

Thus we do not rule out the possibility that the passage of time will bring about desirable changes in the outlook of Communist China, North Korea, and North Viet-Nam. But clearly this cannot come about unless Communist expansionism is deterred and completely frustrated and unless, too, the conduct of all our relationships with Communist China gives her no encouragement that a continued militant course can be accepted.

So long as Peiping, as well as Hanoi and Pyongyang, continue on their present course, I see no basic change in United States policy toward mainland China. It is inconceivable to me that, at a time when Communist China is stridently proclaiming a militant revolutionary thesis and bearing out its threats with actions that undermine the security of nations both in Asia and Africa and even in the Americas, we should relax our guard. It remains the first requirement of our policy to help maintain adequate free-world military strength in order to deter aggression or, where aggression or threats to the peace occur, to be able to cope with such threats effectively. Without such capability to keep the peace, there can be no peace. Nor can there be any real progress in improving the well-being and satisfying the aspirations of the people in Asia. From this general policy there follow a number of specific applications that bear on the relations between Japan and the United States:

1. We believe that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security concluded between us in 1960 still remains fundamental to our common security. The very fact that we have never needed to invoke the treaty in defense against an attack is proof of its worth. There are those who, for one reason or another, would like to see our defensive arrangements altered or terminated. Admittedly it would be to our advantage if Japan's security could be assured without the enormous drain of money and manpower which the maintenance of our bases here involves. But so long as Japan's Communist neighbors openly

See ibid., 1961, pp. 555-558.

; Text ibid., 1960, pp. 669–676.

proclaim their desire to impose their own economic and political system upon the rest of Asia, our mutual security arrangements would seem essential and the United States will continue to cooperate with the Japanese people in the defense of Japan.

We believe that the presence of our men here gives credibility to our pledge to defend Japan in a way that no mere commitment on paper could achieve. We do not, in short, see any need to alter the fundamental concept of our existing security arrangements until there is real evidence that the threat of aggression has disappeared from the Far East.

8

2. The importance of Okinawa to the security of East Asia remains unchanged. In his statement of March 1962 President Kennedy set forth United States policies for the Ryukyus, which remain unchanged under President Johnson. In that statement, you will recall, President Kennedy reaffirmed the importance the United States attaches to our military bases in the Ryukyus. He went on to say that he recognized the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and looked forward to the day when the security interests of the free world will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty. He then outlined several courses of action to increase the autonomy granted to the Ryukyuan people, to improve their well-being, and to enhance the cooperation of Japan and America in programs of assistance to the islands. Two new joint committees have recently been set up to implement this latter purpose, and it has been made clear that these committees are only a beginning step, not a limiting boundary. I feel confident that the cooperation between Japan and the United States in the Ryukyu Islands will permit the continuance of the essential role of the islands in free-world defense and at the same time will contribute to the welfare of the people and to the solidarity of relations between our two countries.

As you know, our new High Commissioner in the Ryukyus, General [Albert] Watson, was able to visit Japan on his way to take up his post in Okinawa and had highly profitable discussions with the leaders of your Government. We expect to stay in close touch with the Government of Japan on this matter and to continue to work toward the objectives laid down by President Kennedy.

3. We continue to believe that the security of South Korea is essential to the security of Japan. We will continue to support the required level of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea, and these, supplemented by our own forces, will be maintained at a level adequate to prevent repetition from any quarter of the attack of 1950.10 Concurrently, we continue to attach fundamental importance to the economic development and welfare of the Republic of Korea as an integral part of its security and of that of Japan and the United States as well.

4. With regard to your own defense effort here in Japan, our grant military assistance is now naturally drawing to a ciose and is now

8 Text ibid., 1962, pp. 1032–1033.

See post, doc. IX-79.

19 See American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, pp. 2536 ff.

represented by our cooperative efforts particularly in the field of air defense and technical equipment for your naval self-defense forces. It is natural and inevitable that Japan should assume the burden of her own defense to an increasing degree, but at the same time we welcome the continuing consultation made possible by our close and cooperative relationships under the treaty.

5. We recognize the profound implications of the Sino-Soviet rift and the possibility that it may lead to greater tension between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China in the northern regions. But we doubt that the U.S.S.R. has yet abandoned her Communist expansionist aims, and certainly not to the point where in the foreseeable future she could be relied upon to play a constructive role in assisting other nations to defend themselves against Communist China. There may be a long-term hope in this direction, but let us recognize always that the differences between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China are still concerned primarily not with their basic objectives but rather with the degree of violence to be employed to achieve those objectives. And let us recognize too that, to the extent that Soviet policy has changed or may change in the future, this will be in large part due to the fact that we, in partnership with other free-world nations, have maintained a military posture adequate to deter and to defeat any aggressive action.

A word further about the situation in Southeast Asia, especially in South Viet-Nam. Here the aim of our policy is to assist the Government of South Viet-Nam in maintaining its independence and its control over the territory allotted to it by the Geneva accords of 1954.12 We do not aim at overthrowing the Communist regime of North Viet-Nam but rather at inducing it to call off the war it directs and supports in South Viet-Nam.

We believe it essential to the interests of the free world that South Viet-Nam not be permitted to fall under Communist control. If it does, then the rest of Southeast Asia will be in grave danger of progressively disappearing behind the Bamboo Curtain and other Asian countries like India and even in time Australia and your own nation in turn will be threatened. If Hanoi and Peiping prevail in Viet-Nam in this key test of the new Communist tactics of "wars of national liberation," then the Communists will use this technique with growing frequency elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

To prevent a Communist takeover we are pursuing within South Viet-Nam a counterinsurgency approach-involving economic and political measures quite as much as military-similar to that which was successfully used to defeat Communist rebellions in Malaya and the Philippines. Some have urged neutralization, but the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam has specifically rejected such a solution for that area. Neutralization of South Viet-Nam alone would, therefore, simply be a step toward a Communist takeover, as the Communists themselves know in pushing it as an interim course for South Viet

11 See post, docs. IX-104-145.

12 Texts in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 750-788.