If I say little on this occasion about the state and development of relationships among the organizations constituting the United Nations family, it is not because the importance of these relationships has in any way diminished. Quite the contrary, the close inter-agency co-operation which has developed over the years becomes increasingly important with every expansion in the range and scope of international action for economic and social betterment. Eloquent testimony to the vitality and effectiveness of this co-operation is provided by the history of the consultations leading to the proposals to combine the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in a single United Nations Development Programme, proposals which the Economic and Social Council has now placed before the General Assembly. It was indeed a remarkable achievement that full agreement could be reached in the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination on draft proposals dealing with issues so profoundly affecting the interests of all the members of the United Nations family.

In the course of the past year, difficulties have arisen, in a number of meetings held or sponsored by specialized agencies, as a result of objections raised by delegations to the participation of representatives of certain Member States. My own attitude towards the policy of apartheid and racial discrimination, or the continuance of colonialism, in any form is well known and I can well understand the feelings that have given rise to such objections. At the same time, I am deeply conscious, as are my colleagues in the Administrative Committee on Coordination, of the importance of avoiding any impairment of constructive international work for human betterment. In the summer of last year, I emphasized to a delegation of the Governing Body of the International Labour Organisation, which came to consult me concerning the problem of the membership of South Africa in that organization, that I attach importance to the agencies in the United Nations family avoiding divergent action on major political issues and to full regard being given by the agencies to whatever position is taken on such matters by the principal political organs of the United Nations. This continues to represent my thinking and my hope.

33

In August 1963, the Economic and Social Council endorsed 2 the broad outlines of a plan I submitted under General Assembly resolution 1827 (XVII) for the establishment of a United Nations training and research institute. I expressed the view that such an institute could make a unique contribution towards achieving the targets of the United Nations Development Decade and enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations itself. By resolution 1934 (XVIII),* the General Assembly requested me to take the necessary steps to establish the institute and to continue to explore for it possible sources of financial assistance, both governmental and non-governmental.

Early in 1964, I appointed a personal representative to visit various countries, to explain the purposes of the institute and to seek financial assistance towards its establishment. More than thirty countries have now made substantial pledges of financial support for the institute, and an almost equal number have indicated their intention to contribute. I consider that the support from Member Governments, both moral and material, is more than adequate to justify the establishment of the institute.

Our hopes of substantial assistance from non-governmental sources towards the establishment of the institute have not yet been fully realized. However, thanks to a generous donation from the Rockefeller Foundation, the institute has been able to acquire a home of its own. I hope that once the institute is established further support will be forthcoming from Governments, and also from non-governmental sources. It is my intention to appoint the members of the institute's board of trustees in the very near future and to call a first meeting of the board early in 1965. I am confident that in due course the institute will make a significant contribution to the work of the United Nations for the promotion of peace and progress.

32

In Res. 985 (XXXVI), Aug. 2, 1963; text in U.N. ECOSOC Official Records, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1 (E/3816), p. 38.

33

Text in U.N. General Assembly Offiicial Records, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/5217), p. 19.

34 Text in U.N. doc. A/5515, p. 27.

V

From a small nucleus at Lake Success in 1949, the United Nations International School has grown in enrolment to 570 children from sixty-eight countries in the current year. During all these years the School has been housed in one makeshift building after another.

35

Under resolution 1982 (XVIII), the General Assembly requested me to continue to lend my good offices to the Board of Trustees of the School in seeking financial and other assistance from both governmental and private sources for the construction and equipment of a proper school building and the creation of an endowment fund.

A survey of the needs of the staff for school facilities indicated that the student body might number in the vicinity of 750 by next year. It was also felt that provision should be made for admitting to the School students from New York City who are not directly connected with the United Nations, and that the target should be a total enrolment of 1,000 pupils.

Our efforts to find financial support for the school building met with success earlier this year, when the Ford Foundation showed considerable interest in the financing of the building, following my proposal to locate the School at the northern end of the Headquarters site. Although the Ford Foundation has not yet made a formal announcement of the donation, I should like to take this opportunity to thank the Foundation in advance for its generosity towards the School. I hope that, early in the nineteenth session, the General Assembly will approve the proposed location of the School at the northern end of the Headquarters site. Financial assistance is still required for building up an endowment fund to a level which would enable the School to be self-sufficient in the future. I shall count on the generosity of both governmental and nongovernmental sources so that the target of the endowment fund may be reached at an early date.

20

VI

On 29 June 1964, I submitted a report to the Security Council which dealt with the withdrawal of the United Nations Force in the Congo, which had then just been completed, and the continuation of United Nations civilian assistance in the Congo. Little needs to be added here to what was said in that report beyond the observation that, immediately following the withdrawal of the United Nations Force, some of our worst fears for the Congo began to be realized and our apprehensions about that country's future were very great.

In view of the serious deterioration in the internal security situation in the Congo since the withdrawal of the Force, it is only natural that the question should be asked why the Force was withdrawn in the first place, since the course of events that might be expected to follow the withdrawal of the Force could have been anticipated. The answer is that there was no decision by the competent organs of the United Nations to extend the mandate of the Force, and there was no request from the Government of the Congo for any extension of the Force beyond the end of June 1964. Without such a request there could be no basis for any United Nations action involving the continued presence of the United Nations Force in the Congo after last June. The Force was sent to the Congo in the first place in answer to the urgent appeal of the Congolese Government; it remained there for almost four years at the desire of that Government; it could not remain there after 30 June without a further request from the Government. Indeed, after December 1963 there was never any intimation from the Government of the Congo of any wish to have the United Nations Force stay on after June 1964.3

I cannot say, of course, how the United Nations would have responded had there been a request from the Government for a continuance of the United Nations Force in the Congo beyond June 1964 up to which date funds had been sanctioned by the General Assembly; but such a request most certainly would

Text ibid., pp. 61-62.

U.N. doc. S/5784 and Corr.

and 2; see post, doc. VIII-15.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 523 ff.

28

See ibid., 1963, pp. 667–677.

have been given serious consideration. There was, however, an evident feeling in some quarters that the United Nations could not maintain an armed force in the Congo indefinitely, and that far too much had already been expended for

this purpose.

Much of the disorder in the Congo thus far has been due basically to the spectacular failure of the Congolese National Army. There are other factors, of course, especially the lack of preparation of the Congolese people for independence in 1960. It will be recalled, however, that a major event influencing the future of the Congo occurred when, within a few days following the country's independence, the Congolese National Army-one of the largest and best armed armies of Africa-mutinied and ceased to be a positive factor for security, law and order in the country. This led to the reappearance of Belgian troops, and started the chain of events which caused the Government, then headed by Mr. Kasavubu and Mr. Lumumba, to appeal to the United Nations for military and other assistance. The United Nations could not ignore that appeal without losing the confidence of most of the world. In responding to it, the United Nations served the interests of the peace of Africa and of the world, as well as those of the Congo, by preventing a power vacuum in the very heart of Africa which would have been extremely grave, with the inevitable risk of East-West confrontation as well as inter-African rivalry and conflict.

As I have reported previously, recognizing how vital it would be to the future of the Congo to have its Army made effective and dependable through retraining and reorganization in order that it might regain a reasonable measure of discipline and morale, repeated efforts were made by the United Nations to induce the Government of the Congo to accept United Nations assistance in the retraining and reorganization of the Army. Indeed, at one stage the personal approval of Prime Minister Adoula was given to me directly for the United Nations training plan, based mainly on assistance to be provided by other African countriesand we proceeded to make arrangements and even recruit personnel for that purpose-but I understand that the Prime Minister was unable to obtain the approval of the Commander of the Army, General Mobutu, for the project."

It would seem advisable also to clear up one more misconception about the Congo, which concerns the often falsely reported attitude of the United Nations towards Mr. Moïse Tshombé, who is now the Prime Minister. The United Nations Operation in the Congo, having been directed by the Security Council to seek, among other things, to preserve the territorial integrity of the country, to prevent civil war and to eliminate mercenaries, was inevitably opposed to the attempted secession of Katanga. While sparing no effort to achieve a peaceful solution, it did what it could, in collaboration with the Government of the Congo, to prevent the attempted secession from becoming an accomplished fact. It succeeded in its objective. The attempted secession of Katanga was led by Mr. Tshombé, as President of that Province. Although the United Nations operation thwarted the Katanga secessionist effort," it never failed to recognize Mr. Tshombé as President of the Province of Katanga, a position to which he had been duly elected.

The Government of the Congo has recently turned to the Organization of African Unity for assistance in helping it to re-establish peace, law and order in the Congo. That organization acted on this appeal by setting up an ad hoc committee, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of Kenya, Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, with a view to assisting the Congo (Leopoldville) to normalize its relations with its neighbours, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi in particular, and to exercising its good offices in an effort to secure a solution to the problem of the Congo by means of conciliation. I hope that this effort will prove helpful. Although the prevailing picture of the Congo may be dark and unpromising, that country has demonstrated remarkable resilience throughout the troubles which have beset it since its independence. The resources of the country are rich. Surprises are frequent in the Congo, and it should not be excluded that the country, realizing that it no longer has a United Nations Force to depend upon for internal security, will in time muster the will and the ability to attain

"See ibid., 1962, p. 832; ibid., 1963, pp. 657, 664-665.

"See ibid., pp. 650-652.

both security and political stability. For the sake of the Congo and its people, for the sake of the continent of Africa and for the cause of peace, I most earnestly hope that this will be so.

Meanwhile, it is worth recalling that, in its four years in the Congo, the United Nations operation reduced to a minimum the risk of East-West conflict there; it prevented the country from being engulfed in civil war, of tribal or other origins; it greatly helped to preserve the territorial integrity of the country; it was mainly responsible for restoring some semblance of law and order throughout the country; it eliminated completely the mercenaries of Katanga, some of whom have now reappeared in Leopoldville; and it provided, and continues to provide, a great amount of technical assistance. These are certainly achievements of lasting value.

It is sometimes forgotten that, although the United Nations Force has withdrawn from the Congo, the largest United Nations Technical Assistance/Special Fund operation anywhere in the world, at present consisting of approximately 2,000 persons, is still found in that country. The main reason for the comparatively large size of this programme is that the voluntary Congo fund, and various funds in trust, have made it possible until now to finance substantial extra-budgetary assistance programmes under the aegis of the United Nations civilian operations in the Congo. Even though there have been some indications that a few countries might be prepared to make voluntary contributions to the Congo fund on a matching basis for the year 1965-1966, I do not intend, in view of the generally disappointing response to my appeal in 1964, to make a further general appeal to Member States to contribute to the fund in 1965.

Today, United Nations technical assistance is undertaking the functions of the civilian operations programme in providing the backbone of many of the essential services and much of the public administration of the Congo. It is heartening to report that, despite the recent alarming situation in the Congo, many experts are still willing to serve there under the United Nations, and I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the constancy, skill and courage of the great many doctors, teachers, agricultural advisers, meteorologists, telecommunications experts, magistrates, airfield control staff, public works experts to name only a few categories-who have continued their work in the Congo under very difficult, and often dangerous and highly unpredictable, conditions. Many of them, in addition to their regular work, have in troubled times provided a nucleus for rehabilitation in areas and towns where normal life had been seriously disrupted. The work of these devoted men and women is a matter for legitimate pride on the part of the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

VII

Since last March, the United Nations peace-keeping effort in Cyprus has been a major concern of the Organization, and I have been reporting on it in detail to the Security Council from time to time. The United Nations Force in Cyprus has already served two three-month terms in the island and its mandate was extended for a third three-month term by the Security Council on 25 September 1964."

The mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus has been to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order, and to a return to normal conditions there. The Force has done much more than might have been expected of it towards the fulfilment of that mandate. The Commanders of the Force, General Gyani and later General Thimayya, the officers and men of the national contingents and the civilian members of the United Nations Secretariat associated with them have, in most difficult and complex conditions, performed their duties with signal devotion and effectiveness. I should also like to pay tribute to the valuable services of my Special Representatives, first Mr. Spinelli, then Mr. Galo Plaza, and now Mr. Bernardes.

4U.N. doc. S/5987; post, doc. IV-138.

The situation in Cyprus is, by any measure, a grim and formidable one, and it is sufficient here to recall that, in spite of the highly inflammable state of affairs which prevails in the island, there have been so far, while the Force has been in Cyprus, only two outbreaks of serious fighting, both of which were quickly contained and halted, the first of these in the St. Hilarion area in late April, and the second in the Kokkina area in early August.

Despite the great obstacles to a return to normal conditions in the island, and, indeed, to any quick solution of the problems of Cyprus, some progress has been made in reducing the dangers and discomforts under which some parts of the population of Cyprus have been living, and it is to be hoped that this progress will continue, with increasingly beneficial results.

As regards the efforts to resolve the long-term problems of Cyprus through the United Nations Mediator, it is not possible at this stage to report any significant advance. The work of Ambassador Tuomioja, the first Mediator, whose tragic death interrupted his painstaking and persistent attempts to find an acceptable solution, is now carried on by Mr. Galo Plaza, who brings to the task of Mediator valuable first-hand experience of the situation in Cyprus from his service as my Special Representative there." It is certain that Mr. Plaza will spare no effort in seeking a peaceful solution, taking advantage of the relative quiet which the presence of the Force has produced.

The financial arrangements to support the Force, in accordance with paragraph 6 of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 4 March 1964," have proved to be far from satisfactory. As I had occasion to state to the Council in my reports on the conduct of the Cyprus operation, the method of financing the Force has been inadequate and funds have been received in such manner, as regards both pledges and payment of pledges, as seriously to hamper the planning, efficiency and economical running of the Force.

VIII

In the introduction to the annual report last year, I referred to the agreement reached with the Governments of Cambodia and Thailand on the desirability of appointing a special representative in the area who would place himself at the disposal of the parties to assist them in solving all the problems that had arisen or might arise between them." The most immediate of these concerned the reactivation of the 15 December 1960 agreement on press and radio attacks and the lifting of certain air transit restrictions. It was hoped that in due time consideration might be given to the resumption of diplomatic relations. The expenses of this mission were to be shared on an equal basis by the two Governments. December 1963, at the request of the two Governments, the appointment of the Special Representative was extended for another year.“

In

During the period under review, the Special Representative has continued to serve as an intermediary between the two Governments on a number of questions, such as the exchange of prisoners, and is at present assisting them in solving the problems that have arisen in connexion with the closing of their respective diplomatic missions in Bangkok and Phnom-Penh. Meanwhile, however, the Government of Thailand has given notice that it is not in favour of continuing the services of the mission on a permanent basis, and has suggested that consideration may be given to dispatching a high-ranking member of the Secretariat on ad hoc missions to the area to discuss the situation with the leaders of the two countries and then make appropriate suggestions. Its views have been communicated to the Government of Cambodia which, while taking a different view of the value of such missions, has agreed to these suggestions in principle. The mission of the Special Representative will, therefore, be discontinued towards the end of 1964."

42

Galo Plaza became U.N. Mediator on Sept. 16, succeeding Ambassador Sakari Tuomioja who had died on Sept. 9.

43 U.N. doc. S/5575; post, doc. IV-105.

44

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 63–64. 45 See ibid., p. 743.

"See post, doc. IX-25.